Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue by Editors, Journal
Journal X 
Volume 2 
Number 2 Spring 1998 Article 8 
2020 
Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue 
Journal Editors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx 
Recommended Citation 
Editors, Journal (2020) "Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue," Journal X: Vol. 2 : No. 2 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/8 
This Complete Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the English at eGrove. It has been accepted for 












 Blaise Cendrars, and the Poem as Fashion Design  
CARRIE NOLAND
All Hopped Up:
Beer, Cultivated National Identity, and Anglo-Dutch Relations, 1524-1625
GEORGE EVANS LIGHT
"Blood Will Have Blood":
Power, Performance, and Lady Macbeth's Gender Trouble
CRISTINA LEÓN ALFAR
Teaching to Strike:
Labor Relations in and out of the Classroom
MICHAEL SPRINKER
"In this life, we want nothing but Facts ..."
CRYSTAL BARTOLOVICH
Reading for Pleasure (Essay Review):




Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Volume 2 • Number 2 • Spring 1998
CONTENTS
High Decoration: Sonia 
Delaunay,
 Blaise Cendrars,  






 Beer, Cultivated National Identity,  




"Blood Will Have Blood":
Power, Performance, and Lady Macbeth's Gender Trouble
Cristina
 














Reading for Pleasure (Essay Review):





R. Urgo  237
2
Journal X, Vol. 2 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/8
Journal x
A Journal in Culture & Criticism
Ivo Kamps and Jay Watson, editors
 
Donald Kartiganer, advisory editor
Advisory Board
Sharon Achinstein, Northwestern U
 
John Archer, U of
 
New Hampshire  
Ann Ardis, U of
 
Delaware  
Andrew Barnaby, U of Vermont
 Christopher Beach, U of
 
Montana  
Richard Begam, U of Wisconsin
 Nancy Bentley, U of
 
Pennsylvania  
Nicholas Bromell, U of
 
Massachusetts  
Douglas Bruster, U of Texas, San Antonio
 Deborah Clarke, Pennsylvania State U
 Gwen E. Crane, SUNY, Oneonta College
 Roland Greene, U of 
Oregon Minrose C. Gwin, U of 
New Mexico  
Allan Hepburn, U of Toronto
 Martin Kreiswirth, U of Western Ontario
 Richard Kroll, U of California, Irvine
 Jayne Lewis, U of California, Los Angeles
 Ruth Lindeborg, Ohio State U
 Tom Lutz, U of
 
Iowa
Robert Mack, Vanderbilt U
 John T. Matthews, Poston U
 Brian May, U of
 
North Texas
Michael Valdez Moses, Duke U
 




Yopie Prins, U of
 
Michigan
Peter Schmidt, Swathmore College
 Lisa Schnell, U of Vermont
Jyotsna Singh, Southern Methodist U
 
Michael Speaks, Hanover, NH
 Michael Sprinker, SUNY, Stony Brook
 Kristina K. Straub, Carnegie-Mellon U
 Jennifer Summit, Stanford U
 Joseph Urgo, Bryant College




Candace Waid, Yale U
Joseph P Ward, Wayne State U
 
Daniel E. Williams, U of
 
Mississippi  
William Van Watson, Washington U
 Jeffrey Williams, East Carolina U .
 Patricia Yaeger, U of 
Michigan  
Sarah Zimmerman, U of Wisconsin,
Madison
Editorial Assistant & Business Manager: Maggie Gordon
 
Design Consultants: Kris Zediker, Chiquitta Walton
The editors of Jx invite submissions of scholarly and/or reflective essays on topics of interest to
 
scholars working in the fields of English and American literary/cultural studies. Submissions should
 conform to the MLA Style Manual. Send two copies to The Editors, Journal x, Department of
 English, University of Mississippi, University, MS 38677. Please include SASE. Submissions
 received in the months of June and July will be held for consideration in August.
Journal x is published biannually in Fall and Spring by the Department of English of the University
 
of Mississippi. Effective with volume 2, subscription rates are $8 (individuals) and $24 (institu
­tions). For all subscriptions outside US add $3 per year, remittance to be made by money order or
 check drawn on a US bank Write to the Business Manager at the above address. E-mail:
 egkamps@olemiss.edu orjwatson@olemiss.edu. Fax: 601 232 5787. Changes of address should be
 reported to the Business Manager.
Journal x is set in Caslon typeface and printed on acid-free paper by the University Publishing
 
Center at the University of Mississippi. The /xlogo was designed by Susan Lee.
Contents ©1998 by the University of Mississippi. ISSN: 0278-310X
3
Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
1.
Among the many ghostly exchanges that take place
 
between Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno in
 the latter
'
s Aesthetic Theory, a central one concerns the  
nature of fashion and its relation to aesthetic behav
­ior. As Susan Buck-Morss makes clear in her pre
­sentation of the Passagen-Werk materials in The
 Dialectics of Seeing, Benjamins assessment of the
 fashion phenomenon specific to monopoly capitalism
 is primarily negative (see 97-101). Intended to intro
­duce the new, fashion only generates “hellish repeti
­tion” (108), “[f]or fashion,” writes Benjamin, “was
 never anything but the parody of the gaily decked-
 out corpse, the provocation of death through the
 woman” (quoted in Buck-Morss 101). Instead of
 seeing fashion as a reflection of historicized under
­standings of the organic body — as Adorno might
 have done — Benjamin views fashion as pure reifica
­tion, transforming the organic body into a commod
­ity whose value is extinguished every season.
Indirectly
 
taking up Benjamins appraisal of fash ­
ion, Adorno argues in Aesthetic Theory that the
 rhythms of fashion in fact play a visible and necessary
 role in the field of aesthetic production. For
 
Adorno,  
as for his model in this context, Charles Baudelaire,
 fashion constitutes the “temporal nucleus of art”
 (192). Fashion 
is
 a heteronomous principle relating  
arts various apparitions back to the particular histor
­ical conditions in which they were wrought. In
 painting as well as poetry, fashion is the figure of the
 contingent, “la vie triviale” [the trivial in Efe],1 “la
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métamorphose journalière des choses extérieures” [the daily metamorphosis of
 
the external world] (Baudelaire 1155). Without this contingent element, the
 artistic monument lacks its alluring detail, its sensual image, and thus fails to
 address the individual in the hollow universalism of its transcendent claims.
Adorno
'
s treatment of fashion would at first seem to be in direct conflict  
with Benjamins, but this conflict 
is
 at bottom a semantic rather than ideolog ­
ical one. Whereas Adorno adopts the word “fashion” as a synonym for “het
­eronomy,” indicating thereby the art work
'
s implication in the conditions of  
production peculiar to its historical period, Benjamin uses the word to desig
­nate commercial determination, evoking the more pejorative sense that the
 word “fashion” had acquired during the first quarter of the twentieth century.
 Because it is temporally specific, the connotative ambiguity of the word as it is
 used by both Adorno and Benjamin can be seen as symptomatic of a larger
 modernist dilemma concerning the nature of art’s relation to history. I want to
 study this dilemma with particular reference to the twentieth-century poet
 Blaise Cendrars, whose work implicitly questions whether art can have a “tem
­poral nucleus” without yielding to the dictates of fashion. Cendrars’ entire
 oeuvre 
is
 generated from the paradoxes produced when the capitalist fashion  
system infiltrates the field of high culture. Cendrars asks whether literature in
 the twentieth century can confess to its association with fashion, avow its sub




 not an abstract concept in Cendrars’ work. From early on in his  
career, Cendrars exhibits 
a
 fascination with the phenomenon of fashion, espe ­
cially as it pertains to dress. His first poetic volume, Dix-neuf
 
poèmes élastiques  
[Nineteen Elastic Poems], was inspired in part by the “simultaneous” dress
 designs of the painter and decorative artist, Sonia Delaunay, whose efforts to
 ally fashion with art raised for Cendrars the question of art’s cultural status in
 a modern world increasingly governed by the laws of
 
the passing fad. When  
Cendrars drew an analogy
 
between poetry and Delaunay’s “robe simultanée” in  
“Sur la robe elle a un corps” [“On Her Dress She Has A Body”] of 1913 (col
­lected in Dix-neuf poèmes élastiques), he in effect presented himself as the
 Baudelaire of his own day. He presented himself, that is, 
as
 a poet dedicated to  
locating in the visual appearance of a generation the “élément éternel, invari
­able [et] poétique” [eternal, invariable, and poetic element] that ultimately pre
­sides over an aesthetic universe (Baudelaire 1154). But the effect of Cendrars’
 hymn to Delaunay was not the same as that produced by Baudelaire’s medita­tions on Constantin Guy. By emphasizing the parallels between poetry and “la
 mode,” fashion, Cendrars came close to endangering the values by which poet
­ry has traditionally been distinguished from more popular or commercial forms.
 For Cendrars did not live in Baudelaire’s universe; the lingering aristocratic
 
val ­
ues that in Baudelaire’s day might have ensured an abiding belief in such a
 
thing  
as an “élément éternel” — religious values, or simply widely recognized stan
­dards of virtue and taste — were for the most part eroded by the time Cendrars
 arrived on the scene. Cultural production in early twentieth-century France
 was no longer divided as it had been during the nineteenth century between
 artisanal and industrial modes of production.2 By the end of the Third Repub
­
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lie, industrial manufacture was rapidly replacing small workshop, craft-based
 
production modes in a number of domains, from the decorative arts to the
 domain of film production.3 Cendrars’ world, in other words, was becoming
 that of 
"
monopoly” or industrial capitalism, one in which “la mode” would come  
to reflect less the complexion of a particular historical moment — its “morale”
 or “passion” in Baudelairean terms — than the directives of increasingly power
­ful entertainment and industrial monopolies. The realm of haute couture may
 have been somewhat protected from standardizing processes that were inex
­orably modifying the appearance of the everyday; however, by the early teens,
 even this elite field of cultural production was succumbing to the demands of
 large-scale industrial manufacture. The general democratization of access to
 elite culture, the increasingly dependent relation between film stars and fashion
 trends, and the emergence of a middle-class “knock-off” market (a market that
 accelerated the alternation of models in response to a larger and more diversi
­fied clientele) were all factors that contributed to the standardization of haute
 couture fashion design.
Thus, the analogy Cendrars established between fashion and poetry in
 
1913 functioned somewhat differently from the association evoked by Baude
­laire in “Le Peintre de la vie moderne” of 1859-60. Even though Cendrars was
 careful to compare poetry to a dress made by a high modernist painter, he could
 not avoid evoking certain parallels between lyric composition and industrial
 manufacture. The analogy he presented in “Sur la robe elle a un corps” drew
 poetry inevitably into relation not with the “temporal nucleus” of art but rather
 with the infernal repetition that, according to Benjamin, fashion had become.
 Apollinaires 1913 depiction of fashion as “le masque de la mort,” the mask of
 death (7), clearly indicates that by the early twentieth century, the word “la
 mode” resonated quite differently than it had in Baudelaire’s day. To be the
 Baudelaire of the early twentieth century meant, then, not only to avow the
 heteronomous, fashionable element immanent to poetry and the other high arts
 but also to place at risk the very distinctions between craft and standardization,
 authorship and imitation, upon which the high arts had, since the Romantic
 period, been founded.
2.
Cendrars belonged to a group of European artists who were attempting at the
 
dawn of the century to import the techniques, iconographies, and discourses of
 popular culture into the domain of high art. What differentiates Cendrars from
 his contemporaries, however, and what makes his contribution to modernism
 so extraordinary, 
is
 that he experimented with the boundaries of high art not  
within the domain of painting or sculpture but rather within one of the most
 conservative and convention-bound spheres of cultural production, that of
 French lyric poetry. Whereas recent critics have familiarized us with the exis
­tence of pre-postmodern forms in avant-garde art, such as the readymade and
 the pastiche, very little attention has been paid to Cendrars’ poetic readymades
 and pastiche compositions, his own peculiar experimentation with the limits of
6
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concepts such as authorship, work, and style. Cendrars’ willingness to associ
­
ate and even at times to equate poetry with decorative and commercial forms
 threatened the epistemological claims of poetic “connaissance” in a way that
 even the Dadaists — who continued to associate poetry with “primitive” chant
 and mimetic ritual — had not yet dared to attempt. Cendrars was already ask
­ing in 1913 whether poetry might not, after all, be nothing more than “sheer
 decoration,”4 a play of linguistic surfaces eliciting pleasure but no deeper or
 more metaphysical response. If, as Cendrars would declare in 1926, “Il n’y a pas
 d’absolu,” [there 
is
 no absolute], then poetry could boast of providing no greater  
access to an eternal absolute, a higher epistemological order, than could, say, the
 haute-couture dress (Aujourd'hui 26). But Cendrars went further
 
in “Sur  la robe  
elle a un corps,” where he declared that the poem was comparable not just to
 any dress but more specifically to 
a
 dress constructed along the lines of a patch ­
work quilt or pastiche. Cendrars implied in this way that poetry, like Delau
­nay's “robe simultanée,” could be reconceived 
as
 a play of surfaces, a texture of  
citations, that the author only “signed” in the guise of an ingenious assembleur.
Although critics have exerted much effort in attempting to clarify Cen
­
drars’ debt to Apollinaire and, conversely, Apollinaire’s debt to Cendrars, the
 influence of Robert and Sonia Delaunay’s simultaneous contrast technique
 upon Cendrars’ work
 
has never been properly explored. It  is clear, however, that  
the remarkable stylistic modifications that Cendrars’ poetry underwent during
 the year 1913 can be attributed primarily to his frequent visits to the Delaunay
 home. Robert Delaunay’s theory of simultaneous contrast was responsible for
 the pastiche compositional technique of Sonia Delaunay’s “robe simultanée”
 and, I will argue, for the pastiche quality of the poems of Dix-neuf
 
poèmes élas ­
tiques. Introduced by Robert Delaunay and elaborated on by his wife, the tech
­nique was based on Michel-Eugène Chevreul’s theory that the perception of
 color values 
is
 determined by the contrast of juxtaposed tones. The Delaunays  
transformed Chevreul’s theory into a technique of “simultanéité” roughly
 defined by Cendrars in 1914 as the process by
 
which one entity gains its iden ­
tity through contrast with another (Aujourd'hui 71-2). Anticipating the post
­modern fascination with surface juxtapositions, the Delaunays reinterpreted
 pictorial depth or “profondeur” as an illusion produced by surface planes of
 color rather than by vanishing-point perspective. It was this reconception of
 depth as a function of surface design that stimulated Cendrars’ interest in cita-
 tional pastiche.
While the simultaneous contrast theory that Robert Delaunay devised in
 
the realm of high art clearly had a significant impact on the young Cendrars,
 the decorative objects Sonia Delaunay created during the same era were per
­haps an even more decisive influence on the development of Cendrars’ literary
 practice. For it was specifically Sonia Delaunay’s experiments with assemblage
 technique in the realm of the decorative arts that compelled Cendrars to revise
 his approach to verbal construction. Encouraged (or compelled) by her domes
­tic situation during the war, Delaunay began to transfer the modernist iconog
­raphy associated with her husband’s canvasses onto a variety of decorative
 objects: curtains, upholstery, lamp-shades, book bindings, scarves, and dress
­es.5 In this way, “simultanéité” evolved from a theory of color contrast into a
7
Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020




 &M Services BV Amsterdam 980402.
-
------- ------------ - --------
— -------— ------------ ----------- -----
Figure 2. Sonia Delaunay, endpapers and binding for Blaise Cendrars,
 "Pâquesà New York” [“Easter in New York”], c. 1912.
© L & M Services BV Amsterdam 980402.
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Figure 3. Sonia Delaunay, “Bal Bullier” [“The Bullier Ball”]. 1913.
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practice of cultural production. The goal of her visual experiments was no
 
longer to discover how one tone affected the perception of another; Delaunay
 was now interested in bestowing upon every available surface what had become
 an eminently reproducible “simultanéiste” iconography that, in fact, sold quite
 well. The implication of her specific version of “simultanéité” was that a visual
 identity between objects situated in different institutional contexts could
 potentially erase the traditional cultural distinctions between them. Impressed
 by Delaunay’s approach to everyday objects, Cendrars began to apply the
 assemblage or “patchwork” technique to the composition of poems, novels,
 screenplays, and radioplays; only in his case, the boundary between elite and
 commercial realms was crossed by integrating discourses drawn from paraliter-
 ary and commercial sources. The assemblage practices of Sonia Delaunay were
 thus directly responsible for what Jean-Carlo Flückiger has aptly named the
 “patchwork” technique of Dix-neuf poèmes élastiques and other works (176).6
 Cendrars’ verbal “patchworks” were a poetic response to Delaunay’s “objets
 simultanés.”
Delaunay’s first attempt to elide the decorative arts with simultaneous con
­
trast technique produced “Couverture” [“Blanket”], a patchwork quilt or assem
­blage of various fabrics and furs that she stitched together for her infant son in
 1911 (see figure 1). Drawing from the folk tradition of her native Russia,
 Delaunay joined fur scraps with patches of “found” fabrics in order to recreate
 the effect she and her husband had achieved elsewhere with variegated planes
 of pigment. The patchwork quilt already combined three elements of the aes
­thetic Delaunay would develop more fully in her fashion designs and book
 bindings: the quilt suggested visually the genre of pastiche; it juxtaposed
 diverse elements without creating a hierarchy of value among them; and it cre
­ated an impression of depth through the contiguity of contrasting surfaces.
 Cendrars would draw attention to these three elements in his own poem on
 Delaunay’s “robe simultanée,” “Sur la robe elle a un corps,” only in his version,
 the implications of Delaunay’s tripartite aesthetics for the future of poetry
 would be more fully explored.
Soon after designing the quilt, Delaunay made a series of
 
appliqué collage  
bookbindings, most notably for Cendrars’ Pâques à New York (see figure 2).
 Similar in this respect to the quilt, the bookbindings play with the effects of
 juxtaposed surfaces. Appearing frequently are the Russian folk art motifs, the
 rainbow and the arc, as well as the triangles and trapezoids of patchwork con
­struction that Delaunay was using in her
 
paintings during the same period (“Bal  
Bullier,” 1913, is one example; see figure 3). These motifs serve as building
 blocks that can be detached and reassembled in each subsequent design.
 Delaunay’s procedure accentuates the autonomy of the unit or building block;
 each shape remains distinct even while participating in a larger composition.
 The detachable quality of the building blocks reminds the viewer of the initial
 gesture of the simultaneous craft, that of assembling rather than inventing,
 selecting rather than originating.
Delaunay was working with the principle of simultaneous constrast on a
 
variety of levels when she designed the “robe simultanée” in the summer of
 1913. An habituée of the Bal Bullier, a popular modernist hot spot on the
 
10
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Avenue de 1’Observatoire, Delaunay
 
arrived one evening wearing a dress that
 would effectively launch her new career as
 a fashion designer (see figure 4)7 In her
 “robe simultanée” Delaunay reiterated the
 motifs employed in her paintings, book
­bindings, lampshades and upholstery of
 the same period, such as the rainbow arc
 and the solar disc. The dress was formed
 on the principle of the quilt, sewn, in
 Delaunay’s own words, “with small pieces
 of fabric that formed patches of color”
 (“The Poem” 198).
Apparently, Cendrars was at the Bal
 
Bullier on the night during the summer of
 1913 when Delaunay stepped out in the
 first model of her patchwork “robe simul
­tanée.” Although not a costume (Delau
­nay’s costume designs for the Ballets
 Russes were far more outrageous), the
 dress was designed to draw attention away
 from the spectacle on the stage to the
 spectacle performed by the audience itself.
 In a compte rendu of the evening at the
 dance hall Guillaume Apollinaire noted
 that Delaunay most intentionally did not
 dance (see Goldenstein 54). Her goal,
 according to Apollinaire, was to draw
 attention to the “corps sur la robe,” the
 limbs dancing on the dress — as the title
 of Cendrars’ poem indicates — and not to
 the woman’s body beneath. In his poem,
 
“
Sur la robe elle a un corps,” Cendrars also  
confuses the distinction between surface
 and depth, decoration and anatomy,
 extending a critique of ontology that the
 poet finds implicit in Delaunay’s practice.
 The first element of Delaunay’s aesthetic
 that Cendrars chooses to thematize in his
 poem, then, is her tendency to destabilize
 
Figure 4. Sonia Delaunay, “Robe
 
simultanée” [“The Simultaneous
 Dress”]. 1913. ©L&M
 Services BV Amsterdam 980402.
the hierarchical relation between truth and appearance, eternal form and
 
ephemeral ornamentation. Appropriately, Cendrars opens his poem with an
 attack on phrenology, the nineteenth-century positivist science that insists,
 unlike the dress, on a one-to-one referential correspondence between surface
 and depth. Instead of positing an absolute correspondence between the shape
 of the cranium and the individual personality, Cendrars, following Delaunay,
 recasts the identity (here, of the woman) as an imaginative reconstruction
 dependent upon the printed surfaces traditionally considered diversionary.
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SUR LA ROBE ELLE A UN CORPS
Le corps de la femme est aussi bosselé que mon crane
 
Glorieuse
Si tu t’incarnes avec esprit
Les couturiers font un sot métier
Autant que la phrénologie
 
5
Mes yeux sont des kilos qui pèsent la sensualité des femmes
Tout ce qui fuit, saille avance dans la profondeur
Les étoiles creusent le ciel
Les couleurs déshabillent
“Sur la robe elle a un corps”
 
10
Sous les bras des bruyères mains lunules et pistils quand
 les eaux se déversent dans le dos avec les omoplates
 glauques
Le ventre un disque qui bouge












Il y a des mains qui 
se
 tendent
Il y a dans la traine la bête tous les yeux toutes les
 fanfares tous les habitués du bal Bullier
 
20
Et sur la hanche
La signature du poète
(Biaise Cendrars, Du monde entier 83-4; © by Editions Denoël)
[ON HER DRESS SHE HAS A BODY
A woman’s body is as modelled as my skull
 
Glorious
If you are incarnated with spirit
Couturiers have an idiotic job
As idiotic as phrenology
My eyes are kilos that weigh the sensuality of women
All that flees, stands out moves forward into depth
Stars hollow out the sky
Colors undress
“On her dress she has a body”
Under the arms heathers hands lunules pistills when
 
waters flow over the back with its blue-green shoulder
 blades
12






The perpendicular cries of the colors fall on thighs
SWORD OF SAINT MICHAEL
There are hands that reach
There are in the train the beast all the eyes all the fanfares
all the regulars of the Bal Bullier
And on the hip
The poet’s signature]
Significantly, Cendrars begins 
“
Sur la robe elle a un corps” by  mocking  pos ­
itivist science and its tendency to locate truth — psychic or spiritual — in the
 order of the organic. The pun between “sot” (“idiotic”) and “sew” in line 4 —
 “Les couturiers font un sot métier” — does little to dampen the blow of the
 accusation against traditional “couturiers” who, like the phrenologists, treat the
 body as 
a
 privileged signified, the truth that the contours of the dress must  
reflect.8 In contrast, Delaunay dissociates the dress from the body it covers.
 The dress recreates the body not only through its abstract patterns but also
 through the images these patterns evoke. That is why “la femme” of line 1 is
 only “Glorieuse” insofar as she “incarnates” herself
 
in a dress, or “avec esprit”  
(line 3). Nude and unconstructed, “la femme” 
is
 as “bosselé(e)” as the “crâne,”  
a word in French often associated with death, as 
is
 “skull” in English. The skull  
and the body of the woman are humped or modelled, differentiated surfaces,
 but they signify nothing — bear neither a spiritual nor an aesthetic truth —
 without incarnation in fabric or text.
If we follow Cendrars’ logic, it would seem that the modern couturière must
 
be freed of the obligation to follow physical contours, since these contours are
 not, in themselves, the source of woman’s “sensuality.”9 In “Sur la robe elle a un
 corps,” Cendrars reconceives “sensuality” as a product of the impressions or
 images that the woman’s reinvented (textile) body evokes. The eyes that scan
 the dress are, accordingly, “des kilos qui pèsent la sensualité des femmes” (and
 here the verb “peser,” “to weigh,” parodies the scientific discourse of the phre
­nologists). The organic body has been displaced as a source of sexual excite
­ment; it 
is
 now the colors that seduce the viewer: “Les couleurs déshabillent”  
[The colors undress] (line 9). Desire is stimulated by the contrast of artificial
 and organic shapes, rather than by the organic feminine curves alone. These
 curves are rivaled as a three-dimensional construct by the depth and volume
 created by the colors on the dress. Line 7, “Tout ce qui fuit, saille avance dans
 la profondeur” [All that recedes, stands out comes forward into depth], refers
 to the colors, the contrasts of which produce the illusion of movement forward
 and away from the surface plane. The traditional surface-depth relation is
 undermined by the principle of composition by simultaneous color contrast:
 Delaunay’s technique of juxtaposed surfaces creates the illusion — and rivals
 the physical reality — of three-dimensional depth.
13
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Cendrars’ hermeneutics of the dress shifts the
 
location of meaning from the  
physical body to the surfaces that adorn it, from anatomy to the body’s spec
­tacular performance or masquerade. The remainder of the poem plays with the
 tension between organic and textile bodies. However, as lines 14-16 indicate,
 there are really three bodies evoked by the dress, each one belonging to a sep
­arate order: the organic, the textile, or the poetic. For instance, “Ventre”
 [Belly] of line 14 represents metonymically the order of the organic nude body
 (although it does not necessarily signify this body; the “ventre” could also be
 the dress’s body, an ambiguity upon
 
which the poem depends). “Disque” [Disk]  
of line 15 represents metonymically the de-anthropomorphized or geometric
 order of the designs on the fabric. And 
“
Soleil” [Sun] of line 16 is a synecdoche  
for the order of the imagined body, that which the poet makes, poetically, of
 what he sees. These three orders are emphatically intermingled in lines 11-13.
 “[B]ras” [arms], “mains” [hands], “dos” [back], "omoplates” [shoulder blades],
 "ventre” and ""seins” [breasts] all belong to the order of the organic body;
 ""disque” and ""arcs-en-ciel” [rainbow] refer us back to the abstract motifs print
­ed on the dress (the primary motifs of Delaunay’s paintings), while ""bruyères”
 [heathers], 
""lunules,
” ""pistils, ""les eaux” [waters], ""La double coque” [The dou ­
ble-bottomed hull] and ""le pont” [the bridge] all belong to the order of the
 poetic or imaginative discourse inspired by the abstract motifs. Meanwhile,
 line 11 reveals a high degree of phonetic rather than visual motivation; the /o/
 of ""les eaux” motivates the /o/ sounds of ""dos” and ""omoplates glau/ques” [blue
­green shoulder blades]. To attenuate even further the relation between the
 phenomenological truth of the body and the incarnated ""spirit” in the dress,
 Cendrars allows the poetry of the line, the sound values of the words, to gov
­ern the longest descriptive sequence of the poem. Although it is the eyes, the
 poet tells us, that ""weigh” the dress, in this case his tongue seems to be gener
­ating the descriptive discourse of the imaginative order. The synesthesia
 implied by the overlap between seeing and speaking, the visual and the poetic,
 is fully realized in line 17: ""Les cris perpendiculaires des couleurs tombent sur
 les cuisses” perpendicular cries of the colors fall on her thighs]. This move
 from the eyes to the mouth as the primary organ realizing
 
the (woman’s) "glory”  
or ""sensualité” 
is
 highly suggestive. The semiotic activity that defines poetic  
writing seems to work not in the service of unveiling the human mannequin but
 rather in the service of veiling her yet again. And here, the familiar etymolog
­ical association of text and textile receives a new twist. Poetry’s own artifice,
 the operations of paranomasia, assonance and internal rhyme, come to resem
­ble fashion as a method of covering the body with another body. And this
 imaginative poetic body, like the textile one, no longer accessorizes the organ
­ic but rather ""incarnates” it. Incarnation, then, 
is
 not a matter of respecting the  
contours of the ontic original; rather, incarnation involves pursuing the direc
­tives of the medium concerned, ceding the ""initiative” to words or, in the case
 of the dress, to surfaces of contrasting color.
Fashion critic Diana Vreeland has commented that Delaunay’s ""robes
 
simultanées,” or ‘"chromatic cocoons,” were ""wrapped around the body like a
second skin or a mad tattoo” (10). Vreeland’s allusion to the tattoo 
is
 evocative  
in this context, for it suggests that for Delaunay dressing 
is
 akin to a kind of
14
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writing on the body. The simultaneous dress reinvents anatomy as inscription,
 
and the job of the couturière becomes one of covering the skin with a text.
 Delaunay in fact attempted to realize her conception of the dress as tattoo
 
when  
she began in 1921 to compose designs for what she called the “robe-poème.”
 This “robe poème” was conceived as a garment stencilled with poetic verses as
 well as various lines and planes of color (see figure 5). Although none of
 Delaunay’s designs for the “robe-poème” was ever produced, the project itself
 indicates a desire on her part to reconceive fashion as a means of incarnating
 female “glory” as language. A direct link can be drawn between Delaunays
 approach to fashion as inscription and the avant-garde conviction that the artist
 must alter the organic body in order to perform an aesthetic (or aesthetico-
 political) project. When Rimbaud writes in 1871 of planting warts on his face,
 or when he imagines a “nouveau corps amoureux” [new amorous body] in
 “Being Beauteous” (181), he exhibits an impulse similar to that realized in
 Delaunay
'
s designs. His portrait of “un homme s’implantant et se cultivant des  
verrues sur le visage” [a man implanting and cultivating warts on his face] offers
 the possibility
 
that one might make manifest or visible (“se faire voyant”) a hid ­
den or simply abstract state of
 
consciousness (270). To tattoo the body is, in  
this context, to force “profondeur” to the surface, to make the deeper self visi
­ble, readable, and, in consequence, a subject of exhibition and performance.
 This visually exhibited or linguistically exteriorized self may remain a function
 of the self’s truth; it 
is
 more likely, however, that the exteriorized self, as it  
enters into the pure play of surfaces, will subordinate its truth to the dynamic
 interaction between, in one case, the colors of the dress, and in the other, the
 phonetic and graphemic textures of words.
3.
To return to Cendrars’ poem, it is now clear why Delaunay’s “robe simultanée”
 
comes to serve Cendrars as 
a
 model for an aesthetic that no longer privileges  
organic “profondeur” over articulated surface. Delaunay’s designs play with the
 lines of the body, treating them nonhierarchically as just another surface enter
­ing into play with the surfaces of applied and thus artificial elements. True,
 Delaunay — at least according to Cendrars — retains the order of the organic
 body, as opposed to the Futurists, who demanded in 1909 “the total suppression
 of the nude” (Boccioni et al. 31). However, the demotion of this nude body to
 pure surface design threatens to eclipse its ontological priority and even its sig
­nificance. As Cendrars’ ambiguous allusions to “ventre,” “dos,” and so on indi
­cate, there is no way to preserve the distinction either in language or in visual
 spectacle between a surface that refers to an anatomical feature and one that
 merely serves a function in an illusionist design. Immanent in Delaunay’s and
 Cendrars’ approach, then, 
is
 the possibility that all surfaces, all texts, behave in  
the manner of citations: the “ventre,” for instance, refers simultaneously to the
 body under the “robe simultanée” and to the visual text on the “robe simultanée.”
 There 
is
 no way to tell, the poem implies, which “ventre” is which.
15
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Figure 5. Sonia Delaunay with Tristan
 
Tzara, “Robe-poème” [“Poem-dress”].
1923. © L & M Services BV Amsterdam 980402.
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Delaunay and Cendrars could have found no better way to signal this prob
­
lem than to have visually associated the “robe simultanée” with the traditional
 practice of quilt-making. The patchwork technique Delaunay applies in the
 “robe simultanée” suggests that each element put into play — the “dos,” the
 “disque,” the “soleil” — exists as a kind of citation, a fragment drawn from a
 larger fabric or discourse. While the elements may appear to form a whole —
 a dress, a poem, a body — they are nevertheless scraps of preexisting discours
­es, fabrics or anatomies stitched together into an assemblage. In “Sur la robe
 elle a un corps,” Cendrars explicitly draws attention to the fact that the incar
­nation of the woman’s glory requires the cutting of fabrics, their separation as
 well as their union. The repetition of the title in line 10 — “'Sur la robe elle a
 un corps’” — provides a kind of mise en abyme suggesting the immediate cita-
 tional, and thus detachable or fragmented, quality of all lyric utterances. The
 lines of a poem or a dress may claim at one point to “incarnate” the glory of the
 ideal, but they, too, are merely surfaces that can be cut out and inserted into the
 next arrangement. Cendrars’ habit of recycling citations from his own works as
 well as from works by others also adds to the impression that lyric discourse,
 just like the discourses of newsprint, popular fiction and advertising, can serve
 as building blocks for assemblage. In an assemblage no single discourse, no sin
­gle element, refers in 
a
 univocal fashion; rather, each element is continually  
reimmersed in a flow of
 
attributes exchanged — phonic and graphemic in the  
case of poetry, chromatic and textural in the case of the dress.
The concluding lines of the poem — 
“
Et sur la hanche / La signature du  
poète” [And on her hip / The poet’s signature] — finalize the analogy between
 poet and fashion designer, “poème élastique” and “robe simultanée.” In the
 original manuscript version of the poem Cendrars follows these lines with his
 own signature, rendering even more explicit the parallel between the fashion
 designer who “signs” at the hip, and the poet who imaginatively reconstructs
 and recovers the woman’s body (Goldenstein 52). But if the poem is composed
 merely of a set of clippings rearranged and reassembled, then in what ways can
 it be said to deserve a signature? Like the designer, Cendrars suggests, the poet
 can also sign because the recreated body, the incarnated ideal, depends upon the
 eye or the ear of a good assembleur. The word “assembleur” is itself derived
 from textile manufacture, referring to the person who sews together the various
 parts of 
a
 garment.
Further, the poet implies in “Sur la robe elle a un corps” that assemblage —
 whether in fashion or poetry — necessarily entails violence. Cendrars refers to
 the violent gesture involved in assemblage in line 18, the detached and typo
­graphically emphasized “ÉPÉE DE SAINT MICHEL.” This line alludes
 most directly to the annunciation and the imminent incarnation of the spirit in
 the “glorious” flesh of Christ. But Cendrars reminds us here that in tradition
­al iconography, when Saint Michael descends to announce the incarnation he
 
is
 often depicted as bearing the glinting sword with which he vanquished the  
dragon. To incarnate, the allusion to Saint Michael’s sword suggests, one must
 also exert violence. In the case of Delaunay’s “robe simultanée,” violence is
 manifested in the cutting and reassembling of swatches of fabric; on another
 level, however, this violence is exerted specifically on the woman’s body, a body
 which is recut and reimagined according to the superimposed contours of arti
­
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fice. Liberating the spirit, or the "profondeur sensuelle” of the woman from the
 
chains of her anatomy is, in Cendrars’ own terms, a violent as well as an imag
­inative gesture. The simultaneity of violence and creation 
is
 consistently fore ­
grounded throughout the poem. We hear the victims of this violence crying in
 line 17: "Les cris perpendiculaires des couleurs tombent sur les cuisses”; and
 we see the hands objectified in the act of cutting in line 19: ""Il y a des mains
 qui se tendent” [There are hands that reach out]. If we consider that ""mains”
 is a term employed by the fashion industry to refer to the second-rank seam
­stresses responsible for cutting the dress form, then the line gains significance.
 Cendrars seems to be implying that Delaunay, as 
a
 fashion designer, applies  
(violent) hands, cutting up not only fabrics but also the natural lines of the
 female body in order to incarnate the glory of this body in 
a
 ""robe simultanée.”  
But if ""tous les yeux” figuratively extend their hands, then all present — ‘"tous
 les habitués du bal Bullier” [All the regulars at the Bal Bullier] — are imagi
­natively
 
resurrecting (re-cutting) the body of the woman. Cendrars depicts the  
violence implicated in the reconstructive gesture in the apocalyptic terms of the
 annunciation. And yet here it 
is
 not God who is incarnated in the flesh, but  
the ""glory” of the woman’s sensuality that 
is
 incarnated in a dress. Once again,  
the order of the spiritual 
is
 vacated to make way for  the play  of sensual surfaces.  
These surfaces must provide an experience of depth formally ensured by allu
­sions to a more profound (religious) order of experience.
In the manuscript of a 1945 preface composed for a volume of Baudelaire’s
 
collected poems, Cendrars indicates to
 
what a great extent the poet’s relation to  
the spiritual has been altered since Baudelaire’s time. ""Comme le monde mod
­erne a perdu la foi, mais n’a pas pu se dépouiller de la sentimentalité chréti
­enne,” begins Cendrars, ""de même j’ai n’ai [sic] plus l’amour des beaux vers et
 des rimes riches, mais reste tout pétri de la sensibilité baudelairienne” [Just as
 the modern world has lost faith, but hasn’t been able to strip itself of Christian
 sentiment, [so] I no longer care for pretty verses and full rhymes but remain
 awed by Baudelaire’s sensibility] (“Baudelaire”).10 Here Cendrars suggests that
 “faith” in divinity (“la foi”) can be replaced by “feeling” (“sentimentalité chréti
­enne”), while poetic conventions (“les beaux vers et les rimes riches”) can be
 replaced by a generalized poetic “sensibilité” — without a consequent loss of
 aesthetic force or value. Cendrars’ wager is that a feeling for the transcendent
 can in fact subsist even when unsupported by any formalized or institutional
­ized vision of a higher order. By extension, Cendrars’ post-Baudelairean poet
­ics implies that surface decoration and its sensual appeal may take the place of
 a system of
 
beliefs. This feeling without faith (“sentimentalité” sans “foi”) is  
like a Hegelian aesthetics without Spirit, an art without aura, or, more accu
­rately, an art that
 
redefines aura (“glory”) as a democratized experience available  
without initiation to “tous les yeux . . . tous les habitués du bal Bullier.”
In 
a
 sense, Cendrars’ privileged figure of the poem as dress merely renders  
literal Baudelaire’s more metaphorical association of “la mode” with art’s
 ephemeral, “modern,” and contingent aspect. For Baudelaire, fashion 
is
 poet ­
ry’s “élément relatif, circonstanciel” [relative, circumstantial element], the
 ""enveloppe amusante, titillante, apéritive, du divin gâteau” [amusing, titillating,
 appetizing element of the divine confection] without which “le premier élément
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serait indigestible, inappréciable, non adapté et non approprié 
à
 la nature  
humaine” [the first element would be indigestible, inappreciable, unadaptable
 and inappropriate to human nature] (1154). But what in Baudelaire appears to
 be a simple “enveloppe” rendering more palatable the suprahuman truth
 becomes in Cendrars’ hands the very source of this truth. If for Baudelaire
 appearance (the “enveloppe” of the contingent) 
is
 present only to introduce that  
which 
is
 not present (the divine), for Cendrars the divine turns out to be the  
very function of its appearances (the “enveloppes”). The poet
'
s task, according  
to Cendrars, is not to “dégager de la mode ce qu’elle peut contenir de poétique”
 [detach from the fashionable whatever poetry is in it]; neither is it to “tirer
 l’éternel du transitoire” [extract the eternal from the transitory] (Baudelaire
 1163). “Dégager” and “tirer” are verbs that suggest an act of separation, a ges
­ture of discernment that would cast aside the shell to reveal the kernel (“l’élé
­ment éternel”) inside. But for Cendrars, shells, envelopes, and appearances are
 precisely the locus of an experience of cosmic proportions.
The concept of depth implied in Baudelaire’s poetics is far more consistent
 
with a traditional epistemology of poetic “connaissance,” one that Jean-Pierre
 Richard, for instance, associates with an experience of an immeasurable, inhu
­man depth. “L’aventure poétique,” states the author of Poésie et profondeur, con
­sists in “une certaine expérience de l’abîme” [a certain experience of the abyss],
 an experience of precisely that which is “inappréciable, non adapté et non
 approprié à la nature humaine” (10). It 
is
 not accidental that Richard associates  
the end of a certain understanding of “profondeur” with the work of Rimbaud,
 a poet who wishes to “nier la profondeur,” negate depth; “il tente d’édifier un
 monde sans en-dessous, un univers délivré de l’origine et de la nostalgie” [he
 attempts to construct a world without foundations, 
a
 universe freed from any  
origin or sense of nostalgia] (11). In continuity with Rimbaud, Cendrars
 recasts “profondeur” as a “profondeur sensuelle,” a depth located in the way the
 eye or ear functions, a sensual experience of the surface as origin and limit of
 meaning. However, as in Rimbaud’s work, it is not the physiology of percep
­tion that
 
underwrites aesthetic truth but rather perception’s “dérèglement.” The  
eyes in “Sur la robe” are like “des kilos qui pèsent la sensualité des femmes”
 because they respond viscerally, deliriously, to a wealth of surface designs and
 inscriptions (to a mélange of “Ventre,” “Disque,” and 
“
Soleil”). In response to  
these three distinct orders of phenomenal reality, the eyes “edify,” to borrow
 Richard’s verb, a world without depth (“sans en-dessous”), a world created
 entirely from a superfluity of non-hierarchicized visual impressions. In 
“
Sur la  
robe elle a un corps,” the “ventre” becomes “un disque qui bouge," a moving disk
 on a two-dimensional surface. The woman’s “glory” is not, then, a materializa
­tion of her spiritual truth or even an unveiling of her physical contours.
 Instead, her “esprit” is fully incarnated in a designer dress.
By drawing poetry into a closer relation with apparel, Cendrars not only
 
realizes a potential inherent in Baudelaire’s aesthetics of the modern; he also
 completes a gesture sketched out implicitly by Rimbaud. Rimbaud, even more
 dramatically than Baudelaire, suppresses the concept of origin and detaches
 appearance from necessity. “Oh! nos os sont revêtus d’un nouveau corps
 amoureux” [Oh! our bones are clothed again in a new amorous body], writes
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Rimbaud ecstatically in “Being Beauteous” (181), thereby intimating that the
 
new world he envisions will involve, above all, a change of costume. And Rim
­baud’s Illuminations is, in fact, full of references to costume: in “Les Ponts” the
 speaker glimpses “une veste rouge, peut-être d’autres costumes” [a red jacket,
 perhaps other costumes] (187), while in “Parade” he is the witness of a perfor
­mance in
 
which a series of “Mâitres jongleurs ... transforment  le lieu et les per ­
sonnes” in “des costumes improvisés” [Master jugglers .. . transform places and
 people in improvised costumes] (180). The volume seems to suggest at times
 that the realization of Spirit, the satisfaction of the “promesse surhumaine faite
 à notre corps et à notre âme créés” [the superhuman promise made to our cre
­ated body and soul], can occur entirely on the level of visual spectacle (184).
 “Quant au monde,” Rimbaud reflects, “que sera-t-il devenu? En tout cas, rien
 des apparences actuelles” [As for the world, what will it have become? In any
 case, nothing like it appears now] (208).
In a strikingly similar manner, Cendrars also views the ultimate incarnation
 
of glory as a matter of wardrobe. Consistent with the aesthetics of “simul
­tanéité,” Cendrars transforms “l’esprit,” the incarnated glory, and even the
 woman’s sensuality, into a function of the surfaces presented to the eye.
 Because these surfaces do not need to correspond to any specific anatomy (nor
 do they answer to any eternal ideal) they always run the risk of falling subject
 to the manipulations of 
a
 contingent third party. In the case of Delaunay’s  
“robe simultanée,” the surfaces of the dress are determined and their patterns
 administrated by a modern artist, not an industrial designer. Yet even an artist’s
 rendering of a fashion design is still constrained by exigencies usually consid
­ered foreign to lyric composition. The author of a garment, no matter how
 greatly informed by a high art aesthetic, still depends extensively on available
 technologies of fabric production, on contemporary modes of cutting and
 assembling, and on the types of accessorization and color schemes privileged
 during a certain period. Although Delaunay belongs to a generation of artists
 who believed that function and fashion are not necessarily anathema to craft
 and aesthetic force, she herself had to admit that in the end the decorative arts
 walk a thin line between “vital, unconscious, visual sensuality on the one hand,”
 and the “lowering [of] the costs of production . . . and the expansion of sales”
 on the other (“Survey” 208). The fashion designer or decorator has to accept
 material contingencies that a lyric poet would, by definition, resist.
But if Cendrars’ analogy holds, that is, if the poet authors a poem just as a
 
designer authors a dress, then the implication is that poetry, too, “edifies” a
world influenced by — perhaps even conditioned by — the contingent.
 “[D]élivré de 1’origine” [freed from any origin], the poet hallucinates a new
 landscape of the body, but this body 
is
 also, like the dress, a functional object,  
a product circulating in a market for which new bodies are always sought.
 Thus, because the poet relinquishes an ideal of permanence, he can only drop
 anchor in the shallow waters of a “profond aujourd’hui.” Profound today, gone
 tomorrow. Cendrars is aware of this fundamental instability, this “sans en-
 dessous,” when he describes his Dix-neuf
 
poèmes élastiques as “poésies de cir ­
constance,” “[n]és à l’occasion d’une rencontre, d’une amitié, d’un tableau,
 d’une polémique ou d’une lecture” [born of the occasion of 
a
 meeting, a friend-
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ship, a painting, a
 
polemic or a reading] (Poésies 106). Cendrars’ "poésies de cir ­
constance” still locate the center of insight in the speaking subject ("Mes yeux
 sont des kilos qui pèsent . . 
.
”), but they simultaneously displace this center by  
admitting that the subject can be touched, redefined by “1’occasion.” In “Sur la
 robe elle a un corps,” Cendrars takes this poetics of the occasion to its logical
 extreme. The accidental occasion — “un tableau,” “une lecture” — is replaced
 by contingencies of an entirely different order, such as the availability of mate
­rials, the influence of fashionable cuts, and the development of new composi
­tional or reproductive techniques. These contingencies provide the “occasion”
 which touches, and therefore alters, both the subject and his or her imaginative
 “creations.” In “Sur la robe,” the “je” 
is
 thus no longer an autonomous creator  
but instead an assembleur; he belongs to that ambiguous class of artisans who
 must work with the given while conceding to the tastes of the contingent
 “other” that markets create. Rimbaud’s infamous “Je est un autre” can be reread
 in this light as the motto of the modern poet as fashion designer. It is the con
­fessional cry of a lyric subject who knows its creations — and even its self-cre
­ations — to be heteronomous products conceived through a dialogue with “la
 mode.”
To the extent that Cendrars seeks a modern subject capable of recreating
 
itself through a “nouveau corps amoureux,” his works provide an early image of
 the postmodern subject as the product of masquerade.11 And to the extent that
 Cendrars deflates Romantic conceptions of originality and authorship he
 engages us in a meditation on the nature of a lyric subject deprived of its auton
­omy. In sum, Cendrars raises the question whether a modernist aesthetics can
 indeed assert and maintain its value without relying upon an all-encompassing
 spiritual or institutional support (or an equally forceful ideology of the
 autonomous subject). Yet in his prescient manner, Cendrars goes even further.
 He also hints at the naiveté of a project that aims to stitch together a pastiche
 of identities without reference to an ethical body capable of suffering. He does
 this in “Sur la robe elle a un corps” by continually reminding his readers of the
 violence inflicted — not incidentally, upon a woman — by
 
a poetics of pastiche.
4.
“
Sur la robe elle a un corps” was published for the first time in 1916 in a cata ­
logue prepared for an exhibition of paintings by Robert and Sonia Delaunay
 that took place in Stockholm. The
 
publication was not authorized by Cendrars,  
and he had no occasion to revise the manuscript version he had entrusted to
 Robert Delaunay three years earlier. The poem appeared again in Cendrars’
 1919 collection Dix-neuf 
poèmes élastiques with very few revisions. Given the  
poem’s odd itinerary, it would be simple to dismiss “Sur la robe elle a un corps”
 as a flawed and trivial poetic effort, one lacking the rhetorical coherence and
 rhythmic balance of many of Cendrars’ other, more carefully wrought poetic
 works. Indeed, critics of French poetry have neglected to provide any extend
­ed readings of the poem, consigning it in this way to an early oblivion. Depart
­ing from earlier critics, however, I will proclaim “Sur la robe elle a un corps” a
 
21
Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue




Cendrarsian poetics, a crucial “art poétique” of the prewar gen ­
eration. For I believe that Cendrars’ own approach to the poem suggests that
 he accorded it far more importance than his critics have previously noted.12 In
 fact, Cendrars demonstrated an almost excessive concern with the publication
 and preservation of “Sur la robe elle a un corps”; his correspondence of the war
­time period provides valuable evidence to the effect that the poem constituted
 for him a viable response to what he considered an outmoded Parisian avant-
 garde. The significance of the poem for Cendrars resided in the fact that it
 posits a new, more dialectical relation between poetry and culture, one that his
 avant-garde contemporaries, as Cendrars himself stressed in 1916, had yet to
 envision.
During the war, Cendrars wrote repeatedly to Robert and Sonia Delaunay
 
from the front to inquire what had become of his only existing copy of “Sur la
 robe elle a un corps.” “Chers amis,” Cendrars begins 
a
 typical missive,
Je n’ai pas de copie du poème de la robe — surveillez donc à ce que Canudo
 
ne perde pas le brouillon que vous lui avez donné. Peut-être pourriez-vous
 me le faire envoyer, et je lui renverrait une copie très
 
lisible. Je ne le sais pas  




[I have no copy of the poem on the dress — so make sure that Canudo [the
 
publisher of Montjoie!] doesn’t lose the draft you gave him. Perhaps you
 could get him to send it to me, and I would send him back a perfectly leg
­ible copy. I don’t know it by heart and I wouldn’t be able to write it again.
 I really want to receive the manuscript.]
Apparently the Delaunays did not reply, for in January 1916, while Cendrars
 
was recovering from the amputation of his right arm, he sent word to Sonia
 Delaunay that he still longed to know where his manuscript of “Sur la robe elle
 a un corps” might have been misplaced. The fact that neither of the Delaunays
 ever responded to Cendrars’ repeated inquiries seems to have caused a rift in
 their relationship: “Je m’étais juré de ne pas vous écrire tant que je n’avais pas
 reçu le poème sur la Robe'
"
 [I swore I wouldn’t write to you until I got the poem  
on the Dress], Cendrars avows in another letter of 1916, “que je vous réclame
 depuis 1 an . . .” [I’ve been asking you for it for over 1 year\, (“1 an” is under
­lined three or four times.)
I cite this epistolary evidence of Cendrars’ continuing interest in the fate of
 
“Sur la robe elle a un corps” in order to suggest the extent to which he valued
 it as a representative work of the prewar period. In general, scholars have tend
­ed to look upon Cendrars’ early poems 
as
 the somewhat careless jottings of an  
author who would only
 
find his true voice in the major novels of the forties and  
fifties. But Cendrars himself seems to have considered the early poems to have
 been quite significant in their own right; they were so radically prescient, so
 beyond their own time, that, 
as
 he wrote Robert Delauney in an undated letter  
from approximately 1916, all other efforts of the “soi-disant” avant-garde
 appeared to him “foutu[s] d’avance” [screwed in advance]. Of course, Cendrars
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would probably have exhibited a similar degree of concern for any manuscript
 
of his that had been mislaid or placed in neglectful hands. I believe, however,
 that
 
“Sur la robe elle a un corps” had gained its authors affection for a very spe ­
cific reason. The poem contains many elements of what I consider to be a tran
­sitional poetics in the context of twentieth-century modernism, a poetics
 departing from the typical modernist sense of writing as the reorganization of
 fragments around a new center to approach a postmodern erasure of the notion
 of
 
centrality itself. “Sur la robe elle a un corps” can be read as a kind of “art  
poétique” in the rough, an inchoate manifesto of a poetics on the cusp of post
­modernism. Publishing the poem was the closest Cendrars ever came to circu
­lating a poetic manifesto on the order of Apollinaire’s “Anti-tradition futuriste”
 (1913) or Marinetti
'
s “Parole in libertà” [“Words in Freedom”] (1913). And  
that 
is
 why Cendrars was so determined to locate the manuscript and to have a  
hand in its eventual publication.
Just what did Cendrars’ “art
 
poétique” consist of, and in what ways can it be  
said to constitute a point of transition between a modernist and a postmod
­ernist aesthetic epistemology? As I have argued, “Sur la robe elle a un corps”
 draws poetic techniques into close association with the specifically decorative
 practices of Sonia Delaunay. While links between the domain of painting and
 the decorative industries were often forged, by the early twentieth-century
 avant-garde, the potential continuity between lyric poetry and the decorative
 arts was less frequently asserted. And yet Cendrars’ attempt to eliminate the
 hierarchy and even attenuate the distinction between the lyric and the decora
­tive arts 
is
 consistent with the practices of a specific group of lyric poets who,  
as early as the 1850s, were already exhibiting a fascination with the ornamen ­
tal. Cendrars represents the culmination rather than the reversal of a trend
 developing within lyric modernism, one that begins with Théophile Gautier’s
 collaboration with La Mode (and his claim that fashion is an art), proceeds with
 Baudelaire’s “Éloge du maquillage” and his analysis of the “dandy,” and reap
­pears in Mallarmé’s meditations on style and self-ornament in La Dernière
 mode. But while Mallarmé’s schizophrenia produces a split between poems of
 monumental impersonality and ephemeral journalism, the two are fully recon
­ciled in Cendrars’ “Sur la robe elle a un corps.” By explicitly associating the
 poem with the dress, “Sur la robe elle a un corps” in effect “spiritualizes” — by
 means of a carefully selected
 
vocabulary of Christian allusions — an instance of  
apparel.
However, while Cendrars’ goal may be to “spiritualiser” the decorative, to
 
solicit and celebrate the “profondeur sensuelle” immanent to the transient, the
 end result is inevitably a demotion of the poetic to the order of the decorative.
 For poetry’s distinction no longer resides in a heightened diction (there are no
 more “beaux vers” or “rimes riches”); nor can such distinction be derived from
 a circumscribed set of themes or located in a compositional technique peculiar
 to poetic production (assemblage, for instance, is a procedure shared by poets
 and dressmakers alike). True, the demotion of the poetic to the status of the
 decorative 
is
 merely hinted at rather than confirmed in the poem. Cendrars  
seems to enjoy the risk he runs when he identifies the poet with the fashion
 designer, and yet he retreats before celebrating the full implications of his anal
­
23
Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Carrie Noland 151
ogy. Cendrars in effect protects the poet from full contingency by choosing as
 
his double a fashion designer who 
is
 also an accomplished modernist painter.  
As an artist, Sonia Delaunay hypothetically
 
exercises greater autonomy over her  
creations than would a couturière employed by a large firm. Cendrars may be
 seen, then, as occupying the crossroads between 
a
 postmodern refusal of cul ­
tural distinctions and a Baudelairean poetics that retains the superiority
 
of high  
art over industrial products and what Baudelaire terms “leur grimace de circon
­stance” (Baudelaire 1034). Nevertheless, Cendrars’ identification with the dec
­orative arts, as well as his excessive attention to surfaces, eventually implicates
 the lyric in 
a
 set of conditions from  which it cannot, without recourse to a high ­
er order — Spirit, Deity, autonomous subjectivity, or even biology — escape.
Delaunay’s efforts to harmonize her "simultanéiste” project with the exi
­
gencies of mass production highlight the dilemmas encountered by artists or
 writers who sought in the twenties to establish a middle-ground between a
 meaningful participation in the social and a strict refusal of heteronomy. It
 should be recalled that the theory of simultaneous contrast was developed sev
­eral years before the stock market crash of 1929, during a period of immense
 enthusiasm for democratizing industries. At that time the competitive capital
­ist market seemed to offer previously unimaginable opportunities for the demo
­cratic distribution of high quality commodities. The rapidity with which
 Delaunay found industrial backing for large-scale production of her “robes
 simultanées” might have persuaded her that industry could indeed provide the
 means for promulgating an avant-garde aesthetic iconography previously con
­fined to the haute couture salon. During the teens and twenties Delaunay
 expended a great deal of energy attempting to develop 
a
 “pochoir” (stencil)  
technique that would allow her to mass reproduce her simultaneous designs
 without a consequent loss of tonal integrity (see Wallen). She also invented the
 "tissu-patron,” a dress pattern upon which she printed both the motifs of
 
the  
“simultanéist” iconography and instructions for
 
the cut and assembly of the fin ­
ished garment. All her experiments in fashion production aimed to synthesize
 an “artistic conception” with “the standardization to which everything in mod
­ern life tends” ("The Influence” 206). Delaunay maintained that such a syn
­thesis between pure art and industry could indeed be achieved. Denying, for
 instance, that her geometric patterns were proof of
 
her compliance with con ­
temporary fashion trends, Delaunay defended her designs in the following
 manner:
[Critics] have announced confidently at the beginning of each new season
 
that geometric design will soon pass out of fashion and be replaced by nov
­elties drawn from older patterns. A profound error: geometric designs will
 never become unfashionable because they have never been fashionable.
 Bad geometric design is the untalented interpretation of copyists and minor
 decorators.
If there are geometric forms, it is because these simple and manageable
 
elements have appeared suitable for the distribution of colors whose rela
­tions constitute the real object of our search . . . (207)
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In contrast to the “minor decorators,” responds Delaunay, the real artists of
 
fashion, those who create the “good” versus the “bad” geometric designs, are
 involved in a type of scientific research. In pursuit of truth not profit, these
 “good” designers are destined to enjoy the laurels bestowed on every “lyric
 vision” (“Rugs” 201). A “lyric vision” in the domain of fashion is, for Delaunay,
 nothing less than a Baudelairean vision, one capable of discerning eternal laws
 in transient appearances. A talented decorator, like a pure scientist, can mobi
­lize a fashionable geometric
 
iconography  for  the purpose of discovering  the pro ­
found relations established by colors operating in a geometric design. It 
is
 only  
by obeying these laws that the decorator resists the role of “copyi t” and man
­ages to offer an intuition of permanent (physiological) harmonies and, happily,
 a fashionable dress.
But if Delaunay in effect retains the Baudelairean lyric schema, if, that is,
 
she sustains a belief in a higher order (in this instance, the essential truth of
 chromatology), then Cendrars announces the advent of an aesthetics that will
 place biology, physiology, anatomy and consequently all ahistorical orders of
 knowledge in serious jeopardy. Along with Baudelaire
'
s “foi,” in other words,  
will go the self-assured epistemology of the chromatic scientist. No “élément
 éternel,” no absolute science of relations, accords one geometry epistemological
 priority over another. In this sense, then, Cendrars’ tentative “art poétique”
 leaves Delaunay’s modernist preoccupations behind and advances toward the
 postmodern world of relativized knowledges and nonhierarchial cultural prac
­tices. By abandoning a poetics of depth, or rather, by reconceiving depth as an
 effect of surface, Cendrars anticipates a postmodern aesthetics in which “[t]out
 est artificiel et bien réel. . . . Les produits des cinq parties du monde figurent
 dans le même plat, sur la même robe” [all is artificial and totally real. . . . Prod
­ucts from the five ends of the world appear on the same plate, on the same
 dress] (Aujourd'hui 12).
Cendrars thus transforms Delaunay
'
s dress from a scientific experiment  
into a postmodern pastiche. No underlying order or chromatic law determines
 the sequence or pattern of the surfaces and any attempt to locate a center from
 which to observe and hierarchize the colors of the “robe,” or for that matter the
 “cinq parties du monde,” constitutes a baldly ideological gesture. Cendrars’
 decentering, similar to Rimbaud’s “dérèglement,” denies priority to any onto­logical, metaphysical, biological, or even aesthetic order. “Je suis trop sensuel
 pour avoir 'du goût’” [I’m too sensual to have “taste”], announces Cendrars; “J’ai
 tous les goûts” [I have a taste for everything] (Aujourd'hui 193). The subject 
is thus set adrift in a
 
world of surfaces, each of which possesses an equal claim on  
its scattered attention.
To reiterate, Cendrars is celebrating this delirious subject and its aesthetics
 
of decentering during a period of euphoria when Europe was only just begin
­ning to appreciate the full consequences of capitalist expansion.14 As time went
 on, industry did eventually disappoint both Cendrars and his collaborator,
 Sonia Delaunay. Sherry Buckberrough recounts how, during the thirties,
 Delaunay abandoned all attempts to ally the decorative arts with her scientific
 experiments in painting. Repulsed by the aesthetic compromises industrial
 manufacture was increasingly imposing upon her after 1929, Delaunay retreat
­
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ed to the exclusive domain of
 
the gallery exhibition (Buckberrough 105). As  
early as 1925 Cendrars also registered the failure of industry to accommodate
 the talents of artist-designers: “Je regrette surtout qu’on ne voit pas plus sou
­vent de vos robes dans la rue” [Above all, I’m sorry we don’t see your dresses in
 the street more often], he wrote to Delaunay (quoted in Goldenstein 55). Cen
­drars’ mature work in particular focused increasingly on democracy’s disap
­pointed promises; in 1949, he even concluded laconically that “[o]n peut
 aujourd’hui . . . condamner le capitalisme” [today we can blame capitalism];
 Vest du fric qu’il s’agit, et de rien d’autre” [all that matters is dough, nothing
 else] (Le Lotissement 286, 285).
“Sur la robe elle 
a
 un corps” introduces the dilemma that Delaunay and  
many artists of her generation would eventually face: the dilemma of having to
 choose between the elitist pretensions of 
a
 higher order on the one hand and  
the dictates of an industry on the other. In a sense, the task Cendrars sets the
 modern artist in his “art poétique” is an impossible one: to de-stabilize hierar
­chies without homogenizing values; to retain aesthetic grandeur without the
 support of Kant, “objective Spirit,” or conventional faith; and finally, to wel
­come contingency without capitulating entirely to capital. Like most of the
 early and most audacious members of the avant-garde, Cendrars wanted to
 maintain 
a
 high degree of craftsmanship (and thus preserve the categories of  
artist and poet) and simultaneously to collapse the distinction between art
 objects and everyday (mass-produced) items. But Cendrars neglects to address
 directly the question of how art is to prevent the vacant order of the transcen
­dent from being inhabited by
 
the interests of an industrial or military class. In  
contrast, Adorno chooses to devote himself entirely to this problem in his mas
­sive study of art under capitalism, Aesthetic Theory. In a long digression that he
 was never able to integrate into the final manuscript, Adorno presents fashion
 in art as the dangerous hinge between self-reflexivity and submission. “Fash
­ion,” asserts Adorno,
is
 art’s permanent confession that it is not  what it claims to be.. .. Against  
its detractors, fashion’s most powerful response 
is
 that it participates in the  
individual impulse, which is saturated with history.... If art, 
as
 semblance,  
is the clothing of an invisible body, fashion is clothing as the absolute.  
(316, 317)
Adorno’s art-as-clothing metaphor could not be more à propos. The important
 
word here, however, is 
"
absolute,” a term Adorno uses to refer to the phenom ­
enon in
 
which one aspect  of an entity (such as its contingency) gains dominance  
over every other aspect (such as its effort to reclaim its independence). Art
 becomes pure fashion when it abandons all attempts at resistance to fashion.
 Fashion, and even more pertinently, art’s confession of its fashionable aspect (its
 desire to please) may indeed provide “strength” to art and prevent it from "atro
­phy” (317); but the “renunciation” or denial of
 
fashion, Adorno stresses, is an  
equally integral part of art. For Adorno, then, fashion appears to penetrate art
 in two different ways, or really, to two differing degrees of depth. In a first
 instance, art fends off its subservience to fashion by insisting upon its own
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counter-order, its own set of exigencies related to an intangible ideal. In a sec
­
ond instance, art 
is
 penetrated by heteronomous constraints to the point where  
it hypostatizes — fully embodies —
 
what previously constituted only one of its  
conflicting aspects. In this second case, art comes to resemble “clothing,” a thin
 tissue or “enveloppe . . . apéritif” that now hangs upon a body whose vulnera
­bility, whose material existence, has become irrelevant. Fashion in art is “legit
­imate” since it manifests the immanence of the historical, except when it is
 “manipulated by the culture industry” which tears it away from “objective spir
­it” (192).
Cendrars situates his poetics precariously between the two possibilities
 
sketched out by Adorno. In this respect, Cendrars represents a turning point
 between a modernist celebration of the everyday and the postmodernist com
­mercialization of the same. Cendrars does not have recourse to an abstraction
 such as “objective spirit” to defend his creations from manipulation; he can only
 hang his poem/dress on an unstable and utterly amorphous clotheshorse called
 “sensualité.” Stretching lyric form to its utmost limit, rendering lyric subjec
­tivity as porous as it can possibly be, Cendrars seems to ask whether a lyric
 poetry can in fact relinquish the principle of autonomy — confess to its inca
­pacity to “live up to” its own ideal — and yet still remain a counterforce to
 unmediated administration.
Finally, the only thing preventing “Sur la robe elle a un corps” from capit
­
ulating to radical heteronomy 
is
 the slender, nearly imperceptible barrier pro ­
vided by the signature of the poet (“Et sur la hanche / La signature du poète”).
 In the poem, this signature must take on the huge responsibility of fighting off
 the repeated assaults of technological and commercial standardization. Yet this
 signature is by no means the fully authoritative paraph of the Romantic lyric
 poet, nor is it reduced to the status of a designer brand label. Instead, this par
­ticular type of signature seems to allude to an intermediary order of subjective
 mastery, a hybrid state between autonomy and commercialism, absolute tran
­scendence and purely ephemeral value. This signature belongs to the space of
 hybridity, an increasingly significant third field of cultural production in which
 one would want to situate a wide variety of modernist and postmodernist pas
­ticheurs. Cendrars and Delaunay are typical of many artists in France, Italy,
 and Russia who were attempting from early on to realize hybrid creations draw
­ing from both the decorative and the contemplative arts. It remains to be seen,
 however, whether the space of hybridity that Cendrars helped to carve out as
 early as 1913 can prove capacious enough
 
to accommodate all the cultural man ­
ifestations that stake a claim within it. As the fashion industry begins to play
 a greater role in funding museum exhibitions (and as publishing houses are
 forced by economic conditions to promote the study of visual culture over the
 study of poetry), the question of whether “confession” can be balanced with
 denial, the energy of fashion with the energy of resistance, grows ever more
 pressing.
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All translations from the French are the author 's.
2.
 




Silverman traces both the threat of machine mass-production on the  




This is  Jamesons description of the postmodern aesthetic (7).
5.
 
Delaunay lost all of her Russian properties during World War I. Find ­
ing herself in a precarious economic situation, she extended her field of opera
­tions beyond the domestic sphere, opening a Casa Sonia in Madrid, an Atelier




Cendrars was working under the sign of the simultaneous contrast tech ­
nique when he collaborated with Sonia Delauney in 1913 to create “La Prose
 du Transsibérian et de la Petite Jehanne de France,” a two-meter long poem
 stenciled with Delaunay s designs and folded in the manner of an accordian.
7.
 
Although Delaunay may not have admitted it at the time, her “robe  
simultanée” was very much 
a
 response to moves made on the competitive chess ­
board of avant-garde art. As several commentators have noted, the competi
­tion between the Futurists and Sonia and Robert Delaunay was quite intense
 before World War I. See Morano; and Braun.
8.
 
It is highly likely that Cendrars intended this pun. The poet had just  
returned from six months in New York where he worked for the Butterick pat






“Sensuality” is Cendrars’ modernist synonym for spirituality. A follow ­
er of Remy de Gourmont’s theory of the aesthetic as the spiritual life of the
 senses, Cendrars substitutes “sensuality” for more traditional poetic values such
 as spirituality, divinity, beauty or truth. Cendrars’ “profondeur” 
is
 a “profondeur  




This manuscript passage does not appear in the published preface.
11.
 
The now classic version of the theory of identity as masquerade is  
Judith Butler’s. In response to Joan Rivières “Womanliness as a Masquerade,”
 Butler asks provocatively whether masquerade “serve[s] primarily to conceal or
 repress a pregiven femininity... [o]r is ... the means by which femininity itself
 
is
 first established” (48). I am suggesting here that once an organic femininity  
is eliminated as a possibility, any female identity one creates may  be susceptible  
to other reifying forces such as commodification.
12.
 
Leroy provides an exhaustive treatment of this period in Cendrars’  
career. He does not, however, recognize the significance of “Sur la robe elle a
 un corps,” nor does he link the poetics it advocates to Cendrars’ later works.
13.
 
The letter is undated; June 1914 is an approximate date suggested by  
the archivist of the Fonds Delaunay, Bibliothèque Nationale, Department of
 Manuscripts. In another letter dated 28 June 1914, Cendrars again expresses
 anxiety concerning the fate of the poem.
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In “Profond aujourd’hui” of 1917 Cendrars relates the ex-centric nature  
of the subject directly to an experience of high capitalism: “Tu te perds dans le
 labyrinthe des magasins où tu renonces à toi pour devenir tout le monde” [You
 lose yourself in the labyrinth of stores, where you renounce yourself to become
 everyone] (Aujourd'hui 12); “Tu vis. Excentrique” [You live. Eccentric] (14).
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All Hopped Up:







 English at Mississippi
 State University,
 writes about early
 modem English culture
 from 
alehouses
 and  
theater to naming
 practices, memory, and
 identity.
I would like to begin with something that we will
 
recognize, at least generically, as a joke. Thus Henry
 Peacham in The Worth of a Penny (1641):
I remember, when I was in the Low Countries,
 
there were three souldiers, a Dutchman, a Scot,
 and an Englishman, for their misdemeanours
 condemned to be hanged: yet their lives were
 begd by three severall men, one a Bricklayer, that
 he might help him to make bricks & carry them
 to walls; the other was a Brewer of Delft, who
 beg’d his man to fetch water, and do other worke
 in the Brewhouse; now the third was a Gardiner,
 and desired the third man to help him to worke
 in, and to dresse an Hop-garden: the first two
 accepted their offers thankfully, this last
 
the Eng ­
lishman told his Master in plaine termes his
 friends never brought him up to gather
 
Hops, but  
desired he might be hang’d first: and so he was.
(10)
In other words, during the Thirty Years War, some
 
military justice is about to be meted out to three var
­ious men, but three local businessmen intercede by
 “begging” the lives of these felons; that is, they accept
 liability for the men in exchange for indentured servi
­tude of some prescribed length. The Dutch and
 Scots felons gladly accept the trade-off of life for
 labor, working for 
a
 bricklayer and brewer respective ­
ly; however, the Englishman refuses his good fortune.
 While the apparent moral of this anecdote 
is
 an  
exemplary notion of the ubiquitously idle masterless
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man, I will argue that its curiously obscure punch line masks deeply felt cultur
­
al anxieties about the nature of what it means to be English; that is, does the
 Englishman refuse his new job out of sheer class disdain for working, or is his
 refusal due to a particular cultural prejudice against the job of gathering hops?1
 Moving from jokes to their comic effects, following Freud following Heymans,
 we expect Verblüffung (bewilderment) succeeded by Erleuchtung (illumination):
 just such illumination is the goal of this essay.
In the century from 1524 to 1625, beer replaced the more traditional ale as
 
the constitutive national drink of the English, a fact enabled by the introduc
­tion of cultivated hops. Concurrently, this period, especially the latter half, saw
 an enormous growth in the sense of English self-identification, due in no small
 part to constant fears of and then the ultimate defeat of the Armada.2 In Forms
 of Nationhood, Richard Helgerson goes so far as to claim originary status with
 respect to national self-fashioning for 
a
 generation of mid-Tudor authors of the  
middling sort born between 1551 and 1564 and active between the 1580s and
 the 1640s (1ff.). Alan G. R. Smith at once expands and narrows this historical
 moment: “The changes of the 1530s also led to the formal establishment of an
 English nation state,’ a realm subject to no outside authority. . . . [T]he feeling
 of national identity and uniqueness continued to grow reaching an apogee in
 the reign of Elizabeth” (88, 89). Whatever the historical framework, these
 Elizabethans certainly engendered “a national cultural formation that has . . .
 survived for the last four centuries on the British Isles” (Helgerson 299-300).3
 Like Helgerson, I am specifically
 
interested in how Elizabethans and Jacobeans  
themselves created and then defined their own national identity. Unlike him,
 however, I do not accept with an unquestioning Eurocentric glee that this Eliz
­abethan English cultural formation “has served as a sequentially engendering
 paradigm for nations throughout the world,” a phrase far too reminiscent of
 history written by colonial victors. Instead, I focus my argument temporally,
 geographically, and psychically within the confines of Elizabethan and
 Jacobean England.
I believe that the two phenomena (the replacement of “English” ale with
 
“Dutch” beer and the growth of English nationalism), linked however humor
­ously in our opening joke, were related. In this essay, I examine just how drunk
­enness served as a generic marker of otherness for European ethnic groups on
 the verge of
 
national self-identification. Specifically, the English were deter ­
mined to blame their own perceived national inebriety on foreign agents, espe
­cially the Dutch. However, even this assertion bore a kernel of truth, as the
 Dutch were fundamental in the development of the large-scale English brew
­ing trade because they originally imported hops into Britain and then later pur
­chased the exported product for resale in the Low Countries. The essay closes
 with a reconsideration of these competing nationalisms by examining, in some
 detail, two English plays with important Dutch characters in the paired con
­texts of militarism and commercialism.
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Drunkenness and Nationalisms
Our joke plays upon ethnic and national biases: a willing Dutchman, a loutish
 
Scot, and a haughty Englishman.4 In fact, the triumvirate of felons is really a
 pair of
 
doubles with the Englishman a member of both: English-Dutch and  
English-Scots. Each pair consists of the English and a race against
 
whom they  
defined themselves, but with whom they felt some amity and connection. I
 focus on the former pair. The English and Dutch were either great allies, as
 leading Protestant countries who jointly fought Spanish Catholic ambitions for
 a “unified” Europe, or great rivals, fighting over the true form of religion and
 the emerging commerce of the high seas, not to mention cloth production —
 often in quick succession, especially during the seventeenth century.5 As G. 
K. Hunter asserts, “The inhabitants of the Low Countries (‘Dutch’ and ‘Flem
­ings’) were the best-known strangers in Elizabethan England” (17).6 But what
 explains the prevalence of
 
drinking images connected with two of their three  
potential employers: the brewer and the hop gardener?
Drink and drunkenness were concerns of great interest in late-Tudor and
 
early Stuart England. Typically the problem of excessive drinking was demo
­nized as something alien and other. In 1617 the English traveler Fynes
 Moryson epitomized this trend, as he saw fit to recount the drinking habits of
 the many nations he visited. Thus at German feasts, there was “endlesse drink
­ing” (84); “Drunkennesse” was their “almost sole vice” (165). “Danes passe (if
 it be possible) their neighbour Saxons in the excesse of their drinking” (101).
 Poles were “as stout drinkers as the Germans” (104). The Swiss claimed mod
­eration, “yet drunkennesse hath much patronage among the best sort” (91).
 Only the French avoided the tar of drunkenness. It “is reprochfull among the
 French, and the greater part drink water mingled with wine” (135).7
While excessive drinking was prevalent throughout Europe, nowhere
 
was it  
more noticed than in the Netherlands. Moryson stated that “Netherlanders use
 lesse excesse in drinking then the Saxons, but more then other Germans. . . .
 But I will truly say, that for every day drinking ... doe they
 
use so great excesse  
as the Saxons” (99).8 Thomas Wilson’s Art of
 
Rhétorique (1560) provided a  pre ­
scriptive catalogue of national characteristics in which the Dutch were known
 for their drinking:
And not onely are matters set out by description, but men are painted out
 
in their colours.... The Englishmen for feeding and chaunging for appar
­eil. The Dutchman for drinking. The Frenchman for
 
pride & inconstance.  
The Spanyard for nimblenes of body, and much disdaine: the Italian for
 great wit and policie: the Scots for boldnesse, and the Boerne for stubbor-
 nesse. (178-9)
As Hunter notes, “Surveys of the time were fond of making lists of French,
 
English, Spanish, etc., national characteristics” (43). For example, Henry
 Butte’s Dyets Dry Dinner (1599) discussed an “English Foole” and his penchant
 for foreign habits: “wanton Italianly; Go Frenchly: Duchly drink: breath Indi-
 anly” (P4r). In 2 Henry IV, Hal states,
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Belike then my appetite was not princely got, for, by my troth, I do now
 
remember the poor creature, small beer ... as thou hast not done a great
 while, because the rest of thy low coun-tries have [made a shift to] eat up
 thy holland. (2.2.9-11,20-2)
Commentators have been quick to note the punning on “low countries” and
 
holland, but none have seen fit to mention the more literal relation between
 “small beer” and its homeland. John Taylor in writing his Drinke and Welcome
 (1637) assumed authorship by one “painefull and industrious Huldricke Van
 Speagle, a Grammaticall Brewer of Lubeck,” whose work Taylor has translated
 from “the high Dutch tongue” (title page). Richard Young in The Drunkard's
 Character (1638) juxtaposed English to Dutch inebriety (Aa8-Aa8v). The dip
­somaniacal Dutchman even became 
a
 stock character in Renaissance drama  
(Haugtons, Englishmen for My Money [1598], Dekker
'
s The Shoemaker's Holiday  
[1599], Dekker and Webster
'
s Westward Ho! [1604], Middleton 's No Wit, No  
Help Like a Woman
'
s [1611], and especially Belchier 's Hans Beer-Pot [1618]).9
The English
 
went even further, blaming the Dutch for English social  prob ­
lems. Much of this anxiety, of course, was economic; as Joyce Appleby notes,
 “Dutch success obviously puzzled Englishmen. . . . Dutch prosperity, like
 Dutch land, seemed to have been created out of nothing” (74). From the late
 1570s through to the Civil War, social and moral commentators developed a
 commonplace that drunkenness was a sin only introduced into England after
 soldiers returned from the Low Countries, 
a
 “metaphysical” commodity  
destroying the moral economy much as “their command over the products of
 other nations” threatened those nations’ real economies. In his Pierce Penilesse
 (1592), Thomas Nashe complained:
let me discend to superfluitie in drinke: a sinne, that euer since we haue
 
mixt our selues with the Low-countries, is counted honourable: but before
 we knew their lingring warres,
 
was held in the highest degree of hatred that  
might be. (1: 204-5)
Even the historian William Camden believed the English “learned by these
 
Netherland warres to drowne themselues with immoderate drinking” 
(3:
 2). As  
late as the 1630s, Samuel Pepys claimed that the English learned the custom of
 drinking healths while stationed in the Netherlands 
(5:
 172, n. 4).
The English were not alone in this demonization of inebriety as a cultural
 marker of the other. Moryson stated that the Swiss “say that excesse came into
 the Commonwealth, together
 
with the accepting of military stipends from for-  
raigne Princes” (91). That most famous Elizabethan tourist, the Swiss Thomas
 Platter, had this to say about his trip to London: “I have never seen more tav
­erns and ale-houses in my
 
whole life than in London” (189), implying that the  
English were drunkards. This finding was confirmed by a lunch given by the
 mayor, where “[t]he drinks consisted of the best beer and all manner of heavy
 and light wines to follow, as for instance, Greek, Spanish, Malmsey, Lanque-
 doc, French and German” (Platter 158).10 Rabelais also noted the drunkenness
 of the English, when he said Jobelin Clotpoll, Garganteas second tutor, might
 “die in that manner, drunk like an Englishman” (1: 61).11
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As Chris Highley has shown, drawing upon Foucault, national identity in
 
this period was often defined in terms of that which was either not present or
 somehow perceived to be other; thus the English defined their own civilization
 relative to their neighboring other, the Celtic Fringe of Wales, Scotland, and
 Ireland.12 Moryson demonized this fringe in terms of its drinking as well,
 specifically citing the latter two cultures for their excesses: “The excesse of
 drinking was then farre greater in generall among the Scots then the English,”
 while the Irish “use excesse therein” (156,162). The English also defined their
 sober nation relative to its sodden neighbor and ally just
 
across the Channel, the  
States General of Holland; however, continental visitors, even prior to the
 1590s, were quick to notice the excessive drinking of the English. Clearly
 drunkenness as a foreign and alien phenomenon was a widespread cultural par
­adigm in the Renaissance; what is important is not so much the “truth” of such







Tore [God] an excellent song.
Iago. I learn’d it in England, where indeed they are most
potent in potting: your Dane, your German, and your swag-bellied Hol
­
lander, — Drink, ho! — are nothing to your English.
Cas. Is your [Englishman] so exquisite in his drinking?
Iago.
 Why, he drinks you, with facility, your Dane dead drunk; he sweats  
not to overthrow your Almain; he gives your Hollander a vomit ere the next
 pottle can be fill’d. (2.3.74-85)
Here all the usual suspects are rounded up and their various drinking capacities
 
displayed for our mirth. Ostensibly a Venetian and thus foreign view of the
 English character and culture, Iago’s paean clearly played as nationalist propa
­ganda to the groundlings, if not to the rest of the audience.
Hops and English Identity
While I have expounded on the drunken stereotypes inscribed in our opening
 
ethnic joke, I have not yet explained how the punch line ties into an emergent
 national identity. What are hops and why would an Englishman refuse to grow
 them other than out of laziness? A brief historical background will establish
 the importance of beer — the chief by-product of hops — to the material pro
­duction of normative cultural values. Because the water in early modern Eng
­land, especially that in London, was virtually undrinkable, the everyday drink
 was some sort of alcohol, which has the dual virtues of
 
killing off all bacteria  
while providing an ample caloric intake.13 Originally this drink was ale, but by
 the 1590s production and market forces had combined to replace ale with beer.
One simple technological improvement accounted for this transformation
 
from ale to beer — the introduction of hops production on a large scale in Eng
­land.14 This transformation encoded the curiously mixed nature of national
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self-consciousness. Beer, a Dutch invention, unlike English ale,
 
was made with  
hops, which served as a preservative.15 This foreign triumph, however, was nei
­ther straightforward nor immediate. The original reception of both the plant
 and its by-product beer was underwhelming. Hops in its wild form was native
 to England, but as a cultivated crop it had to be reintroduced from Europe in
 the 1400s.16 During Henry VI's reign a petition was presented to Parliament
 against the “wicked weed called hops” (Fuller 1: 493). As a going economic
 concern, however, hops production did not begin in England until the 1520s,
 when Flemish farmers began cultivating it in Kent (Bickerdyke 71).17 Later,
 such “Dutch who settled in Colchester, Canterbury, and Sandwich in the 1560s
 retained the legendary Dutch work habits, according to Thomas Manley, who
 compared them to the ‘lazy, wastfull, and disorderly’ English” (Appleby 76). A
 popular but unreliable distich ran: “Hops, Reformation, bays and beer / Came
 into England all in one year” (Bickerdyke 67).18 An alternative version in
 Henry Buttes’ Dyets Dry Dinner emphasized the fifth-column element of
 Dutch brewing practices:
Besides the necessitie hereof [of hops] in brewing of Beere, is sufficiently
 
knowne to Germany and England, and all these Northerne parts of the
 worlde: yet I know not how it happened (as he merrily saith) that heresie
 & beere came hopping into England both in a yeere. (G4r)
In other words beer 
is
 northern in its origin as is the Protestant Reformation  
that Henry VIII’s failed divorce set in motion. Hops’s association with hereti
­cal Protestantism as significant
 
Dutch exports breeds a kind of xenophobic hys ­
teria; hops may be necessary for beer, but beer belongs in other “Northerne
 parts” than England. Henry VIII went so far in 1530 as to enjoin the Royal
 brewer to put “neither hops nor brimstone into the beer” (Bickerdyke 71).19
 Not only was the spice devilish, it was also foreign, attributes that were far from
 mutually exclusive. Andrew Boorde in his Dyetary (1547) played up the
 nationalist characteristics of drink: “Ale for an Englysshe man is a natural
 drynke. . . . Bere ... is a naturall drynke for a Dutche man. And nowe of late
 dayes it is moch vsed in Englande to the detryment of many Englysshe men”
 (10). As late as 1574, Reynolde Scot in his A Perfite Platforme of a
 
Hoppe Gar ­
den was instructing Englishmen how to grow hops based on Dutch methods he
 had seen at Poppering; he also accused the Dutch of “dazeling us with the dis
­commendation of our soyle, obscuring and falsifying the order of this mysterie”
 (B2v).20 Notice the quasi-religious metaphors at work here, as if the Dutch
 were false angels who misrepresented the Eden that was England by “dazeling”
 its inhabitants.
By the 1580s, however, there was a clear change of
 
heart. The economic  
viability
 
of hops as a crop and the market penetration of its most significant by ­
product, beer, necessitated a revision of English cultural heritage. Hops was
 recuperated as a “native” plant within the herbal literature (Gerarde 737-8).21
 Authorities complained of a lack of beer for the English Armada due to a
 shortage of hops! (Public Record Office, SP 12/215 fol. 55). The English even
 distinguished between native hops, which were good, and the foreign version
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with any powder, dust, dross, sand, or other soil whatsoever ” (Fuller 1:  
493, quoting Statues of the Realm 1 JI c. 18). A royal investigation by the lord
 treasurer in the 1590s found that hops grown “beyond sea” were seldom used in
 domestic brewing because they “were boyled before they came over” and “would
 moulder to verry
 
duste” (British Library, Landsdowne MS 71 fol. 65r). Admit ­
tedly, during this period there was some linguistic confusion over ale and beer;
 however, at any time after the 1580s when the proper distinction was made,
 beer was praised for its medical and dietetic advantages over ale, specifically for
 those accorded by the inclusion of hops (Culpeper 130).
Similarly, English authorities sought to legislate against foreign competi
­
tion. As far back as 1289, the Norwich Leet Roll recorded the following fine:
 “De Ricardo Somer quia vendit cervesiam / flandrensem occulte per quod Bal
­livi /
 
perdiderunt custumam ... ijs” [Of Richard Summer because he sells Flan ­
ders ale privily, whereby the Bailiffs have lost custom] (Hudson 21).22 Such
 efforts were widespread, especially at the local level in and around London.
 Legislation against or limiting the scope of foreign brewers has a long history
 dating back to at least the 1460s (Guildhall Library, London Letter
 
Book L fol.  
25). Alehouses owners were “enjoyned not to suffer any tapster that is a for-
 reyner to draw or offer any beere or ale for or under them” (Corporation of
 London Record Office, Repertories 30 fol. 40v).23 Like other trades regulated
 by the guilds,
No Inholder, vintner, winesellor, hostiller, pybaker (?), cooke, tippler or
 
huxter or any other shall buy anie manner of Ale or beere to sell by retaile
 but of freemen enfranchized and inhabitinge within the fredom and liber
­ties of the saide cittie. (Guildhall Library, MS 5496 fol. 8v)
Just such an exclusionary law allows the economic resolution brought on by a
 
“deus ex machina supplied by a Dutch captain who, as an alien merchant, could
 not sell his shipload of goods directly on the London market” in Dekker s The
 Shoemakers
 
Holiday (Seaver 93). Of course, this anxiety over foreign competi ­
tion is also part and parcel of the cultural fantasies of self-determination that
 underlie nationalist sentiment; surely Dutch beer was not a staple import of
 Britain because even with hops as an ingredient the product still did not keep
 well enough to be transported long distances. Israel demonstrates that most
 Dutch brewing occured in big “inland towns . . . which produced a good deal
 of beer, mostly for local consumption locally but also in the south Netherlands”
 (18).
This curious shift in the status of hops exemplifies the fluid and transfor
­
mational nature of cultural and national identities in this period. As illustrat
­ed by Boorde in 1547, beer originally was considered a “Dutch” drink. A scant
 thirty years later, however, the English crowed about their “beere exceedinge in
 goodnesse faire the beere that anie of them can brewe in the lowe countries”
 (British Library, Landsdowne MS 71 fol. 50r). Conversely, only after Leices
­ters failed military campaign of 1587 ended serious English intervention in the
 Low Countries was drunkenness perceived 
as
 a continental sin imported back  
from the Netherlands to England; the high correlation between vagrants and
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ex-soldiers seemed to solidify this truism (Beier 93-5).24 For the English in the
 
1590s, beer remained a troublesome product as well as a cherished element of
 their national heritage. Well into the seventeenth century, John Taylor, the
 Water-poet, was still rehearsing cultural xenophobia around alcohol praising
 “english Ale” against foreign beer (B3v). Such old habits die hard.
Now we must turn to related internal debates over the status of beer in
 
English society and the definition of England itself as a nation. I will focus on
 how these issues were dramatized in the popular theater.
Beer, Englishness, and the Popular Stage
Typically, Renaissance stage Dutchmen either provide local cosmopolitan color
 
or comic dialect effects (see Middletons No Wit No Help like a Womans and
 Haughtons Englishmen for my Money); however, in two specfic instances they
 actually produce a commentary on emergent nationalism. I wish to examine
 two very different plays: one extremely well known (Thomas Dekker’s The
 Shoemakers Holiday), the other virtually unknown (Daubridgcourt Belchier’s
 Hans Beer-Pot). Through these plays, we will see how the English constructed




s The Shoemakers Holiday, Rowland Lacy’s disguise as Hans  
Meulter places him in a tradition that includes Shakespeare’s Prince Hal. Both
 are aristocrats who seek to understand the baser sort by frequenting their tip
­pling haunts, only “Tom, Dick, and, Francis” (1 Henry IV 2.4.8) are here
 replaced by the journeymen, Firk, Hodge, and Ralph; unlike Hal, however,
 Lacy does not seek to lead such London lads into foreign combat. Rather he
 avoids his commission as “Chief colonel of all those companies / Mustered in
 London and the shires about / To serve his Highness in those wars of France”
 (1.47-9), and chooses instead to serve the gentle craft of shoemaking. This dis
­guise serves mutliple purposes: at once comic, economic, and perhaps even
 xenophobic.
The comic nature of Hans 
is
 twofold: alcoholic and linguistic. Lacy’s sec ­
ond appearance in the guise of Hans after his Hal-like soliloquy in act 3 defines
 the stereotype of the droll, dropsical stage Dutchman, while marrying the two
 themes in a comic drinking song:
Der was een bore van Gelderland,
Frolick sie byen;
He was als dronck he could niet stand,
Upsee al sie byen;
Tap eens de canneken,
Drincke, schone mannekin. (4.42-7)
[There was a boor (peasant or country clown) from Gelderland
 
Merry they are
He was so drunk he could not stand,
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Drunk they all are.
Pour another cup,
Drink, pretty little man]
This language 
is
 actually “a mixture of Dutch and English” and typical of  
Renaissance stage dialects, which were primarily used for Irish, Scottish, and
 Welsh characters (R. Dekker 62). Although Firk has been insistently hinting
 at his thirst, his master Eyre only relents out of hospitality for the newly hired
 Dutch journeyman: “Hodge, entertain him.... Come, my last of the fives, give
 me a can. Have to thee, Hans!” (4.105-20).
The play is rife with puns on gentle (Bevington 110; Seaver 100). Eyre and
 
his journeyman as well as Lacy
 
practice “the Gentle Craft” (3.4). Indeed, Eyre  
seems to manifest gentility in many of his actions, as in the drinking scene
 above. Ultimately Eyre becomes a true gentleman as he is both elected lord
 mayor and granted “[o]ne honour more” by the king (21.130). However, this
 world of gentility is bounded by harsh economic and political realities. David
 Scott Kastan has shown how the very work of the play 
is
 work itself. The  
arrival of the Dutch “ship of merchandise” which empowers Simon Eyre
'
s 
ascension to the lord mayoralty precisely mimics contemporary reality (7.134).
 In contrast to European
 
powers that  got rich on the plunder of colonialism, “the  
Dutch ... had made their money in a most mundane fashion.... [B]road-bot-
 tomed Dutch fluyboats had plied the waters of
 
the North Sea in a seemingly  
endless circulation of European staples” (Appleby 73). Consider the ships
 “sweet
 
wares ”: “Prunes, almonds, sugar candy, carrot-roots, turnips — O, brave  
fatting meat” (7.139-41). Firk expounds on a brave new world of seemingly
 exotic comestibles; however, the seriousness of trade still seeps in. Most critics
 seem to think Firk mistakenly either lists turnips as exotic or includes them by
 association; however, turnips were to become an essential part of Englands
 rural-agricultural economy, for their planting allowed quicker renitrification of
 fields than simply letting them lie fallow.25 Already they were used as both a
 table item and 
as
 a replacement crop for hops. The savvy Dutch merchant  
knows there is much profit to be had in such a plain tuber. Similarly, Hans 
is hired on as a journeyman by Eyre because he is, as Hodge asserts, “Fore God,
 a proper man and, I warrant, a fine workman” (4.63-4) and because even a
 native son like Firk threatens to quit if Hans is not hired. As Bevington notes,
 “this even-handedness”
 
in Dekker 's presentation of Hans “is remarkable in view  
of the strength of feeling in London about cheap immigrant labor” (111).
Finally, however, there is 
a
 tinge of xenophobia to Dekker 's play world:  
Firk would have Eyre hire Hans so
 
“that I may learn some gibble-gabble. Twill  
make us work the faster” (4.51-2). Although primarily good-natured, Firk’s
 interest in Hans and his skills displays a typical English anxiety about superior
 Dutch industry; as Bevington notes, there was “resentment of foreign labor
 from the Lowlands” (101). Indeed, “Dekker manages to have it both ways with
 his audience about xenophobic stereotypes: they can laugh at Firk and yet con
­descend to Hans s beer drinking German drollery” (111).26 Much of this xeno
­phobia is based on Britain’s seemingly unique situation as a fortress island girt
 against the conflict ravaging Europe; throughout the period leading up this
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play, the last decade of the sixteenth century and of Elizabeth’s reign, England
 
was consumed both by a sense of strife and one of apocalypse (Seaver 87-8).27
However, the play more than compensates for this xenophobia by also
 
allowing Hans to be the agent of Eyre’s ascendancy. In this interpretive ver
­sion of a play that presents a moral lesson on the virtues of hard work in the
 guise of the shoemaking lord mayor, Dekker’s invention allows the disguised
 noble Lacy to help 
a
 London tradesman. The enabler of this aid is the Dutch  
disguise by which Lacy can converse with the Dutch captain. Here, Dekker
 scores a double point: the industry and success of Dutch merchants are given
 nationalistic acceptance by underlying a constitutive myth of English urban
 self-creation; and, at the same time, the disguise allows a noble free range in the
 commercial world of the city. However, it 
is
 only a disguise, and there comes  
a time for it to be doffed. Lacy manages to turn even this act to good effect by
 telling Eyre:
Let me request you to remember me.
I know your honour easily may obtain
Free pardon of the King for me and Rose,
And reconcile me to my uncle’s grace. (20.43-6)




the play’s beginning. But the pardon he seeks is great for he has been, as Lin ­
coln claims, a traitor "heaped” with "desertless favours . . . / To be commander
 over powers in France” (21.47, 48, 49), a position he forsook for "love’s desire”
 (57). .
Like any English play on nationalism, The Shoemakers Holiday owes more
 
than a little debt to Shakespeare’s Henry V, I have already argued that Lacy’s
 disguise mimics those of Hal, although he obviously lacks the latter’s battle
 experience. We perhaps most clearly see this debt in the play’s royal conclu
­sion: the moment at which the royal prerogative supersedes the royal grant of
 
a
 journeyman’s holiday in commercial London, the moment when the troops  
return to the Continent: "Come, lords, a while let’s revel it at home. / When
 all our sports and banquetings are done, / Wars must right wrongs which
 Frenchmen have begun” (21.194-6). This time apparently no Dutch disguise
 will serve Lacy, nor has he need of one, having wooed and won Rose.
Some twenty years later at the onset of the Thirty Year’s War, Daubridg-
 
court Belchier returns to these issues of beer and nationalism and to the source
 text of Henry V in his "closet” drama, Hans Beer-Pot, his Invisible Comedy of See
 me and See me not. The play, apparently printed in London in 1618, interest
­ingly reverses our beverage flow. Hans, a sodden country servant who likes to
 "cracke a pot” (B3r) with soldiers while on his master’s business in Utrecht,
 continually seeks "cans of English Beere” (D4v; emphasis added). The play was
 most likely intended for a fervently nationalistic English audience, although no
 evidence that the play was ever performed in London exists; nor 
is
 it certain  
that it was performed in Utrecht for expatriates and soldiers, even though the
 title page claims that the play was "ACTED In the Low Countries, by an hon
­est Company of Health-Drinker"; one can imagine a sort of early modern ver
­sion of the soldiers’ review in South Pacific. Belchier himself lived in Utrecht
 
41
Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
George Evans Light
from 1617 and died there in 1621 (Webb and Stephen 4:144). The play
 
becomes something of a fount of
 
cultural nostalgia for the Elizabethan world  
of the 1590s even as its “plot” disintegrates into a tissue of set speeches in three
 acts followed by a pseudo-Petrarchan pastoral song about a “Queene” (H2v).
Throughout the play, England 
is
 the cultural measuring stick even while  
Holland is the setting. In an early speech, later repeated and embellished with
 respect to martial accomplishments, “Cornelius Harmants, a rich Country
 Gentlemen” (Bv) explains at least his own fascination with all things English:
What courting calst thou them, thou rubst me up,
 
To thinke upon the times forepast, I saw
 In Englands Court 
so
 famous and renownde  
Of great Elizaes blessed memory
That ayded so these troubled Netherlands
With men and money; still oh, oh, still me thinkes
 
I see those Worthies marching on earthes Stage;
 The famous Essex, Norreis, Sidney too,
 And wisest Vere, that held Ostend so long,
 Gainst hells foule mouth, and Spanish tyranny,
 As yet his complices can testifie. (B4r)
This speech
 
brings the spirit of Henry V 's St. Crispin 's Day  speech to life, as the  
names “Familiar in his mouth as household words, / . . . / Be in their flowing
 cups freshly rememb’red” (4.3.52, 55). Of course, given the probable audience
 for
 
the play, it can also be seen as a spirit booster: you soldiers now should want  
to live up to the reputation of your predecessors. Furthermore, it perpetuates
 the myth of Elizabeth I as gallant, generous, and warlike, when the reality 
is that she had mixed feelings about active involvement in the Low Countries (see
 note 5). Also, for a play printed in 1618, it proffers a nostalgic vision of a late
 English greatness. While James had no interest in continental squabbles,
 Belchier, himself an expatriate who would die in a siege of Utrecht, praises
 “Elizaes blessed memory / That ayded so these troubled Netherlands.”
The fascination with Britain goes beyond its martial prowess to its eco
­
nomic prowess, as English commodites are all the rage. Beyond Hans
'
s taste  
for English beer, the “rich merchant Garland” (Bv), son-in-law to Cornelius,
 also orders “two cans of your best English beere” (Er). Later, Cornelius in a
 moment of unfettered profligacy invites the tapster Joaske Flutterkin to his
 house “[t]o eate some venison, here ’tis novelty; / It came from England, baked
 in Rye paste” (F3r). Even the lower orders have the same fascination. “Pasquill
 Beeremond a Sentinell” (Bv) desires “a Tankard full of Spanish Wine / Like
 those in London Water-bearers use” (F4v) and will eat some “Pies” on his jour
­ney of “[t]hree English miles” (Gr) that surely must be like the venison pastry
 just described.
The play further intermixes things Dutch and English in its economic the
­
ory.
 While the Dutch were usually seen as innovators even to the point of  
English anxiety, Belchier has his Dutch characters learn from their English
 compatriots. Thus Cornelius is described by Flutterkin:
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O theres a man lives bravely, keepes an house,
 
Releeves the poore, his gates be never shut;
 His tables free, theres meat for honest men:
 He livde in England, learnt that countrey guise,
 For Hospitality, few such be here:
Yet frugall too, was never prodigall,
Spends nothing more, but what he well may spare,
He borrowes nought, nor lends on usurie:
Yet hath ynough. (G4r-Ev)
If anything, Flutterkin is mimicking English complaints about Dutch econom
­
ic success. As Appleby notes, The Dutch “enjoyed a burgeoning trade, a
 remarkable prosperity, had plenty of money, high land values, high prices, and
 the lowest interest rate in Europe. A group of English writers were convinced
 that Dutch success stemmed from their low interest rate” (88). This well-
 meaning moderation runs through the entire family. “Hanneke, his wife” (Bv)
 has a similar approach to life:
As God doth blesse the earth with great encrease,
And in great measure send us ten for one:
 
So must those blessings carefully be kept,
 And not with wretchlessse heed, let runne at large,
 For 
so
 huge heapes of wealth consume to nought,  
And like fayre buildings unrepayrde, decay.
Yet must not beastly miching niggardize,
Cause us forget our selves, and those that want,
But give releefe from our aboundant store:
We have enough, our charge 
is
 not so great,  
One daughter shee s bestowed richly, and
 Her portion payde, no penny more in debt,
 Two sonnes besides, and they provided for,
 The yongst at Schoole, the other trayles a Pyke,
 And for preferment lookes each day, each houre. (B2r-v)
Hans the servant praises his mistress 
as
 “the best that ever trode on shooe: / I  
would not chaunge my life to be Lord Mayor / Of that fayre towne of London
 (B3r) — not Amsterdam or Utrecht; again England is the fount of value and
 meaning.28 The aforementioned elder son Younker, although deemed a profli
­gate by his family for suffering from the “fancies of unbrideled youth” (B2r), 
is in fact his fathers son, a sober sort who shares the wealth: “In this Ile please
 you, but Ile drink no more” (E2r). The two are finally reunited in their love of
 martial affairs. Younker complains that “it grieves me much / To see poore
 Souldiers walke in mean attire; / And lesse respect that have deserv’d well[,]”
 for which he blames “times corruption” (G3r-v). In response to this Cornelius
 returns to his favorite tale:
When I was in my flowre of youth, and livde
 
in Englands Court, that swarmde with Marrtialists,
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Seaman and Souldiers, there had great respect,
Were set by; honourd more than other men. (G4r)




 stirring refrain: “Blest be that hand which brought this blessed peace;  
/ And blest be those that pray it never cease” (Hr). Like father like son:
 Younker himself has absorbed his father
'
s speeches and, as we shall see, his nos ­
talgic love of England.
The militarism of the play turns to further comic effect when Serieant
 
Goodfellow tries his hand at debating Younker in “construction of Quids vers
­es” (Er) and on various other matters “Italian, Spanish, English, Dutch, or
 French” (Dv). Their debate soon turns to matters military, as Younker prevails
 over his less-educated tavern comrades:
The question which I prosecute 
is
 this,
If horse or foot should haue preheminence:
They are needfull both, to make an armie vp:
Yet those great Armies which the Tartars usde,
Were all of horse; so were the Persians
Till later times English Shirleis taught
The use of foot, and how to entrench a Campe. (E2r)
In this continuing discourse on the “disciplines of war” (Shakespeare, Henry F,
 
3.3.96-7), Younker could be Fluellen himself. Like all his fathers discourses
 before him, his has its own nationalistic and nostalgic agenda praising foot over
 horse, “[w]hen Henry th’ eight of famous memory, / Wan Bolleigne from the
 French” (Fv). Here again the Tudor myth 
is
 firmly founded on continental  vic ­
tories.
Both Belchier and Dekker reinscribe Anglo-Dutch relations after their
 
own fashion to further nationalist agendas, be they attempts to solidify support
 for foreign wars amongst all strata of London society or attempts to remember
 an earlier age when English glory was gained on Dutch soil. In that sense, they
 invert our opening joke, which operates on its own kind of nostalgia. Written
 in the mid-seventeenth century when the royal houses of England and the
 Dutch Republic were linked in marriage, Peacham
'
s joke fondly remembers a  
much earlier Tudor England brought up on “local” ale instead of “foreign” beer,
 and it evokes a mythical time when matters continental, be they hops or war,
 did not threaten the English way of life. In The Shoemakers Holiday, Dutch
 hard work 
is
 not a threat but rather  a support for the morality tale of Eyres rise.  
Beer becomes a sign of holiday festivities but also of comradeship, even across
 classes. Hans Beer-Pot similarly signifies good fellowship across the various
 orders as “two cans of your best English beere” (Er). Its mid-Jacobean nostal
­gia looks back at closer Anglo-Dutch relations under Elizabeth and fantasizes
 a home away from home for Englishmen like Belchier himself amongst the
 Anglophilic Dutch community of Utrecht. In both plays, hopped beer com
­bines the best of Dutch and English spirits.
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An earlier and much different version of this paper focussing on the Henriad
 
was delivered at “Reinterpretations: the New Heaven, New Earth of the Past,”
 the 23rd annual regional meeting of the Northwest Conference on British
 Studies at the University of Oregon (October 11-12, 1991). For their helpful
 suggestions, I would like to thank the anonymous reader for
 
Jx, Judith Bennett,  
Michael Bristol, Ivo Kamps, Seth Lerer, Ania Loomba, Ron Rebholz, David
 Riggs, Bradley Rubdige, and Paul Seaver. Derede Arthur shared her expertise
 on nationalism; Jeff Erickson alerted me to the Dickensian usage of “Hollands.”
  I especially would like to thank the staffs of the libraries at the University of
 California at Berkeley, the British Museum, the Corporation of London
 Record Office, the University of
 
California, Davis, the Guildhall, Mississippi  
State
 
University, the Public Record Office (Chancery  Lane), and Stanford Uni ­
versity for their generous support. The essay
 
is dedicated to S. Smith, J. Tetley,  
and T. & R. Theakston.
1.
 
While I'm more interested in national identity expressed in terms of  
alcohol, the English traditionally viewed themselves as superior to other Euro
­peans and explained their idleness by pointing to the paradise in which they
 lived. Thus Richard
 
Morison in condemning the Pilgrimage of Grace notes the  
difference between the English and other Europeans: “Other men, that are
 borne in bare countreys, and can not lyue, onles they
 
moche trauayle the world,  
auoyde myserie by their great labour and toyle. In Englande the grounde
 almoste nourisheth us alone. . . . God hath gyuen us to good a countrey, we
 maye here to many of us lyue ydle” (E4v).
2.
 
Defining nationalism and determining when it first arose is a vexed  
problem in social and political theory. For some recent important work, see
 Anderson; Armstrong; Colley, Britons 5-9; Corrigan and Sayer; Elton; Gellner;
 Hechter 47-73; Helgerson; Newman; Samuel 1: 1-56; Anthony Smith; and
 Tilly. According to Peter Sahlins, national identity is organized around “the
 social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the collective self and its
 implicit negation, the other,” a formulation I find useful in my argument even
 if the North Sea separates England from the Low Countries (270-1).
3.
 
Here Helgerson's diachronic argument gets away from itself. The Irish  
certainly did and do not share this English enthusiasm. Nor do the Scots, as
 the recent devolution debates make clear.
4.
 
The joke belongs to the genre, “There were three men, an x, a y, and a  
z.” As Henri Bergson notes, “repetition is the favourite method of classic com
­edy. It consists in so arranging events that a scene is reproduced either between
 the same characters under fresh circumstances or between fresh characters
 under the same circumstances” (121-2).
5.
 
For good discussions of the changing relationship between the English  
and the Dutch during the seventeenth century, see Duffy 27-31, and Edmund
­son. Recently Wallace MacCaffrey has neatly summarized Anglo-Dutch rela
­tions during Elizabeth
'
s reign: “For the English the long-term advantages were  
equally important. The experience of the years since 1572 had made the estab
­
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lishment of an independent regime in the provinces an axiom of English poli
­
cy.... By 1585 it was painfully clear that only direct English intervention could
 prevent the restoration of Spanish power in the Low Countries, wielded by a
 monarch whose well-founded suspicion of English intentions was fast harden
­ing into relentless enmity. ... By 1598 it was beginning to become apparent
 that such a goal did not necessarily demand a general peace, that there was a
 half-way house in which England could withdraw from active participation in
 the Low Countries campaign without breaking altogether the cords that bound
 her and the States-General in a common interest” (298). For more on eco
­nomic and military rivalries, see Pincus, “Popery” and “Republicanism.”
6.
 
See also Pettegree and Grell. In the census of 1567, 2030 out of 2730  
aliens counted in London were Dutch (Kirk and Kirk 365). Similarly in 1573,




However, this lack of excessive drinking may be read negatively, as a  
marker for the effeminacy of the French. As Alan Sinfield notes, “In Henry V,
 the superior manliness of the English is so insisted upon that
 
it comes to appear  
the main validation of their title: because they are more manly than the French,
 they are more fit to rule anywhere” (130).
8.
 
For a general discussion of English travellers in the Low Countries, see  
Stoye 239-325. For good discussions of alcoholic consumption in the Low





For a more thorough discussion of this topic specifically and the role of  
national identity generally in Renaissance drama, see Hoenselaars.
10.
 
Notice how most types of wine are assigned a nationality.
11.
 
The translation is mine. The original runs “si d’auenture il mouroit  
ainsi sou comme vn Angloys.”
12.
 
Christopher Highley says that conceptually “the English organized  
their Celtic neighbors through a network of flexible and shifting relationships
 that allowed the English to both distinguish and where appropriate make
 strategic connections between them” (92). For more on Britains and Others,
 see Colley, “Britishness and Otherness” 309-29.
13.
 
Consumption data for the early modern period is notoriously hard to  
come by and unreliable. Josephine A. Spring and David H. Buss note that
 “[b]eer consumption reached a maximum of 832 pints per person pr yr (or 2.3
 pints pr person pr day) in 1689” (568). However, in The English Alehouse, Peter
 Clark notes that “[i]n 1545 soldiers in the English garrison at Boulogne prob
­ably drank about 4 1/2 gallons each of beer a week or rather more than 2 quarts
 a day” (109).
14.
 
Today the terms ale and beer have collapsed to have basically the same  
meaning, but in terms of sixteenth-century brewing they had quite distinctive
 significations; ale was traditionally and then legally a mixture of fermented
 malt, water, and yeast; beer substituted hops for the yeast. For the legal defin
­ition of ale, see London Letter Books
 
L 31. For a good explanation of the tortu ­





Intriguingly, gin, first distilled by Franciscus Sylvius in Leiden in the  
seventeenth century, has a similar cultural history. The beverage was intro-
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duced to England by soldiers returning from the Low Countries. Late into the
 
nineteenth century, gin was also called Hollands. The standard work on the
 Dutch brewing industry remains R. Dekkers Holland in Beroering,
16.
 
Clark 31-2; Mathias 3-4; and Monckton 18. The etymologies of beer  
and hops in the OED illustrate the changing nature of this reception. Hops is
 first mentioned c. 1440 as a plant used in the brewing process. Beer, while an
 ancient English word, 
is
 rarely used in Old English, except in poetry. It  
becomes common only in the sixteenth century, just as the product takes off.
17.
 
To this day Kentish hops are among the finest in the world and high ­
ly sought after. Anchor Steam, a San Francisco microbrewery, imports Kentish
 hops for its fine ales and beers.
18.
 
Two other versions of the ditty are extant:
Hops and turkeys, carp and beer
Came into England all in one year
and
Turkeys, carps, hops, pickerel, and beer
Came into England all in one year.
Note that this tune already highlights the unique nature of England's insulari
­
ty; outside products had to come into England. This ditty provides the tradi
­tional but unprovable date of 1524 for cultivated hops introduction to England
 by the Dutch.
19.
 
Perhaps the use of sulfuring, whereby sulfur was added to old hops as  
a preservative, accounts for the ban on brimstone; however, the hellish conno
­tations of fire and
 
brimstone were a commonplace. See Genesis 19:24 and Rev ­
elations 19:20 in the Geneva Bible,
20.
 




A century later, Culpeper wrote of “such things only as grow in Eng ­




Hudson mistakenly translates “cervesiam” as beer; however, the foreign  
nature of the drink and its relation to the fine are worth noting.
23.
 
Here “forreyner” is a wider term denoting anyone not free of the city,  
but that would include foreigners in the more modern sense. As Ian Archers
 notes, “immigrants mainly from the Netherlands and France” were typically
 called “strangers or aliens” (131).
24.
 
Gregory A. Austin provides a useful caveat: “Camden, Nashe, and  
Shakespeare, among others blame this [prevalence of drunkenness] on Dutch
 influence, but it is also clearly rooted in a variety of major domestic changes
 occurring since at least the mid-century” (180).
25.
 
John Gerarde demonstrated the English turnips relationship to the  
Dutch in two ways. First, “[i]t groweth in fields and divers vineyardes, or hoppe
 gardens in most places of England” (178; emphasis added). Second,
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They of the lowe countries does give the oile which is pressed out of the
 
seede, against the after throwes of women newly brought to bed, and also
 do minister it to yoong children against the wormes, which it both killeth
 and driveth foorth. (178)
The significance of turnip husbandry for the four-crop rotation system which
 
spawned Englands agricultural revolution was a discovery of the mid-seven
­teenth century (Kerridge 269-77). For the standard interpretation of the
 turnip, see Smallwood and Wells’ edition of The Shoemakers Holiday (Dekker
 125, n. 139-40).
26.
 
Confusing the Dutch and the German is typical of this period.
27.
 
Here contemporaries have it both ways: they see England as distinct  
from Europe and in some ways safe, but
 
they also note that their island is occu ­
pied by other “races,” especially the Scots — some of whom display French
 Catholic leanings. The fear of Scotland or Wales proving a backdoor into Eng
­land for Catholic forces proved prescient with the Jacobite invasions of the
 eighteenth century, even if the invasions themselves failed.
28.
 
Surely this remark is a nod towards Dekker 's play.
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My title refers to a moment in act 3, scene 4 of Mac
­
beth
 after Banquo’s ghost has disrupted the quiet of  
Macbeths conscience. Left alone with Lady Mac
­beth, who has hastened their
 
guests’ departures, Mac ­
beth murmurs, “It will have blood, they say; blood
 will have blood” (121). These lines provide the con
­text for my reading of the play, in which the bloody
 competition for preferment and power implicated in
 absolute systems of monarchy is doomed to 
a
 cycle of  
failure and repetition. “To be thus is nothing, / But
 to be safely thus” (3.1.47-8), Macbeth discovers, so
 that Duncans blood is only the first that must be
 shed in Macbeths chase after an ever-illusive state
 security. Thus, blood calls to itself; the
 
violence upon  
which his precarious authority stands breeds more
 violence. Comforted by his wife, however, Macbeth
 abandons his hysteria and confirms the dialects of
 this logic: “Come, we’ll to sleep. My strange and
 self-abuse / Is the initiate fear that wants hard use: /
 We are yet but young in deed” (3.4.141-3). Mac
­beth’s ability to shake off his terror and his doubt to
 refocus his attention on the bloody business of king-
 ship ever before him is enabled, I will argue, by Lady
 Macbeth, who gives him the image of himself he
 seeks. Thus Shakespeare’s tragedy interrogates the
 tyranny of absolute monarchical practices that the
 playwright divorces from naturalized gender con
­structions by placing Lady Macbeth at the center of
 the play’s violence. While she is often read as rup
­turing her designated gender function, I argue that
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she provides a parodic inversion of the ideal wife and allows Shakespeare to put
 
pressure on masculinist and violent structures of relations that depend on
 womens abject confirmation for their unremitting self-perpetuation.
Lady Macbeth
'
s "evil” is, in this regard, an ideologically inscribed notion  
that is often linked in our literary tradition to strong female characters who
 seek power, who reject filial loyalty as prior to self-loyalty, and who pursue
 desire in all its forms — romantic, adulterate, authoritarian, and even violent.
 Evil, then, is a gender-linked concept that reifies constructions of action as
 definitive of masculinity. I want to suggest that Shakespeare’s tragedy presents
 a complex vision of gender and power, which, rather than reinscribing binary
 oppositions of male/female, active/passive, and good/evil, exposes structures of
 violence and tyranny as dependent on naturalized definitions of femininity and
 masculinity. Macbeth explores a system of power relations that requires both
 men
'
s glorification of violence and women s renunciation of desire for a phan-  
tasmatic stability.1 That women in power seem to behave like men suggests
 that binary oppositions are cultural fabrications. Thus Shakespeare uncovers
 the gender trouble2 behind the prescriptions that constitute femininity as com
­pliance, masculinity as violence, and violence as power.
Lady Macbeth
'
s place in critical history is one of almost peerless malevo ­
lence.3 Scholars argue that she violates the dictates of gender by conjuring the
 spirits to “unsex” her. When she encourages Macbeth
'
s violence by questioning  
his manhood, she is perceived not just as shrewish but as the play’s source for
 the definition of masculinity as violence.4 In her defense of Lady Macbeth,5
 Joan Larsen Klein writes,
In spite of the view of some critics that Lady Macbeth 
is
 the evil force  
behind Macbeth’s unwilling villainy, she seems to epitomize the sixteenth
­century belief that women are passive, men active. . . . Lady Macbeth’s
 threats of violence, for all their force and cruelty, are empty
 
fantasies. (244)
Klein suggests that Lady Macbeth’s femininity absolves her of evil, fusing
 
female action with evil and passivity with a naturalized femininity. Despite the
 poststructuralist and feminist practice of questioning monolithic, essentialist
 readings of subjectivity, critics find it all too easy to resort to more traditional,
 even moralized, analyses, so that they ignore cultural imperatives constructing
 gender norms and vilifying deviation.6 My analysis of Lady Macbeth begins,
 in this regard, not by measuring her behavior according to naturalized pre
­scriptions of appropriate and inappropriate , feminine conduct but by probing
 the cultural injunctions — invoked by the play’s politics of gender and violence
 — governing her conduct.7
The violence underwriting the structures of power in place prior to Lady
 
Macbeth's encouragement of Macbeth’s violence, in this regard, cannot simply
 be cast off when a woman contemplates power. Shakespeare succeeds in high
­lighting the brutality of absolute monarchy by placing power in the hands of a
 woman who approaches it not according to “womanly” virtues of mercy and
 reconciliation but according to politically expedient and pragmatic notions of
 suspicion, deception, and death. I urge a reading of Lady Macbeth at least
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resembling the complexity of scholarly views of Lear, Edmund, Edgar, Duncan,
 
Macbeth, and Macduff, who are often read sympathetically despite the violent
 and ruthless competition for preferment and power in which they take part.
 Such 
a
 reading is possible despite  Alan Sinfield's contention that Lady Macbeth  
“is not a character,” and it can be made within the very paradigm of character
 analysis that he advocates (Faultlines 78, 61-6). Rather than violating and then
 collapsing back into a natural (and prior) passive feminine conduct, Lady Mac
­beth performs gender according to the fluctuating politics of power and vio
­lence staged by Macbeth. Just as the violent cultural context of the play provides
 competing discourses for Macbeth, it enables and, in part, encourages a shift
­ing set of responses from Lady Macbeth that are simultaneously “masculine”
 brutality and “feminine” obedience. If she does indeed transgress her gender to
 become manly, therefore, it is because she must do so to reflect — as conduct
 manuals demand — the bloody desire of her husband. That tracts on women’s
 conduct cannot be said, literally, to demand anything of the kind is less impor
­tant than the submission they do demand, which can be misunderstood, mis
­recognized as a constant and unquestioning feminine compliance with the
 desires of the masculine.8
In this light, Lady Macbeths encouragement of her husbands regicide can
 
be read as Shakespeares parodic depiction of wifely
 
duty. Set within a structure  
of power dependent on violence for stability, Lady Macbeth’s behavior adheres
 to rather than transgresses her gender role. Macbeth comprises a radical staging
 of female gender, then, that contextualizes womens desire in hostile patrilineal9
 structures and points to a cultural manufacturing of femininity as passive, ten
­der, and merciful. Because Lady Macbeth reproduces the bloody competition
 for preferment and power ostensibly inherent to masculinity, Macbeth demon
­strates the artificiality of gender
 
divisions; and because Shakespeare underscores  
the brutality of patrilineal power regardless of the gender of its perpetrator or
 the “legitimacy” of a given monarch, the moral distinctions traditionally
 informing critical reception of state power and violence become uncertain. The
 differentiation between that which 
is
 socially sanctioned and that which is  
abject, in Kristeva’s terms,10 
is
 uncovered in its ideological fragility. The abject  
is located not within a feminine chaos but rather
 
in the masculinist competition  
for property and domination that builds on a ruthless denial of female desire.
 Macbeth, in this light, uncovers the complex dynamics of gender and power
 through representation of a ruthless female character who reproduces the vio
­lent practices of a masculinist order. That we often fail to sympathize with
 Lady Macbeth says more about our own moralized expectations of femininity
 and masculinity, I argue, than it does about Shakespeare’s own sense of gen
­der.11
2.
Many critics have noted the play’s association of manliness with violence and
 
power. However, these scholars do not extend their analysis of Macbeth's por
­trayals of masculinity to Lady Macbeth’s gender role, despite the fact that both
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s valorization of masculine brutality and Lady Macbeths performance  
of femininity are produced by the same socio-symbolic system.12 To begin fill
­ing this void, I argue that the play
'
s monarchical structure, sustained by brutal  
competitions for preferment and power, compels Lady Macbeths support of
 Macbeth
'
s regicide, so that Lady Macbeth can be read as performing gender  
according to Lacan
'
s conception of male/female roles, which are governed by  
the phallus.13 Rather than embodying evil within the play, Lady Macbeth
 encourages her husband to seize the power requisite to 
a
 ruthless patrilineal  
order. I want to make clear that Lady Macbeth
'
s role as the phallus is not a bio ­
logical imperative but, as I have argued elsewhere in regard to feminine
 masochism (see
 
“Staging”), the  product of cultural injunctions that, as Kahn has  
brilliantly shown (Man
'
s  Estate 1-20), not only define men 's honor and women 's 
value according to womens virtue but require womens obedience to their
 fathers’ and husbands’ every desire in order to maintain that virtue. Lacan’s
 theorization of phallic gender prescriptions, then, describes in psychoanalytic
 terms internalized cultural mandates on gender performance — cultural man
­dates that limit female action and desire to male agency.14
My interpretation of Lady Macbeth situates her phallic position within a
 
historically specific cultural production of early modern monarchical power and
 gender configurations. Macbeth desires the power to usurp the throne, and,
 subject to his desire, Lady Macbeth 
is
 compelled to reflect its fulfillment.  
While the nature of her guarantee and of Macbeth’s ability to embody such
 power/violence is illusory, the law drives both of them to perform gender
 according to phallic principles. Because the patrilineal structure of
 
power in  
Macbeth is already based on a brutal and violent hierarchy of relations, Lady
 Macbeth’s encouragement of her husband to commit regicide conforms to the
 brutality of the play’s structure of authority and domination. Macbeth, in this
 sense, problematizes a patrilineal system of relations based on violence for its
 stability and perpetuation. This political backdrop to the tragedy suggests that
 Lady Macbeth’s actions find their brutal source in both the monarchical and
 gender structures of power already
 
in place rather than in a  primordial and nat ­
uralized maxim for feminine good and evil.
I take my argument from the Lacanian conception of female and male sub
­
jectivities, which are governed spectrally, as a phantasmatic "being” of and "hav
­ing” the phallus, a structure that determines relations between the sexes. The
 phallus, as Elizabeth Grosz explains, "is both the signifier of the differences
 between the sexes and the signifier which effaces lack and thus difference. It 
is the term with respect to which the two sexes are defined 
as
 different, and the  
term which functions to bring them together, the term of their union” (117).15
 This difference, which Grosz explores in detail, is embedded in the construc
­tion of female sexuality as lack, "that is, as lacking the phallus in order for men
 to be regarded as having it” (119). The phallus, therefore, becomes the sym
­bolic site of difference between men and women, that which distinguishes them
 from one another in culture and "brings them together” in a union predicated
 on the fulfillment of masculine desire. Thus, Grosz argues, Lacan’s choice of
 the phallus as the point of difference between men and women in the symbol
­ic order reproduces male and female inequality (122). The phallus comes to
 represent male power and naturalizes men’s control over the home, the market
­
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place, and the government. Women lack not just the penis but power. Men, in
 
possession of the phallus (the penis for which the phallus stands in symboliza
­tion), become the subjects of desire, the agents of power, those whose desire
 must be guaranteed. It 
is
 through the masculine need for fulfillment that the  
woman becomes the phallus, “is” it in the sense that she becomes the mimetic
 reflection, the ventriloquized guarantor, of mans desire. Male dominance and
 female obedience and passivity become naturalized through this symbolic
 bifurcation. Though Lacan asserts, then, in “The Meaning of the Phallus,” that
 the relations governed by the phallus have nothing whatever to do with the
 social or the cultural but only with the “other scene” of the unconscious (79),
 we can see that they are indeed descriptive of socio-political relations between
 the sexes in a heterosexual matrix.16 In this sense Lady Macbeth confirms —
 as both witness and support
 
— the masculinist violence and power her husband  
values, performs as warrior, and desires in his fantasy of kingship.
My reading of Lady Macbeth as the phallus is indebted to Judith Butler,
 
who emphasizes womens function within the binary and extends and critiques
 Lacans theorization. She argues that gender is a performance, a reading that
 she bases on Lacans assertion that “it is in order to be the phallus . . . that the
 woman will reject an essential part of
 
her femininity, notably all its attributes  
through masquerade. It 
is
 for what she is not that she expects to be desired as 
well as loved” (84). In response to this passage, Butler writes:
The term [masquerade] 
is
 significant because it suggests contradictory  
meanings: On the one hand, if the “being,” the ontological specification of
 the Phallus, is masquerade, then it would appear to reduce all being to a
 form of appearing, the appearance of being, with the consequence that all
 gender ontology is reducible to the
 
play of appearances. On the other hand,  
masquerade suggests that there is a “being” or ontological specification of
 femininity prior to the masquerade, a feminine desire or demand that is
 masked and capable of disclosure, that, indeed, might promise an eventual
 disruption and displacement of the phallogocentric signifying economy.
 (47)
Two important points become manifest. First, gender is a performance consti
­
tuted by oppositional phallic relations. Second, the performance of femininity
 compels women’s renunciation of desire in favor of the desire of the Other.
 That renunciation presupposes a repressed desire, a desire that must be
 repressed in order to support the desire of the Other, so that the Other will
 have power (the phallus). That female desire is denied in order for male desire
 to be fulfilled suggests that female desire, outside phallic precepts, threatens
 male desire. To neutralize that threat, female gender is constructed into a
 reflection of the desire of the Other. The dialectics of this matrix point to the
 phallus’s socio-political underpinnings, which, I would suggest, are reflected
 throughout early modern culture but perhaps most profoundly in the manuals
 on women’s conduct.
Despite the new emphasis on companionate marriage that emerges in the
 
period, liberal humanist Juan Luis Vives invokes a tradition in which (sexually)
 rebellious daughters are murdered by fathers, brothers, and other women:17
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Hippomenes, a great man of Athens, when he knew his daughter desoiled
 
of one, he shut her up in a stable with a wild horse, kept meatless. ... In
 Spain ... two brethren that thought their sister had been a maid, when they
 saw her great with child, they dissembled their anger so long as she was
 with child. But as soon as she was delivered ... they thrust swords into her
 belly and slew her. . . . [T]hree maidens with a long towel strangled a maid
 that was one of their companions, when they took her in the abominable
 deed. (105-6)
Vives’ text, through its advocation of
 
education for women, sets up a curricu ­
lum that teaches women to mimic a masculinist moral order. He conjures
 female “evil” to exorcise it and constructs a virtuous female subject compelled
 to reflect the desire of the masculine other. In this regard, then, as Butler con
­tends, women confront
 
“a strategy of survival within compulsive systems [that  
makes] gender 
a
 performance with clearly punitive consequences” (139).  
Lacan’s paradigm, therefore, in which women “are” the phallus so that men
 “have” the phallus, 
is
 juridically controlled. And it is this cultural and symbol ­
ic system that I suggest 
is
 staged in Macbeth.
What this means, then, for a reading of Lady Macbeth 
is
 that she has been  
scapegoated in Shakespearean criticism as the source of violence in the play.
 For if she functions 
as
 the guarantor of Macbeth’s bloody desire, she cannot be  
said in any way to assert her own desire or ambition. Lady Macbeth must
 encourage her husband’s desire to be king, for she is required by the symbolic
 order to act 
as
 his Other, as the object who, through her lack, supplies his  
potency. My argument abandons the moralized reading of Lady
 
Macbeth for a  
psychoanalytic one18 to interrogate what I see to be a lingering tendency in the
 literary criticism of female characters to ignore the fractured and multiple
 nature of subjectivity and to posit instead a totalizing account of it. Such read
­ings fail to consider the circumscribed nature of Lady Macbeth’s (among other
 female characters’) desire,
 
which, as tracts produce it, must  be the fulfillment of  
masculine power. These analyses also assume an individualized agency unsup
­ported both by antifeminist tracts on women’s nature and by laws such as those
 documented in T. E.’s The Laws Resolutions of Womens Rights. Lady Macbeth
 must reflect, on pain of public humiliation, her husband’s desires, so that her
 responsibility for the play’s violence is complicated by the phallic prescriptions
 determining her gender function in Macbeth's masculinist culture of violence.
Lady Macbeth’s relationship to the witches, in this light, is more tenuous
 
than critics have often assumed.19 Their representation as spectral apparitions
 sets them apart from Lady Macbeth, whose role in the tragedy is circumscribed
 fundamentally by the material conditions governing gender, economic, and
 hierarchical relations.20 The witches’ gender instability, uncanny powers, and
 malevolence toward men embody typical early modern anxieties about female
 agency. Yet it 
is
 not at all clear that the witches are human, female or male, but  
only that they hold power over mortal men. Such uncertainty, compounded by
 the threat such power holds, sets them apart from the material conditions reg
­ulating Lady Macbeth’s performance of gender. Thus the “feminine evil” they
 represent is phantasmatic because their powers are specifically fantastic, other
­
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worldly. “Real” evil, it would seem, can only be represented by supernatural
 
rather than human beings. Thus their characterization highlights such evil as
 belonging to mystical and specialized realms of existence, to 
a
 conjuration of  
spirits. While Lady Macbeth mimics their
 
language, her actions cannot be read  
in the same light as those of the witches because she must function within the
 cultural and ideological limitations of her society. The witches, on the other
 hand, do not function within those limits.
Lady Macduff, however, 
is
 subject to the same societal restrictions as Lady  
Macbeth. Both women are deserted by husbands driven by masculinist honor
 to participate in the play
'
s violence. Lady Macduff, like Lady Macbeth, must  
remain at home as tyranny rages and await her husbands return. Whether
 through passivity or through active encouragement, then, both women must be
 read as parties to a structure of power dependent on violence for stability.
 While Lady Macduff critiques her culture’s brutality when she 
is
 informed of  
the danger she and her children face, she is as powerless against it as is Lady
 Macbeth:
Whither should I fly?
I have done no harm. But I remember now
I am in this earthly world — where to do harm
Is often laudable, to do good sometime
 
Accounted dangerous folly. Why then, alas,
 Do I put up that womanly defense,
 To say I have done no harm? (4.2.73-9)
Lady Macduff’s impotence in the face of danger points to Goldberg’s claim that
 
“masculinity in the play is directed as an assaultive attempt to secure power, to
 maintain success and succession, at the expense of women” (259). While Lady
 Macduff’s critique implies her conception of some other socio-political system
 of relations, changing the play’s structure of gender and power fails in the face
 of the patriarchal law that that structure reflects. Neither the “evil” of the
 witches nor the “goodness” of Lady Macduff, then, need mar my complication
 of critical visions of Lady Macbeth. The former underscore the phantasmatics
 of feminine “evil,” and the latter’s inability
 
to act against her unavoidable, albeit  
passive, confirmation of a masculinist philosophy of violence conforms to the
 same phallic prescriptions governing Lady Macbeth.
I want to make clear that I am not suggesting that Shakespeare in any way
 
supports the violence of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth but that in his examina
­tion of a
 
patrilineal order dependent on women’s renunciation of desire, he par ­
odies early modern conceptions of “appropriate” femininity. The period 
is marked by 
a
 proliferation of tracts defining ideal femininity, and while pam ­
phleteers vary in method, they all agree that female virtue demands a sexual and
 moral submission to fathers and husbands. As Constance Jordan has argued,
 women’s participation in the economic exchange that stabilizes such power
 implies a coercion (44). In Macbeth, however, patrilineal standards of “appro
­priate” femininity are turned upside down. If “being” the phallus demands
 women’s unquestioning obedience in a culture dependent on the violent acqui-
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sition and protection of power, then the possibilities of a Lady Macbeth who
 
unquestioningly assists her husband to commit regicide can be imagined. In
 this light, Lady Macbeth is not an anomaly of female evil too gross to be imag
­ined but a woman whose actions conform to a masculinist culture of violence.
3.
The political structure of Macbeth, as headed by Duncan, traditionally has been
 
accepted by critics as a legitimate and therefore inviolable government. Signif
­icantly, however, several scholars have begun to question that point of view,
 among them Alan Sinfield, who interrogates the assumptions valorizing "vio
­lence [as] good . . . when it is in the service of the prevailing dispositions of
 power; when it disrupts them, it 
is
 evil” (“History” 63).21 Sinfield’s reading of  
Macbeth asks what the difference 
is
 between absolutism and tyranny, “between  
Macbeth
'
s rule and contemporary European monarchs?” (65). The answer is,  
finally, none. He argues against the necessity of a Jamesian reading of the play
 that “attempt[s] to render coherent and persuasive the ideology of the Abso
­lutist State” (66), and suggests instead that Buchanans History of Scotland
 
may  
constitute part of Macbeth's ideological design. Sinfield contends that, by iden
­tifying Mary Queen of Scots as both legitimate ruler and tyrant and her
 deposers as both usurpers and lawful inheritors, Buchanan offers an alternative
 to the critical assumption that Macbeth was written with James’s Basilikon
 Doron in mind (64-8). While Sinfield admits the play can be read as support
­ing Macbeth
'
s opponents, he points out that
Macbeth kills two people at the start of the play: a rebel and a king, and
 
these are apparently utterly different acts of violence. That 
is
 the [Jame ­
sian] ideology of Absolutism. Macduff also, killing Macbeth, is killing
 both a rebel and a king, but now the two are apparently the same person.
 The ultimate intractability of this kind of contradiction disturbs the Jame
­sian reading of the play. (67)
Sinfield's analysis is apt, effectively disrupting the long-standing reading of the
 
Macbeths’ inherent evil. Legitimate and illegitimate power are exposed as ide
­ological fictions, as putative guarantees of stability to those in power. That
 James may have liked the play and allowed its continued performance suggests
 that Shakespeare succeeded in staging the complexities at stake in absolutist
 government: Duncan’s murder, followed by
 
Macbeth’s inevitable downfall, fol ­
lowed by
 
Malcolm’s ascension, can support a Jamesian reading that depends on  
seeing Macbeth as “a complete usurping tyrant in order that he shall set off the
 lawful good king, [and therefore] not... be a ruler at all in order that he may
 properly be deposed and killed.” But these events can also be read as promot
­ing the need to depose all tyrants — legitimate or illegitimate. As Kinney
 observes, the play ends in unsettling echoes of Macbeth’s rise to power (155).
 And missing from Malcolm’s scene of victory, he also points out, 
is
 Donalbain,  
“who, Holinshed tells us, will return at a later date to kill King Malcolm[,] in
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turn to take the throne himself.” The spectral nature of legitimate and illegit
­
imate rule, then, haunts Shakespeare’s tragedy and suggests that the violence of
 Macbeth and Lady Macbeth 
is
 subject to a more complex set of circumstances  
than moral denunciations of them 
allow. Macbeth begins with the weird sisters’ chant that “Fair 
is
 foul, and foul is  
fair” (1.1.11), so that conventional distinctions between good and evil are
 immediately under question. Macbeth echoes them in his observation, “So foul
 and fair a day I have not seen” (1.3.38), but his speech following confirmation
 from Rosse that he 
is
 indeed Thane of Cawdor explicitly raises questions about  




Two truths are told,
As happy prologues to the swelling act
Of the Imperial theme. . . .
This supernatural soliciting
Cannot be ill; cannot be good. If ill,
Why hath it given me earnest of success,
 
Commencing in a truth? I am Thane of Cawdor.
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs,
 
Against the use of nature? (127-37)
We see in the weird sisters’ chant, in Macbeth’s observation about the weather,
 
and in his attempt to unravel the good and evil proposed by the images in his
 mind the testing of absolute moral distinctions. Rather than 
a
 pure exchange  
of moral categories, the distinctions between foul and fair begin to blur. In
 Macbeth’s conception of the patrilineal order, Duncan’s rewarding of his mili
­tary prowess with the title Thane of Cawdor acknowledges his value as a war
­rior. The title also expands his power. That the witches anticipate this news
 accurately suggests to him that their identification of him as king is also accu
­rate. To be king is to hold the highest, most valued and most powerful office,
 and, he notes, such success cannot bode ill. Yet the news also conjures in his
 mind the act of regicide that must be committed in order to be king. Such
 imaginings cannot be good; yet these visions result from the good fortune
 revealed to him by both the witches and Rosse. Good and evil merge rather
 than remain polar and absolute opposites, so that traditional distinctions are
 rendered insecure and phantasmatic. In this regard, Shakespeare establishes a
 set of circumstances that elides evaluation through traditional moral divisions.
Similarly, I want to suggest that the basis for the play’s equation between
 
violence and masculinity is staged in act 1, scene 2 when Duncan learns that his
 war against usurpers has been victorious.22 The sergeant describes the battle
 between “[t]he merciless Macdonwald / (Worthy to be a rebel)” (9-10) and
brave Macbeth (well he deserves that name),
Disdaining Fortune, with his brandish’d steel,
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Which smok’d with bloody execution,
Till he unseam’d him from the nave to th’ chops,
 
And fix’d his head upon our battlements. (16-18, 22-3)
In his account, the sergeant identifies both the traitor’s and the defender’s acts
 
of violence as admirable. Duncan’s response to Macbeth’s brutality is: “O
 valiant cousin, worthy gentleman!” (24). Violence becomes gentlemanly behav
­ior when legitimized by the king. Macbeth’s bloody valor enhances his honor
 and reputation, which are further increased when the sergeant adds a descrip
­tion of the renewed assault on Macbeth and Banquo, who fought against those
 new forces “As cannons overcharg’d with double cracks, so they / Doubly redou
­bled strokes upon the foe. / Except they meant to bathe in reeking wounds”
 (37-9). As James L. Calderwood observes, “Lady Macbeth may complain that
 [Macbeth] is too full of the milk of human kindness ‘to catch the nearest way,’ 
 but that 
is
 not the Macbeth we see on the heath enraptured by thoughts of  
murder” (72). He is also not the Macbeth described by the sergeant. He
 appears violent enough to commit murder, perhaps especially when his own
 acquisition of power 
is
 at stake.
Duncan rewards Macbeth for his violence with the title of Thane of Caw
­dor. He also praises the sergeant for the honor of both his words and wounds.
 Moreover, victory in battle for the Scots does not mean an end to the violence,
 for Duncan orders the death of the current Thane of Cawdor as a traitor to his
 kingdom. Macbeth’s reward is, then, a result of more bloodshed. The rebel
 Cawdor’s violence, however, because it threatens those in power, is illegitimate,
 evil, and punishable by death. The execution of Cawdor is therefore legitimate,
 necessary to stabilize Duncan’s throne. The differences between legitimate and
 illegitimate violence, it seems, are ideological fictions. Violence underwrites
 both legitimate power and illegitimate usurpation. Rather than seeing Duncan,
 then, as “the single source from which all good can be imagined to flow, the
 source of benign and empowering nurturance, the opposite of
 
that imaged in  
the witches’ poisonous cauldron and Lady
 
Macbeth’s gall-filled breasts” (Adel ­
man 132), we must also see him as part of the masculinist violence within the
 play. The violence of Duncan’s war against the rebels, followed by Macbeth’s
 murder of him and Macduff’s murder of Macbeth, demonstrates that structures
 of power dependent on violence for survival breed the violence brought against
 them. The patrilineal order’s very survival depends on “masculine” violence,
 which is rewarded highly and praised as nobility and goodness. I want to
 extend Sinfield’s analysis, therefore, to a reading of Lady Macbeth and her
 putative “evil,” both because his work (along with that of Calderwood, Gold
­berg, Kinney, Mullaney, and O’Rourke) complicates visions of the play as pit
­ting transcendent good against transcendent evil, and because, as Sinfield’s
 reading of Lady Macbeth as “not a character” indicates, a space for privileging
 the experience of female characters in masculinist cultures of power and vio
­lence needs carving out. Otherwise, violence and evil are all
 
too easily displaced  
onto female characters who are caught up in already established systems of bru
­tality that they are compelled to guarantee.
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If, then, Macbeth blurs the distinctions between good and evil monarchical
 
power, it should not be too great a leap to suggest that Lady Macbeths evil
 might also be equally uncertain. When Lady Macbeth learns of her husband’s
 encounter with the three weird sisters and asks the spirits “That tend on mor
­tal thoughts” to “unsex [her] here, ! And fill [her] from the crown to toe topful
 I Of direst cruelty!” (1.5.41-3), she is not creating the equation between cruel
­ty and masculinity but asking for the masculine brutality necessary, according
 to the configurations of the 
play,
 to encourage violence.23 Having internalized  
cultural injunctions to be the ready reflection of Macbeths desire, she seeks the
 capacity
 
for violence that he seems to request from her  in his letter. Beyond the  
valor he already possesses, attaining the power promised him by the weird sis
­ters necessitates a revision in both their conceptions of legitimate violence.
 Neely’s observation that Lady Macbeth asks “only for a perversion of her own
 emotions and bodily functions” (328) 
is
 crucial; that Lady Macbeth requires  
help to pervert her emotions suggests that she 
is
 not innately wicked. Instead,  
her plea signals the shift that her
 
role as the phantasmatic guarantor of her hus ­
band’s capacity for murder requires her to make. In this regard, then, she calls
 on spirits for masculine aggression because that 
is
 what she lacks. And it is for  
what she is not that, as Lacan tells us, she expects to be loved.
While Macbeth’s letter says nothing about regicide, his position in the line
 
of succession places him behind both Duncan’s sons, which he notes “is a step
 I On which I must fall down, or else o’erleap, I For in my way it lies” (1.4.48-
 50). In order to ventriloquize her husband’s desire for power, Lady Macbeth
 conjures the spirits of mortality to
Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
 
And fill me from crown to toe topful
 Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood,
 Stop up th’ access and passage to remorse,
 That no compunctious visitings of nature
 Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
 Th’ effect and [it]! Come to my
 
woman’s breasts,  
And take my milk for gall, you murth’ring ministers,
 Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature’s mischief! Come, thick night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
 
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark
 To cry, “Hold, hold!” (1.5.40-54)
Lady Macbeth’s speech provides both a transgressive and parodic alternative to
 
that of Juliet, who conjures the night to “Come” and “Hood my unmann’d
 blood, bating in my cheeks, I
 
With thy  black mantle” (Romeo and Juliet 3.2.10,  
14-15). Shakespeare counters Juliet’s romantic idealization with Lady Mac-
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s parodic performance of the ideal wife. Night’s cloak, for Juliet, privatizes  
rites of love; for Lady Macbeth, night's cloak privatizes rites of blood. Her
 speech can be seen in light of Emily C. Bartels’ analysis of platea figures, the
 revengers and villains in Shakespearean drama, whose soliloquies demonstrate
 that
the idea of agency, of the subject’s ability to act as and on the self, 
is
 at once  
most vital and most vexed. . . . Their stories show us that, in Shakespeare
 at least, agency and autonomy do not go hand in hand, that self-determi
­nation takes place through and not despite popular forms and pressures,
 and that
 
the self’s dependence on those forms and pressures is a site of both  
possibility and crisis. (175)
Bartels’ argument emphasizes the fractured nature of agency for characters such
 
as Lady Macbeth, who perform not only according to a theatrical pattern but
 in line with a gender paradigm. Because her function is predicated on renun
­ciation of her own desire, Lady Macbeth unquestioningly seeks to confirm her
 husband’s ambition, notwithstanding her inability ever to do so. With the
 promises of the weird sisters made word on the page before her and the knowl
­edge of Macbeth’s “burnt. .. desire” (1.5.4) for the power promised him, Lady
 Macbeth recognizes the requirements of her role. The act she plots to commit
 (and which Macbeth conceives of on his own) is not evidence of an inherent
 evil but of her subjection to the patrilineal order’s definitions of gender and
 power. Thus the laws governing women position Lady Macbeth between cul
­turally derived pressures and constraints compelling her to encourage Mac
­beth’s bloody ambitions.
Lady Macbeth’s summoning, then, of the spirits to “Make thick [her]
 
blood, / Stop up the th’ access and passage to remorse, / That no compunctious
 visitings of nature / Shake [her] fell purpose, nor keep peace between / Th’
 effect and [it]!” (43-7) is a call for the spectral power a woman may have to
 “chastise with the valor of [her] tongue” (27). Her speech is not motivated by
 an individualized agency because it serves to support the power and desire of
 another. Action for her, therefore, is always a fantasy with no substance. The
 conjuration of spirits she attempts underscores the fantastic aspects of her role.
 Lady Macbeth does not so much transgress her gender as she prepares for a
 performance. Like an actor
 
offstage  who stretches, takes rhythmic breaths, and  
murmurs a prayer to St. Genesius, Lady
 
Macbeth seeks the phantasmatic state  
of mind and body enabling a masquerade. Because the power Macbeth desires
 lacks mercy, sympathy, and tenderness, she asks the spirits to thicken her blood
 —
 
to masculinize her — not because she  wants to be a man but because her role  
requires her to mime Macbeth’s necessarily ruthless, and equally masculine,
 ambitions.
In this regard, she cruelly taunts Macbeth as he hesitates to commit regi
­
cide not because she seeks to emasculate him but because, on the contrary, her
 role compels her to remind him of his culture’s expectations for masculinity.24
 When Macbeth snaps at her in exasperation, “I dare do all that may become a
 man; / Who dares [do] more 
is
 none” (1.7.46-7), she reminds her husband of  
his honor, of the honor, in fact, of his word:
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I have given suck, and know
How tender ’tis to love the babe that milks me;
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have pluck’d my nipple from his boneless gums,
 
And dash’d the brains out, had I so sworn as you
 Have done to this. (54-9)
While Adelman contends that “Lady
 
Macbeth’s image of murderously disrupt ­
ed nurturance .. . functions to subject Macbeth’s will to female forces” (134), I
 would point out that the forces she conjures are those already underwriting the
 play’s structures of power. When Garber asserts that Macbeth “becomes ... the
 man-child his wife will bring to birth — and dash to shards” (154), she attrib
­utes the play’s masculine brutality to Lady Macbeth. But Lady Macbeth’s
 image symbolizes no more malevolent a force than Duncan’s praise of Mac
­beth’s execution of Macdonwald as “gentlemanly” and of his praise of both the
 sergeant’s wounds and words as smacking of honor.25 Her juxtaposition of the
 love she felt for
 
the son she nursed with a willingness to kill him is not evidence  
of a lack of maternal feeling but of the monstrosity of her husband’s forswear
­ing of his word. His oath to her, by this logic, 
is
 as sacred as that maternal  
bond, and his forsaking of that oath is comparable, in her estimation, to the
 murdering of a son. For a man to swear and then forswear 
is
 as monstrous as  
for a woman to kill the son and heir she nurtures.
Her success, then, is derived not from making
 
Macbeth “imagine himself as  
an infant vulnerable to her” (Adelman 137) nor from her ability to make him
 “intimidated by her valor and stung by her taunts at his virility” (Kahn, Mans
 Estate 181) but rather from her grasp of both male and female roles. She
 invokes the masculinist honor with which her husband identifies as a soldier at
 the same time that she taps the constructed masculine impulse in him toward
 violence. His response confirms that impulse as also masculine: “Bring forth
 men-children only!” he urges her, “For thy undaunted mettle should compose /
 Nothing but males” (1.7.72-4). Macbeth recognizes in her not only the fear
­lessness of a man but the maker of men. Re-masculinized by her words, he
 again resolves to commit murder. His renewed conviction 
is
 not spurred entire ­
ly by his wife, then, making her the evil instigator of murder, regicide.26
 Rather, Macbeth recognizes her injunctions to be his own understanding of
 bloody valor as not only valuable, admirable, and honorable but masculine, just
 as Duncan found Macbeth’s violence gentlemanly. The absolute distinctions,
 then, between a moralized, legitimate form of government stabilized through
 violence and an immoral, illegitimate usurpation through violence collapse.
5.
Committing regicide, however, is simpler for Macbeth and Lady Macbeth in
 
theory than in fact. While drugging the grooms and placing the daggers in
 Macbeth’s reach exhilarates Lady Macbeth, she admits “Had he not resembled
 / My father as he slept, I had done’t” (2.2.12-13). She 
is
 stopped from mur-
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dering Duncan herself because he represents for her
 
the image of her father, the  
law of the Father, in fact, which precludes her from action and compels her to
 aid Macbeths action. Macbeth, however, expresses horror at having commit
­ted the deed. When his wife urges him to return to the scene and leave the
 daggers next to the grooms, he cries, ‘Til go no more. / I am afraid to think
 what I have done; / Look on’t again I dare not” (47-9). And while Lady Mac
­beth herself returns the daggers and smears the grooms with blood, the act of
 regicide, counter
 
to the law  of the Father, has undone both of them. First, Lady  
Macbeth
'
s chastising her husband not to “unbend your noble strength, to think  
/ So brain-sickly of things” (42-3) fails to rouse Macbeth
'
s manhood as before.  
The valor of her tongue, successful in planning Duncan’s murder, now falters.
 And Macbeth
'
s military violence and power also fail him. He can only reply,  
“To know my deed, ’twere best not know myself. / Wake Duncan with thy
 knocking! I would thou couldst” (70-1). Their roles — being and having —
 collapse in the face of their transgression. As Butler contends,




 not equivalent to that Law and can never fully symbolize that Law.  
Hence, there 
is
 a necessary or presuppositional impossibility to any effort  
to occupy the position of “having” the Phallus, with the consequence that
 both positions of “having” and “being” are, in Lacans terms, finally to be
 understood as comedic failures that are nevertheless compelled to articulate
 and enact these repeated impossibilities. (46)
By act 2, scene 2 just such a failure in the Macbeths’ gender positions has
 
occurred. The play’s culture of violence, which enabled Duncan’s murder and
 enabled the polarization of gender roles into “appropriate” acts and behaviors,
 collapses under the weight of the law of the Father. Macbeth’s regicide, even
 within the constructions of a violent and brutal system of relations, transgress
­es that law.
Critics have noted the shift in Lady Macbeth’s power once Duncan’s mur
­
der is committed. Both Klein and Williamson argue that Macbeth’s separation
 of himself from his wife as he engages in further political machinations and
 plots of murder effectively neutralizes Lady Macbeth’s conception of herself as
 his wife and helpmate, sending her into her “feminine” madness. While I
 would agree that Lady Macbeth is replaced by the witches in Macbeth’s confi
­dence, Klein’s and Williamson’s readings reify the notion of femininity as pas-
 sivity/madness (and also, therefore, as not-evil, which I have already noted in
 Klein’s case). In their analyses, Lady Macbeth fails to sustain her “masculine”
 power because she goes mad, and she descends into madness because Macbeth
 rejects her 
as
 his dearest partner of greatness. While she cannot console or  
advise her husband, I would emphasize that even in her madness her language
 remains informed by masculinist structures of power. Though she is not effec
­tive in recalling Macbeth to his guests as he challenges Banquo’s ghost, she con
­tinues to encourage her husband in his course of action even when she is not
 acquainted with the details of his plans. That by this point in the tragedy she
 fails to do so confirms that “having” and “being” the phallus require 
a
 constant  
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occurs only in anticipation of variation and repetition. What remains  
constant is Lady Macbeth
'
s role as the feminine guarantor of her husbands  
power. When she asks him “What’s to be done?” (3.2.44) in response to his
 claim that “there shall be done / A deed of dreadful note” (43-4), Macbeth dis
­courages her continued participation in his violence and urges his wife to “Be
 innocent of the knowledge, dearest chuck, / Till thou applaud the deed” (45-6).
 Clearly, her role as his “dearest partner of greatness” has altered. The reflection
 of power he now desires requires his wife’s passivity.
Being the phallus by act 3, then, shifts to more traditional submissive obe
­
dience and inactivity. No longer an active participant in her husband’s machi
­nations, Lady Macbeth must await others’ acts, like an audience member.27 It
 
is
 at this point that the destructive nature of her phallic role becomes most  
acute. Despite her desire to share with her husband an active role, she must
 defer to his desire. We can see therefore that she 
is
 denied any independence  
as a subject because “being”
 
the phallus requires a negation of herself of her own  
desire always and already in favor of Macbeth’s. In this context, Lady Mac
­beth’s insanity must be read not 
as
 an inherent feminine response but as the  
effect of gender prescriptions. Her descent into madness and subsequent sui
­cide, therefore, are responses to the subjectivity to
 
which she is consigned  by her  
culture and by her husband’s rejection of her in favor of the witches. Whether
 in her function as the active guarantor of Macbeth’s brutal potential or as, at
 this point, an innocent and silent guarantor of his role as king, Lady Macbeth
 functions within constructions of female ontology requiring her to reflect back
 to her husband his desires — regardless of her always, already inevitable failure
 to do so.
That her role as the phallus implies a compulsion to repeat 
is
 evident in  
Lady Macbeth’s sleepwalking scene, during which she painfully reenacts the
 moments when she was closest to her husband, the most effective at remas
­culinizing him and consoling him:
Fie, my lord, fie, a soldier, and afeard? What need we fear who knows it,
 
when none can call our pow’r to accompt? ... No more o’ that, my lord, no
 more o’ that; you mar all with this starting. . . . Wash your hands, put on
 your nightgown, look not so pale. I tell you yet again, Banquo’s buried; he
 cannot come out on’s grave.... To bed, to bed; there’s knocking at the gate.
 Come, come, come, come, give me your hand. What’s done cannot be
 undone. To bed, to bed, to bed. (5.1.36-9, 43-5, 62-4, 66-8)
In her madness, Lady Macbeth searches for her role as her husband’s partner in
 
greatness, for her role as the voice of violence and comfort, piercing logic and
 reassuring calm. Macbeth’s search for power as offered to him by the weird sis
­ters has taken that role away from her. Lady
 
Macbeth’s reenactment of the role  
she played before Macbeth urged her to remain innocent of his actions suggests
 a frustration with her role as a
 
wife awaiting her husband’s return from war and  
from the witches. Though she expresses guilt both in the repeated attempts to
 wash the spot of
 
blood from her hand and in her memory of Lady Macduff,
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Lady Macbeth relives the moments when she was most actively involved in.
 
public life and successful at enhancing her husband’s political power. But
 because “being” the phallus 
is
 subject to a set of circumstances under constant  
fluctuation, Lady Macbeths desire to sustain an active partnership with Mac
­beth is not just frustrated but must be denied because it does not reflect his
 desire. In tracing the trajectory of her descent from sanity to insanity, we can
 see that in Shakespeare’s play feminine madness 
is
 a response to “being” only  
for
 
an Other. Lady Macbeth’s insanity  and suicide, therefore, interrogate polar ­
ized gender structures, revealing them to be destructive of female subjectivity.
Significantly, the same polarization also destroys Macbeth and ends his
 
reign. As Lady Macbeth ends her life in despair of her
 
powerlessness,  Macbeth  
also ends his life steeped in masculinist violence:
I will not yield,
To kiss the ground before young Malcolm’s feet,
 
And to be baited with the rabble’s curse.
Though Birnan wood be come to Dunsinane,
 
And thou oppos’d, being of no woman born,
 Yet I will try the last. Before my body
 I throw my warlike shield. Lay on, Macduff,
 And damn’d be him that first cries, “Hold, enough!” (5.8.27-34)
Macbeth’s defiance of the witches’ prophecy that Macduff, “from his mother’s
 
womb / Untimely ripp’d” (15-16), would defeat him illustrates his identifica
­tion with the masculine role defined within the play. Valor, brutality, and brav
­ery in battle are the values Macbeth takes with him into death. The bloody
 virtues that Macbeth embodied and Duncan rewarded materially underwrite
 Macbeth’s determination to stand against Macduff. Both husband and wife die
 searching for that ruthless power in themselves valued by their culture. Both
 die fixed within diametrically opposed gender roles: Lady Macbeth at home,
 in private, through what is viewed traditionally by critics as the feminine act of
 suicide, and Macbeth on the battlefield in defense of his power and name.
6.
Such an ending suggests not 
so
 much that evil is overcome by the good of a  
legitimate monarch in Malcolm but that both the valorization of brutality and
 violence as masculine and the polarization of gender roles into feminine pas
­sivity and masculine action are doomed to self-perpetuation and self-defeat.
 Like the ending of King Lear, which I have argued elsewhere takes no comfort
 in Edgar’s legitimate acquisition of the throne (see “King Lear’s Immoral’
 Daughters”), Malcolm’s ascension to the crown in Macbeth affords no transcen
­dental assurance that goodness reigns again. That Malcolm may
 
be better than  
the alternative does not suggest that the system itself gains stability or that cor
­ruption comes to an end. For if we are to take seriously his declaration to Mac
­duff that within himself are “ [a]ll the particulars of vice so grafted / That, when
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they shall be open’d, black Macbeth / Will seem as pure as snow, and the poor
 
state / Esteem him as a lamb, being compar’d / With my confineless harms”
 (4.3.51-5), then we must read the ending of Macbeth as nihilistically recupera
­tive of the same state-sponsored violence under both Duncan and Macbeth.
 While many critics argue that Malcolms claims are disingenuous, designed to
 test Macduff’s loyalty to the Scottish throne and to Malcolm himself, I would
 argue that the textual evidence for such a test 
is
 slippery. While Malcolm  
indeed expresses doubts about Macduff’s loyalties, the ambiguity of his claim
 that Macduff "Wip’d the black scruples” from his soul and reconciled his
 thoughts to Macduff’s “good truth and honor” (116-7) makes it uncertain
 whether Malcolm 
is
 rejecting suspicion of Macduff or his own tyrannical ten ­
dencies.28 I favor the latter reading, so that if he tests Macduff, he tests Mac
­duff’s (hopefully unlimited) ability to wink at monarchical depravity.
Macduff at first passes such a test. Malcolm’s claims to unsatisfiable sexu
­
al appetites (60-6), earns from Macduff comfort that “We have willing dames
 enough” (73). Having won Macduff’s willingness to overlook
 
these faults, Mal ­
colm only reverses his claim to tyranny when Macduff can no longer support a
 monarch so utterly devoid of graces such as “justice, verity, temp'rance, stable
­ness, / Bounty, perseverance, mercy, lowliness, / Devotion, patience, courage,
 fortitude,” (92-4), and who promises: “Nay, had I pow’r, I should / Pour the
 sweet milk of
 
concord into hell, / Uproar the universal peace, confound / All  
unity on earth” (97-100). When Macduff rejects Malcolm and Scotland upon
 Malcolm’s promises of utter depravity, Malcolm repudiates that evil in himself,
 crediting the goodness he sees in Macduff and claiming that his “first false
 speaking / Was this upon [him]self” (130-1). While he seems to claim a sin
­less life heretofore, I would argue that we are meant to identify with Macduff’s
 pregnant silence and apt response: “Such welcome and unwelcome things at
 once
 
/ 'Tis hard  to reconcile” (138-9).29 Yet Macduff was at first willing  to sup ­
port Malcolm regardless of his lasciviousness because he retains legitimate
 claim to the throne as Duncan’s son. When Macduff renounces his support,
 Malcolm must reverse his claims to depravity, for, after all, Malcolm needs
 Macduff to support his claim to power militarily, despite his right to it as heir.
 Macduff 
is
 to Malcolm what Macbeth  was to Duncan: the great warrior whose  
battle strength has retained his liege’s seat on the throne.
While critics have argued that the play sustains rather than interrogates
 
patrilineal forms of power (see Stallybrass 193-205), I argue Macbeth prob-
 lematizes binary oppositions of king/tyrant, legitimate/illegitimate, good/evil,
 active/passive, and male/female. Macduff’s skepticism in response to Mal
­colm’s reversal suggests that the latter’s claim to goodness is suspect, that in
 fact, a revision of power at the play’s end as no longer necessarily violent or
 tyrannical 
is
 in doubt. The ending of Macbeth illustrates the potential for  
tyranny within absolute monarchy, specifically when it defines masculinity as
 murder and femininity as governed by injunctions to guarantee an inherently
 unstable system based on patrilineal power.
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I have argued that in Macbeth gender performance 
is
 enabled by an already  
established culture of violence, both of which are compelled to 
a
 cycle of fail ­
ure and repetition. Lady Macbeth
'
s evil is revealed, in this light, as the product  
of a system of power relations dependent on both masculine brutality and
 womens phallic guarantee for its stability and power. I want to take this argu
­ment one final step to argue that Shakespeare
'
s play is a parodic staging of  
“appropriate” femininity advocated by pamphlet writers such as Vives, Rych,
 Whately, Pricke, and Swetnam, among others. The mandate that women “be”
 the phallus, that they act to confirm patrilineal power, 
is
 certainly the aim of  
such pamphlet writers. But their injunction works spectrally to conjure and
 then exorcise the “evil” of female desire, so that any real or original of
 
female  
nature is lost, unknown. The transgression of patrilineal law that pamphlet
 writers attempt to exorcise 
is
 almost always sexual — adulterous — and Lady  
Macbeth’s transgression 
is
 not. Yet her transgression is directly aimed at the  
throat, if you will, of that law. Not only does she seek to “unsex” herself, she
 does so in order actively to encourage her husband
'
s regicidal desires.
In this regard, Shakespeare's characterization of Lady Macbeth interrogates
 the patrilineal naturalization of femininity as good or evil depending on
 womens support of or threat to masculine desire. He assumes the absolutism
 of laws governing womens conduct and stages the consequences for women
 when they are denied a right to desire outside the precepts of a masculinist
 socio-political gender system. Her “power,” then, which 
is
 subject to that sys ­
tem, is unmasked as phantasmatic, as a conjuration of ghosts. In her examina
­tion of parody, Butler argues that
gender
 
parody ... does not assume that there is an original  which such par ­
odic identities imitate. Indeed, the parody is of the very notion of an orig
­inal; just as the psychoanalytic notion of gender identification 
is
 constitut ­
ed by a fantasy of a fantasy, the transfiguration of an Other who is always
 already a “figure” in that double sense, so gender parody reveals that the
 original identity after which gender fashions itself 
is
 an imitation without  
an origin. (138)
To parody early modern conceptions of ideal and evil femininity, Shakespeare
 
conjures a woman whose loyalty to her husband offends monarchical and moral
 precepts. The absolutist categories of angel and monster that produce anxiety
 in and of themselves, therefore, are set against the context of a society that
 thrives on violence in order to parody, to exaggerate a set of masculinist values
 that women are required to reflect and guarantee. If, under early modern
 morality, women must function through a compliant and unquestioning affir
­mation of the patrilineal order, thereby
 
denying their own desire in favor of the  
desire of another, then Shakespeare envisions a set of circumstances that his
 audience must reject. The result is a parodic displacement of patrilineal moral
­ity, exposing it as a shifting set of values that supports the prevailing disposi
­tions of an inherently unstable power structure.
69
Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
Published by eGrove, 2020
Cristina León Alfar 197
Thus Shakespeare problematizes a structure of power relations compelling
 
all of its subjects to survive through an ideology of brutality, regardless of gen
­der, uncovering both the false division of masculine and feminine ideals sup
­ported in early modern tracts and the potential tyranny of the patrilineal order.
 Whether victim or attacker, legitimate ruler or pretender, characters express
 violent desires, specifically 
l
inked to contemporary definitions of masculinity.  
Unmasked 
is
 a politics of gender that demands brutality and discloses patrilin ­
eal configurations of governance and power based on the execution of kings as
 well as traitors. In this regard, the play stages a kind of hyper-doubling that
 Fineman has argued 
is
 the overarching theme of Shakespeares corpus (428):  
Duncan’s execution of the traitor Cawdor is no less brutal, no less ruthless than
 Macbeths battle murder of Macdonwald, than Macbeth
'
s murder of  Duncan,  
and finally than Macduff
'
s murder of Macbeth. Banquo’s response to Mac ­
beth’s regicide is not outrage, nor does he report his suspicion of Macbeth’s
 guilt to others because “it was said / It should not stand in thy posterity, / But
 that myself should be the root and father / Of many kings” (3.1.3-6). Violence
 serves power, and power 
is
 sustained by violence. Banquo is willing to wink at  
regicide when his progeny’s acquisition of the throne is in view. Similarly,
 Macduff’s personal loss when Macbeth kills his wife and child, and not the
 treason of regicide, motivates his alliance with Malcolm, the rightful heir to the
 throne. Rather than being unique to Macbeth and Lady Macbeth, therefore,
 such self-interest underwrites all the play’s political maneuvers. When Dun
­can’s, Macbeth’s, and Malcolm’s monarchies all depend on violence for stabili
­ty, the distinctions between tyrant and king collapse. As fictions designed to
 sustain those in power, legitimate and illegitimate forms of power are exposed
 as the same: violent, ruthless, brutal. The addition of “masculinist” to that
 equation and of Lady Macbeth’s putative transgression of femininity further
 complicates a politics of gender.
Thus Shakespeare does not “mobilize the patriarchal fear of unsubordinat
­
ed woman” (Stallybrass 205) in his characterization of Lady Macbeth if we
 acknowledge patrilineal injunctions specifying “appropriate” femininity as
 behavior that compliantly (and impossibly, phantasmatically) confirms mas-
 culinist power.30 If a culture is defined and sustained by violence (which is
 equated with masculinity and rewarded materially), then we cannot expect
 women who are required to support their men’s acquisitions of such power to
 act only insofar as they are “women” — weak,
 
passive, nurturing. Having begun  
to ask questions about the ruthlessness of patrilineal forms of
 
power in King  
Lear, Shakespeare drives the point home more forcefully, I would argue,
 through a female character who on the surface seems more nightmarish than
 Goneril and Regan, not just because she appears willing to commit infanticide
 but because she encourages her husband to acquire power illegitimately, via
 regicide. But as I have shown, Lady Macbeth’s transgression of “appropriate”
 (compassionate and merciful) femininity is, instead, conduct in line with the
 play’s masculinist
 
violence. Lady Macbeth, rather than being the evil source of  
violence within the play, 
is
 a product of a masculinist and tyrannical structure  
of power relations, so that she performs gender according to that structure’s
 (often) violent mandates. “Blood will have blood” (3.4.121), Macbeth observes,
 echoing, I would argue, Shakespeare’s notion of patrilineal structures of power.
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I would urge, therefore, that our contemporary condemnation of womens
 
brutality must be re-visioned, re-viewed — in Donna J. Haraway’s terms — lest
 we reify conceptions of femininity and masculinity as split along traditional
 binaries of passive/active, peaceful/violent, and good/evil, and thereby enable
 moralized indictments of womens actions that we excuse in men (see Haraway
 188-96). In this sense, we will abandon the myth of neutrality/objectivity to
 ask ourselves why we label women such 
as
 Lady Macbeth evil and what forms  
of power are served by labeling them evil. Very
 
simply, if we mean, as feminists,  
to argue that subjectivity is fractured, unstable, made up of splittings and inde-
 terminacies, then we must reengage the female characters who have, until now,
 embodied precisely the opposite in literary history. Neglecting such an analy
­sis creates a hole in the logic of feminist criticism’s practice. It suggests that we
 cannot pay attention to female characters we cannot fully admire, embrace, and
 defend while simultaneously, and without question unintentionally, reinscribing
 the split of subjectivity into gender norms. This is not a practice we take with
 us into our daily political lives, where, for example, we deplore the need for
 Hilary Rodham Clinton to prove her femininity, and by association her right
­ful place among “first ladies,”
 
by baking cookies. Clintons experience in Wash ­
ington has, in fact, been remarkably fraught with gender troubles reminiscent
 of those in Shakespearean tragedy. A woman of power, of educational and pro
­fessional accomplishments, she is either a kind of Lady Macbeth who engineers
 the suicides of White House staff and then covers up key evidence to exempt
 her husband from responsibility, or a Goneril whose lust for power not right
­fully hers makes her an unnatural and inappropriate advocate for children and
 national healthcare. While I do not mean to suggest that Shakespeares plays
 offer a universal representation of the trouble with gender and power, I do want
 to point out that very close to home we may be able to find models of gender
 and power that may assist
 





Derrida argues that the commodity, as theorized by  Marx, is a phantas-  
matic construction: “For if no use-value can in itself produce this mysticality
 
or  
this spectral effect of the commodity, and if the secret 
is
 at the same time pro ­
found and superficial, opaque and transparent, a secret that 
is
 all the more  
secret in that no substantial essence hides behind it, it is because the effect is
 born of a relation (ferance, difference, reference, and difference), as double rela
­tion, one would say as a double social bond” (154). Similarly, male and female
 genders are phantasmatically structured through having and being the Phallus,
 a relation of difference that, superficially, organizes male/female relations in
 Macbeth. I use the term, then, both in its Derridean sense and as it is used by
 Judith Butler: “Every effort to establish identity within the terms of this bina
­ry disjunction of
 
'being and 'having’ returns to an inevitable ‘lack’ and 'loss’ that  
ground their phantasmatic construction and mark the incommensurability of
 the Symbolic and the real” (44).
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2.
 
I refer here and in my title to Butlers Gender Trouble: Feminism and the  
Subversion of Identity, which provides the basis for my reading of Lady Mac




For three articles that typify this argument see Harding; Davies; and  
Schiffer. Even feminist critics, to whom I am indebted for having enabled my
 argument, fail to question readings of Lady Macbeth as evil. Adelman identi
­fies Lady Macbeth as a kind of nightmare mother, “the inheritor of the realm
 of . . . infantile vulnerability to maternal power, of dismemberment and its
 developmentally later equivalent, castration” (137). While Kahn asserts that
 “the women Shakespeare portrays in \Antony and Cleopatra, Macbeth, and King
 Lear] did not contrive their ideas of manliness out of whole cloth; they took
 them from 
a
 world managed by men” (Mans Estate 152), even she observes  
twice that Macbeth “becomes [Lady Macbeth’s] kind of [bloody] man” (173,
 182). Though Willis attempts to highlight the ambiguities in the play’s invo
­cations of fair and foul, Lady Macbeth remains for her an annihilating mother





Jardine 94-5, 97-8; and French, especially 245-8.
4.
 
See Greene, who argues that the equation of masculinity with violence  
originates in Lady Macbeth. His argument depends on an acceptance of tradi
­tional gender configurations, so that Lady Macbeth’s desire to “unsex herself”
 (1.5.41) in order to kill transgresses normalized gender configurations. See also
 Bushnell 128-9; Callaghan, Woman and Gender 62, 124; and Richmond 20-4.
 Liston (233) points out Duncan’s associations of manliness and violence; and
 Kimbrough notes that Lady Macbeth mimics society’s definitions of masculin
­ity and femininity (177, 183). For Garber, “gender undecidability and anxiety
 about gender identification and gender roles are at the center of Macbeth —
 and of Macbeth" (Shakespeare's Ghost Writers 97).
5.
 
Dash offers a sympathetic reading of Lady Macbeth based on theatrical  
and film interpretations of the play and its characters (see especially 155-207).
 Belsey problematizes absolutist visions of women such as Lady Macbeth, Beat
­rice-Joanna, Vittoria, Cleopatra, and Joan of Arc as chaotically evil. She
 
writes,  
“these figures are also in a sense heroic, and to this extent the plays offer their
 audiences no single, unified position from which to judge the heroines who
 refuse the place of silent subjection allotted to women” (184). Despite Belsey’s
 instructive argument, moral judgments in regard to Lady Macbeth’s evil still
 dominate her critical history.
6.
 
My analysis of Lady Macbeth is guided by Dolan’s definition of post ­
structuralism and performance criticism: “Poststructuralism simply questions
 liberal humanist notions that men and women are free individuals capable of
 mastering the universe and points out the way in which ideology 
is
 masked as  
commonsensical truth. Poststructuralist performance criticism looks at the
 power structures underlying representation and the means by which subjectivi
­ty 
is




Carol Thomas Neely has argued that while cultural materialist and new  
historicist theorists share with feminist theorists “the view that all discourse 
is
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culturally specific and ideologically pregnant” (“Constructing the Subject” 6),
 
“cult-historicists,” as she nicknames them, continue to marginalize, displace,
 erase, and allegorize women. My work 
is
 greatly indebted to many cultural  
materialists, foremost among them Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, yet
 I sympathize with Neely’s critique. My analysis is, therefore, a response
 (among many) to Neely’s call for culturally specific readings that privilege the
 history and experiences of women (15). See also Callaghan’s invocation of the
 feminist slogan “the personal is political” (Woman and Gender 35); and de Lau-
 retis, who urges feminists toward a more historically and culturally informed
 critical practice (158-86). At the same time, I want to acknowledge Loomba’s
 problematizing of Neely’s argument, which Loomba rightly points out threat
­ens to “devalu[e] other social differences and thereby the ‘experiences’ of
 
‘other’  
women” (22). While I privilege the experience of Lady Macbeth throughout
 my argument, I do not mean to suggest that her experience of gender perfor
­mance would be the same as, for example, that of an African female monarch
 such as Cleopatra.
8.
 
Several scholars, feminists in particular, have turned to the contentious  
debates about women’s nature in conduct manuals, domestic tracts, and medical
 treatises to contextualize their studies of women and drama in the early mod
­ern period. See Belsey 138-44, 152-60, 178-83, 200-2, 217-21; Comensoli 1-
 26, 52-3, 66-8; Jankowski 45-9, 62-3, 105-6, 108-9, 169-70; Hutson 17-51;
 Loughlin 13-52; Newman 3-12,15-31. Woodbridge traces the formal contro
­versy from 1540 through 1620 (18-113). For feminist analyses of early mod
­ern treatises on female nature, see Benson 173, 205-50; Henderson and
 McManus 3-130; Jones, “Counterattacks” 45-62, as well as her “Nets and Bri
­dles” 39-72; Klein, Daughters 65-9, 97-100; and Wayne 15-29 passim.
9.
 
Through use of the term patrilineal as opposed to patriarchal, I retain  
the sense of a male-dominated power structure while emphasizing the eco
­nomic relations in which women are commodified. Such a structure enables
 the setting of a woman’s worth according to her obedience and virtue, and
 enables, I argue, a cultural injunction to be the phallic guarantor of masculine
 power. The term also establishes the violence of
 
competition among men for  
property and power
 
that women are, in part, supposed to alleviate through their  
exchange. That women’s guarantee of peaceful relations is as phantasmatic as
 their insurance of phallic power only highlights the always already impossible
 ideal women are compelled to embody. It underscores as well the compromise
 to any individualized agency or desire on womens part. For 
a
 discussion of  
women’s role as commodity in the Renaissance, see Jordan.
10.
 
If, as Kristeva argues in Powers of Horror, the abject is present in any ­
thing transgressing the moralized sanctions of society, but especially in blood,
 pus, urine, excrement, and sweat — in the excretions of the body — then it is
 clear that woman, in the depths of her uncontrollable body, represents the lim
­its and limitlessness of the abject. Kristeva’s critique points to the bodily excess,
 the ungraspable, and therefore fearsome, materiality of the feminine. Lady
 Macbeth, in this light, as a woman whose “lust” for power coincides with a
 “transgression” of maternal instincts, represents for contemporary
 
critics all that  
is abject.
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11.
 
Sprengnether observes that critical denunciation of Lady Macbeth  
results from Shakespeare’s ambivalence concerning gender (“Reading” 236).
12. 
A notable exception to this tendency is Callaghans argument in  
“Wicked Women” (363). Callaghan, however, sees power in Macbeth as “clear
­ly located among the insatiable forces of feminine misrule” (359), and not, as I
 argue, within an already existing masculinist structure.
13. 
Callaghan also invokes Lacan 's conception of phallic power, which she  
concludes 
is
 useful to an understanding of the ways in which, in tragedy,  “[m]an  
and woman are divided by the sword in a symbolic system which utilizes the
 phallus as the marker of gender difference and as a crucial mechanism of
 power” (Woman 172). She emphasizes, however, the ways in which phallic
 power is turned against women and does not make an argument in regard to
 women’s positions as the phallus. Cook also emphasizes the phallus in her
 analysis of male anxieties about cuckoldry in Much Ado About Nothing. She
 argues, in part, that women’s positions as mirrors of masculine desire obviate
 feminine alternatives to the “binary structures by which patriarchy figures gen
­der” (82). I want to suggest, however, that this negation of feminine alterna
­tives just may be the point not only in Macbeth, but perhaps in Much Ado as
 well. For the orthodox notions of appropriate femininity — which I locate in
 the conduct manuals of the period — fail both Lady Macbeth and Hero. A kind
 of skepticism, therefore, attends their characterization and the domestic and
 state power relations governing their performances of gender. Finally, Mary
 Beth Rose; Kahn (“The Rape”); and Van Watson, like Callaghan, use sword
 play and imagery 
as
 a metaphor for phallic  power, which suggests both an inter ­
esting movement in early modern drama studies and that Lacan’s formation of
 gender relations is indeed descriptive of power relations between men and
 women in the period.
14.
 
Freedman points out that while Lacan does indeed describe a social  
formation in which men have power (over women) and women confirm that
 power, he does not interrogate the structure he explains. My use of Lacan
 acknowledges Freedman’s argument and attempts to interrogate the cultural
 formation Lacan describes by emphasizing the renunciation of agency and
 desire requisite to Lady Macbeth’s performance of gender. I recommend Freed
­man’s article in its entirety as both a cogent reading of Lacan and the phallus
 and as an insightful and persuasive analysis of the politics and complexities at
 stake in feminist/psychoanalytic inquiries into theater.
15.
 
See also Jacqueline Rose, especially 49-81; and Sprengnether, who both  
emphasizes the phallic roles as being a perception of the child and cogently




16. On “deconstructing the Phallic mother’s image” as a way to “shed light  
on the historical construction of [women and mothers] as categories” see Ian 8.
17. 
Vives explicitly advocates public humiliation, ostracism, and death as  
punishments women will receive for disobedience and loss of virtue, but other
 tracts are pertinent as well. See Pricke; Rych; Swetnam; and Whately, who
 advocates female submission to male superiority and wife-beating.
18.
 
There are psychoanalytic readings of Lady Macbeth, most notably  
Adelman’s and Fineman’s. I would note, however, that both Adelman’s and
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Fineman’s visions of Lady Macbeth as an “annihilating mother” (Fineman 447)
 
depend on Freudian rather than Lacanian interpretations of her function in the
 play. The female power Freud feared is precisely that which Lacan suggests
 men require to imagine a unified masculine self.
19.
 
See Adelman 134-8; Greenblatt 124-5; Schiffer  206-9; and Stallybrass  
196-205. For a reading that complicates this view, see Dash 155-207.
20.
 
Here I agree with Eagletons claim that "[t]he witches experience no  
such conflict [between body and language] because their very bodies are not
 static but mutable, melting as breath into the wind, ambivalently material and
 immaterial” (7). While I might be perceived as substituting Lady Macbeth for
 the witches in his argument that it 
is
 “they who, by releasing ambitious  
thoughts in Macbeth, expose a reverence for hierarchical social order for what
 it is, as the pious self-deception of a society based on routine oppression and
 incessant warfare” (2), my argument is distinct from his on at least three major
 points. First, as Eagleton asserts, the witches initiate the dissolution of
 
firm  
definitions and erosion of binary oppositions, but they are not, 
as
Lady Mac ­
beth is, subject to the culture of violence on which they unleash their chaos.
 Second, I do not claim that Lady Macbeth releases thoughts of ambition in
 Macbeth but that Macbeth’s own ambitions are produced by his culture’s val
­orization of rank and privilege. Third, while I do assert that the play exposes
 patrilineal forms of power as based on routine oppression and incessant warfare,
 my argument explicitly interrogates any claims Lady Macbeth or Macbeth
 might have to Eagleton’s version of "bourgeois individualism],” so that Lady
 Macbeth 
is
 ruled — constituted — by those values prized in her culture that  
her husband desires to embody. Her function as the phallus, therefore, pre
­cludes her from such individuality and also places her within a material econo
­my of violence to which the witches are not subject.
21.
 
See also Berger 64-78; Biggins 269-70; Calderwood 80; Kinney 148-  
73 passim; and O’Rourke 213-26 passim. Goldberg (especially 247-57) also
 complicates critical tendencies toward reading the play as pro-Jamesian. On
 the historical/political stakes in Macbeth see Hawkins; and Williamson. Willis
 provides a skillful account of the opposing views on Macbeth's place as a pro-
 Jamesian play (210-13).
22.
 
On Macbeth as "the most complete representative of a society which  
values and honors a manliness and soldiership that maintain a cohesiveness of
 the tribe by extreme violence, if necessary,” see Asp 154.
23.
 
Rebecca Bushnell argues persuasively that "[w]hile Macbeth’s decision  
to proceed clearly echoes earlier images of the tyrant’s uxoriousness, it is also
 different because in following his wife, Macbeth supposedly upholds masculine
 values” (128). Though Bushnell asserts that Macbeth fulfills Lady Macbeth’s
 desires (129), her argument is instructive. While Berger argues that the Scots’
 “subtextual attack on the maternal provider exactly complements the reciprocal violence of Lady
 
Macbeth,” he sees her as "moved by mimetic desire to join the  
manly ranks” (72). Such desire motivates her bloody image of “plucking her
 nipple from her male child’s ‘boneless gums’ and dashing his brains out” (72).
 While I too see Lady Macbeth as moved by mimetic desire, I reverse Berger’s
 claim to argue that she wishes to be the mimetic reflection of violence Macbeth
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desires to embody. She is not, in my reading, attempting to join male ranks but
 
to ensure her mans masculinist violence. Berger
'
s reading, however, compli ­





See Sinfield’s Faultlines for his analysis of “the orthodox idea of what a  
thane should be like” (64).
25.
 
While I cannot agree with Eagleton when he reads Lady Macbeth as  
"a ‘bourgeois’ feminist who strives to outdo in domination and virility the very
 male system which subordinates her” (6), I do believe that he does correctly
 observe that “it 
is
 hard to see why her bloodthirsty talk of dashing out babies’  
brains 
is
 any more ‘unnatural’ than skewering an enemy soldiers’ guts.” Clear ­
ly my reading takes issue with Eagleton’s use of “bloodthirsty,” but his point
 resembles mine when he notes that the opposition between natural and unnat
­ural “will not hold even within Macbeth’s own terms, since the ‘unnatural’ —
 Macbeth’s lust for power — 
is
 disclosed by the witches as already  lurking with ­
in the ‘natural’—the routine state of cut-throat rivalry between noblemen.”
26.
 
We can see, therefore, that when Schiffer argues that “[i]n taking up  
his sword against Duncan, Macbeth assassinates his moral self, the true source
 of whatever manhood, whatever humanity, he once possessed” (210), he both
 moralizes a “natural” masculinity and ignores the cultural injunction within the
 play fusing masculinity with murder.
27.
 




In this regard I would read “scruples” as informed by the ambiguities  
evident in the OED (1989 ed.) definition: “A thought or circumstance that
 troubles the mind or conscience; a doubt, uncertainty or hesitation in regard to
 right and wrong, duty, propriety, etc.” (292), which was in use as early as 1526.
 In this regard, Malcolm may indeed have been struggling with his desire for
 excess and the “proper” duties of kingship until Macduff’s “good truth and
 honor” prompted him to abandon the temptation to “pour the sweet milk of
 concord into hell” (4.3.98).
29.
 




Similarly, Greenblatt's emphasis on Lady Macbeth and the witches as  
“implicate[d] ... in a monstrous threat to the fabric of civilized life” (125)
 ignores the internal threat to society embodied in a political structure of rela
­tions stabilized by masculinized violence. In such a societal formation, the
 witches become, like Lady Macbeth, merely the mimetic (phantasmatic) reflec
­tions of an already established masculinist and ruthless ambition and power.
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Teaching to Strike:












York at Stony Brook.
 He is the author of
 numerous articles and
 several books, includ
­ing Imaginary Rela
­tions: Aesthetics and
 Ideology in the The
­ory of Historical
 Materialism and His
­tory and Ideology in
 Proust: A la recherche
 du temps perdu and
 the Third French
 Republic.
[T]rue literary activity cannot aspire to
 
take place within a literary framework.
 ... Significant literary effectiveness can
 come into being only in a strict alterna
­tion between action and writing; it
 must nurture the inconspicuous forms
 that fit its influence in active commu
­nities better than does the pretentious,
 universal gesture of the book — in
 leaflets, brochures, articles, and plac
­ards. Only this prompt language shows
 itself actively equal to the moment.
—Walter Benjamin
Even though this essay originated in response to the
 
strikes at Yale during 1995-96, I wont be discussing
 them in any sustained way. Instead, I want to devote
 the space allotted me to draw out some of the gener
­al implications that the events at Yale may have for us
 as teachers of literature and culture, that is to say, as
 functionaries in what Louis Althusser termed the
 educational Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). In
 doing so, I’ll move back and forth between two dis
­tinct, though not necessarily opposed or contradicto
­ry, conceptions of what we are and what we do. In
 brief, I
'
m going to be claiming that we are at  once cul ­
tural intellectuals charged with the duty of training
 citizens in a nominally democratic polity, and also
 workers with a legitimate interest in improving the
 conditions under which we are compelled to labor.
 The biblical ban on serving
 
both notwithstanding, we  
really do answer to god and to mammon. To pretend
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otherwise as I was taught to do as an undergraduate and a graduate student,
 
and as any number of silly, benighted, but ultimately just self-serving Yale pro
­fessors and administrators have continued to insist by maintaining that the Yale
 graduate students are being mentored into professional maturity, hence, that
 they cannot really be workers is just to ignore the obvious, material situation
 of teachers in post-secondary educational institutions. It is certainly apposite
 at this point to remind readers that the National Labor Relations Board
 (NLRB) has officially ruled that graduate students are indeed workers, that not
 only was Yale’s position to the contrary incorrect but the punitive actions taken
 against activists of the Graduate Employees and Students Organization
 (GESO) were illegal
. 
2
Let me take up mammon first, since I understand it somewhat better, hav
­ing had to work for a living my entire adult life — and even a little before that.
 To gain access to a ruling-class education, I had to do a fair amount of manual
 labor in my teens and twenties. Granted, one tends to romanticize this aspect
 of one’s background; nonetheless, I believe that a decisive ingredient in under
­standing our position as workers — and a powerful instrument in being able to
 resist the ideological blandishments with which, typically, teachers in the
 humanities attempt to recruit their students into what we still anachronistical-
 ly term "the profession” — 
is
 to have hailed from a working-class milieu and  
been compelled to labor in various proletarian occupations at one time or
 another. For many years the only jobs I was licensed to perform were ill-paid,
 often physically demanding, and for the most part required little if any mental
 exertion. In those years,
 
I understood the difference  between workers and boss ­
es perfectly well, and by virtue of that experience, I think, I now can get my
 head around that same distinction 
as
 it is embodied in the hierarchies (real and  
imagined) of post-secondary education. Here, then, is my workerist construc
­tion of the labor relations by which we are constrained, starting at the bottom
 and working up to the top level:
Graduate students = temp workers hired out of the union hall
Junior faculty = probationary full-time employees
Tenured faculty = older employees with some seniority rights
Department chairs = shop stewards
Deans = foremen
Provosts, vice-presidents = middle managers
Presidents, chancellors = CEOs
Trustees = boards of directors
You’ll notice that the structure of this hierarchy 
is
 exactly that of the modern  
capitalist corporation, not (despite all the stupidities spouted last spring by
 Annabel Patterson, Margaret Homans, et alia) that of a medieval guild, where
 the lowest tier of workers is the apprentices/graduate students. Yale Universi
­ty styles itself— and is, I gather, in legal status — that older type of corpora
­tion. But as Michael Moore, of TV Nation and Roger and Me fame, recently
 observed at a rally in support of GESO when he nominated Yale as " corporate
 criminal of the year,” it — and every other college and university I know of —
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is in most respects a corporation in the sense that IBM, GM, and AT&T are.
 
Indeed, as innumerable commentators have stressed, higher education is
 becoming more and more corporatized with each passing year. In the era of
 downsizing and capitals overt attacks on labor across the Organization for
 Economic Cooperation and Developement (OECD), as firms restructure to
 accommodate themselves to a period of increased inter-capitalist competition,
 post-secondary
 
education marches to the very same tune, responding to identi ­
cal imperatives. “Leaner and meaner” — the cliché applies with equal force to
 limited liability companies and colleges and universities, both public and pri
­vate.
Lest you think this comparison far-fetched, let me relate what the dean of
 
the graduate school at my own university, SUNY at Stony Brook, reportedly
 said about a plan, defunct for the moment, but doubtless on his agenda for the
 future, to institute differential stipends for doctoral students in the sciences
 (who
 
would get more) versus those in the humanities and some of the social sci ­
ences (who would receive proportionately less). When challenged by graduate
 student union representatives on the injustice of reducing stipends in English
 from just under $10,000 per year to $5,000, his reply was precisely that of the
 crassest capitalist entrepeneur: "If that’s what they’ll come for, then that’s what
 we should pay them.” The underlying rationale for such a comment 
is
 surely  
transparent; nonetheless, I offer here some further anecdotal evidence of the
 university’s increasing integration with the practices of corporate organization
 and the stern discipline of profit maximization.
At my own institution, as at most others, the local university bookstore is
 
run by a national chain (Wallace’s in this case, although the dominant enter
­prise nationally 
is
 Barnes & Noble). Our provost issued a directive a couple of  
years ago, invoking the pleasant fiction that in doing so he was merely striving
 to make purchasing textbooks more convenient for students (in particular those
 with physical disabilities), that enjoined all faculty to place a copy of their text
­book orders with the university bookstore. In the past, some had chosen to deal
 exclusively with the local independent bookseller located on the edge of the
 campus, partly to support what had been for many years the only decent gen
­eral bookstore for miles around, but also because service in the university book
­store had historically been execrable. The results of this caving-in to the logic
 of corporate monopoly are yet to be determined, save in one particular: the
 local independent has closed its doors — a loss surely
 
to be felt by students and  
faculty alike, who will now be left to purchase their non-course books at the
 local Borders, where the selection is much more limited, and
 
which, by the way,  
is much further from the campus. So much for the argument from conve ­
nience.
To offer further evidence: at Oregon State University, food services in the
 
student union have been given over to a series of Pepsi subsidiaries, including
 Taco Bell, after many years of being run by the university itself. The adminis
­trator charged with overseeing this corner of the university, when criticized by
 one of the faculty for his decision, reacted defensively (and utterly predictably),
 by saying that: 1) formerly these services were run at 
a
 loss (the extent of which  
was not specified); and 2) the university was just giving the students what they
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wanted anyway. The spurious appeal to democratic values — giving the stu
­
dents what they want — repeats the same line that corporations themselves
 adopt when challenged to meet even minimal standards of social responsibility.
 Tobacco companies are currently trying to defend their criminal behavior in
 promoting nicotine addiction over many years in these very terms: freedom of
 choice for the consumer. But if one or more corporations enjoy a monopoly in
 a market (as is the case at Oregon State), the concept of “choice” has clearly
 been emptied of all content. As Marx once observed of capitalist labor rela
­tions, freedom to choose one’s employer 
is
 in effect  but the freedom to starve in  
the streets.
Finally, one wonders what bribes had to be spread around for the follow
­
ing to have been instituted. At Tufts University, when students phone the reg
­istrar to learn what grade they have earned in a course, they are compelled first
 to listen to an advertisement for Coca-Cola prior to obtaining the information
 they are requesting. Doubtless, the university receives some remuneration for
 making its airwaves available to this corporate giant, but 
is
 it the business of  
any institution of higher education to become a willing shil for a product that
 rots the teeth, will dissolve nails left in it overnight, and whose exact chemical
 composition remains to this day a well-guarded secret, locked in a vault in the
 company’s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia? Such is the obsequiousness of
 contemporary university administrators towards their capitalist patrons that to
 ask these questions is considered bad form, when it is not simply dismissed
 with contempt for its naïveté. In this environment, it is small wonder that
 remarks like that of my graduate dean cited above seem commonsensical: the
 mentality of corporate managers permeates their discourse because they are
 increasingly beholden to capitalist enterprises. The administrators ought per
­haps to ponder the old proverb: If you sup with the devil, you need to have a
 very long spoon.
To return to my chart, one should bear in mind that in an era of increas
­
ingly fierce competition among individual firms, no one in the hierarchy is
 entirely secure in his or her position, although some enjoy comparatively more
 protection than others. The most secure (in some instances more secure than
 the administrators, who don’t always hold faculty rank in a department and
 who, if they do, typically have no more interest in returning to the shopfloor
 than does a foreman promoted off the line) are probably the tenured faculty,
 who cannot easily be fired or even demoted. (This is true for the moment, but
 may
 
not be in the long term. Tenure could  be abolished altogether, as for exam ­
ple the trustees of the University of Minnesota seem bent on doing, and as the
 administration of the City University of New York has effectively done under
 the cover of a trumped-up state of financial exigency.) Just as unionized work
­ers with lots of seniority tend to be among the most conservative forces in any
 struggle over downsizing, sacrificing their junior members and accepting two-
 tier hiring as the price of protecting their own interests, so tenured faculty,
 especially those who see retirement on the not-too-distant horizon, are often
 the most vociferous defenders of existing structures of workplace exploitation.
 Hire more graduate students and adjuncts to teach the lower-division service
 courses, and pay them less if
 
that’s what it takes — such is the message (not  
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often expressed openly, of course) that tenured faculty convey to the bosses,
 
who are only too willing to implement it, and for two very good reasons: 1) it
 not only is much cheaper
 
than employing more professors but also 2) these temp  
workers don’t enjoy the kinds of protection available to regular faculty and so
 don’t create as much trouble for the administrators as do regular faculty —
 until, like the Yale graduate students, they organize collectively and engage in
 irritating, disruptive activities like grade strikes. I assume you are all aware that
 while we are here at this convention, a group of adjuncts, part-timers, and
 
TAs  
is  meeting across town to establish a national union of those most exploited  
members of the teaching corps. Bottom line: ain’t no other way to do it. Let’s
 face it: we’re workers, and we need to recognize that the artificial — ultimate
­ly feudal — hierarchies by which we have been asked to define ourselves inside
 the university are in no one’s but the bosses’ interest. Given this choice, I know
 which side I’d rather be on.3
Enough, then, of mammon, now for the god bit. I’ve alluded several times
 
to the conventional ideological conditioning one receives as an undergraduate
 and graduate student of literature and culture. Recently, this ideology of the
 enduring, historically unchanging value of literature — which one thought had
 had 
a
 stake driven through its heart by the theory boom of the 70s and 80s and  
by the rise to prominence of cultural studies — has received 
a
 new  lease on life.  
Prominent senior professors (including recent past president of the MLA San
­dra Gilbert and former enfant terrible of the theory world Frank Lentricchia)
 have loudly proclaimed their allegiance to it. In a breathtaking gesture of bad
 faith, they have excoriated those among us who think (as Gilbert and Lentric
­chia themselves once professed to think) that the study of literature and culture
 is imbricated in a complex structure of socio-political relations that cannot,
 without considerable violence, be set aside in the act of interpreting cultural
 texts. The return from the dead of the "let’s
 
just read literature and appreciate  
its pleasures” crowd is arguably the most striking, and to me most puzzling,
 phenomenon of the 90s. They even have their own national organization, the
 Association of Literary Scholars and Critics (spawned
 
by the notorious Nation ­
al Association of Scholars [NAS] and bankrolled by right-wing foundations
 similar to those that support the NAS itself). Its officers include Roger Shat
­tuck (he of the infamous comparison equating cultural value with gonads, both
 being in essence immutable in his view), Christopher Ricks (high priest of
 arcane allusion), and the ever-resourceful John Ellis, who decided one fine day
 that a career in Germanistik would consign him to obscurity, whereas attacking
 theory would
 
likely bring him to the attention of some movers and shakers. He  
was right, of course.
One need not go on much about this curious revanchism in the academy,
 
except to say some things about how
 
to combat it in the classroom, for there the  
decisive battle will be joined. On that terrain, we enjoy some natural advan
­tages over our adversaries. First, our cultural repertoire, while it may not be
 identical to that of our students, 
is
 a good deal closer to theirs than is, say,  
Roger Shattuck’s or Christopher Ricks’s. A former senior colleague of mine
 (now retired), when I described an especially bad lecture in our department as
 "the Mr. Rogers version of Shakespeare/’ looked puzzled and responded,
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“Who’s Mr. Rogers?” I said he was the guy with the sweater (now enshrined in
 
the Smithsonian) who came on after Sesame Street, to which my insouciant
 interlocutor replied, “What’s Sesame Street? It’s difficult to imagine someone
 so singularly out of touch with contemporary American culture gaining much
 sympathy from undergraduates today. On the whole, we’re better equipped to
 talk to our students about their own enthusiasms than are those who think lit
­erary study 
is
 an invitation to outdo Eliot’s notes to The Waste  Land.
Second, while I continue to hold onto some private heresies concerning the
 distinctiveness of aesthetic objects, it 
is
 nevertheless clear to me — and, I hope,  
to most of you — that the turn to a sociological concept of culture has been
 generally salutary4 and that its overall demystification of cultural value holds a
 kind of populist appeal for students. If we take the view that, to recall Terry
 Eagleton’s ditty, “Chaucer was a class traitor” and 
“
Shakespeare hated the mob,”  
we’re likely to get further in persuading students that their studying literature
 has some purchase on the real world — and is therefore worth doing
 
— than if  
we insist that not knowing Homer and Dante is a sign of their vulgarity and
 well-nigh irremediable cultural inferiority. The overwhelming majority of
 undergraduates today will not migrate into the upper echelons of this society,
 so helping them to obtain a measure of ruling-class toning 
is
 just a shuck —  
and mostly they know it. Our convictions about literature as an ideological
 apparatus thus give us the basis for a pedagogy students can actually use to
 understand the world in
 
which they live, an advantage not likely  to accrue from  
teaching them to appreciate the elegance of Elizabethan sonnets or to gloss the
 allusions in The Rape of the Lock..5
Third, and finally, by understanding our own situation as workers rather
 
than as members of a priesthood charged with passing on the artistic mysteries
 to future generations, we are much more likely to comprehend and be capable
 of
 
speaking to those entirely legitimate desires of  our students that center on  
career and material security. The principal goal of students who persevere in
 higher education is certification — of skills, of intelligence, of some disciplinary
 knowledge or other that will gain them access to 
a
 decent job, if not immedi ­
ately then over the long term of their working life. Why, after all, do we our
­selves stay in this racket? Well, the pay is decent (for some), the hours and the
 nature of the tasks performed not too onerous (for many), and the vacations
 generous (for
 
most). What at least some among us are enraged about these days  
are the diminished material advantages of a career in higher education. Such
 is, remember, the general situation of most
 
people compelled to work in corpo ­
rate America. In recognizing that we have more in common with clerical and
 custodial staff (as the Yale graduate students have done) than with doctors,
 lawyers, and investment bankers (which 
is
 the company in which we imagina ­
tively place ourselves when we call our work a profession), we take the first
 small step towards identifying with our students and thus towards a more
 democratic pedagogical practice.
All that said, the tough questions about how and what we teach our stu
­
dents remain.6 I want to close with the following admonition. The right to
 strike is, with some few exceptions, guaranteed for all workers in the United
 States by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the so-called Wagner Act;
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it is a right workers earned through long years of violent, bloody struggles
 
against the capitalist class and its paid lackeys. Even Yale University will now
 have to concede, however unwillingly, that graduate students holding teaching
 assistantships are workers, not apprentice bosses. But the logic of
 
the NLRB  
decision (not lost on Yale) 
is
 that if this segment of the teaching staff can  
unionize, so (pace the
 
Yeshiva decision) might the rest of the university’s teach ­
ers. Employers in every corporation where unions have little or no historic
 presence are plainly scared that their workers will start forming unions. Wit
­ness the brutal way in which the self-styled “progressive” bookstore chain Bor
­ders has responded to the threat of unionization among its own employees.7
 On the whole, workers understand the facts of economic life with great lucidi
­ty. They know when they’re getting the short end of the stick, and sooner or
 later, they realize that their interests lie in collective organization, in not accept
­ing whatever the owners are pleased to give, and in demanding decent wages
 and working conditions and long-term job security. In short, workers typical
­ly don’t need to be taught to strike, because they know strikes are the principal
 means at their disposal for compelling owners to return some of the surplus
 appropriated from the workers’ own labor.
But for some the temptation is not to recognize that they are
 
workers at all.  
Teaching to strike begins by showing people that they are, most of them,
 
work ­
ers and not owners, that no matter how often they are promised substantial
 material rewards and the compensation of increased status for ignoring this
 fact, the implacable logic of capitalist accumulation will in the end determine
 the limits of what the owners are pleased to grant them. To convey this basic
 lesson in what
 
it means to live in a capitalist world,  we all have to get our heads  
straight about which side
 
we’re on. The students who voted overwhelmingly  to  
have GESO represent them sorted that one out sometime back. And if it can




This paper is an emended and expanded version of a talk delivered at a  
special session of the Modern Language Association Convention, held in
 Washington, D.C., December 1996; the session
 
was devoted to the significance  
of the Yale strikes for
 
literary studies. It  retains traces of the occasion for which  
it was originally written.
2.
 
Since writing this sentence, events have proven just how bloody-mind ­
ed Yale is determined to be, while demonstrating the equal resolve of GESO
 not to be cowed. The university chose to ignore the NLRB ruling, and GESO
 has had to refer the matter to the courts, naming individual administrators and
 faculty in their suit. At this writing, GESO is preparing for an NLRB-sanc
­tioned recognition election that will include (as the original, non-sanctioned




The person who refereed this article for Jx registered the following  
objection to my overly generalized characterization of “the profession”: “the
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profession is extremely varied, and there is a great deal of difference between
 
Yale and Kansas State, not to mention South-Southwest Oklahoma State Col
­lege [a fictional institution one presumes]. This constitutes its own hierarchy,
 whereas the paper elides it into one structure. All universities are not alike, and
 professors at Yale have 
a
 vastly different status accrediting other professionals  
with some consequences (a recommendation letter or suggestion to a journal
 editor for a prestigious publication, or lack thereof, matters).” No argument
 from this quarter, but 
is
 this so different from working, say, for Chase Manhat ­
tan as opposed to the local finance company? One rubs elbows with a different
 class of clientele in each, at the same time that the tasks performed by persons
 holding comparable positions in these different institution tend to be remark
­ably similar, as does the ideology binding shareholders, corporate officers, and
 salaried employees together in an invidious relationship that masks the realities
 of exploitation. I have more direct contact with my students than Annabel Pat
­terson and Margaret Homans, and I’ll wager I supervise more doctoral disser
­tations than both of them put together, but our job descriptions are essentially
 identical. At the level of actual labor, of course, those who teach in the less
 prestigious (or is it just less pretentious?) colleges around the country are more
 akin to the sweated factory workers spread across the globe in the era of flexi
­ble accumulation. And like sweated labor, those whose teaching loads are five
 and six courses per term tend to be less mystified about the conditions of their
 employment than those of us who occupy comparatively privileged positions in
 the imaginative hierarchy of educational distinction.
4.
 
A senior member of Stony Brooks English department has recently  
taken the opposite position, asserting in a letter to the dean of Arts and Sci
­ences that this kind of work 
is
 inappropriate to the discipline of English, and  
that those who think otherwise ought to be transferred to some other depart
­ment to be replaced by staff with a more dutiful regard for the special qualities
 of literature 
as
 art. One can only guess at how widely this  view is shared. I sus ­
pect it’s for the most part confined to those whose training antedated the the
­ory boom of the 70s and 80s, but my evidence for this claim is almost entirely
 anecdotal. On the other hand, the most recent MLA survey of frequently
 taught texts in standard curricula for English and American literature indicates
 that changes in course syllabi since the 1950s have been minimal — a few addi
­tions have been made, but for the most part the same authors continue to dom
­inate. Whether Hawthorne, Melville, Shakespeare, and Milton are taught in




The referee further objected at this point: “While  I understand the sense  
of this, those on the right or moderates might say the same thing, but specify
 an entirely different
 
way to do this [that is to say, make sense of the world they  
inhabit]. ... Also, I don’t think it is prima facie true that a cultural studies cur
­riculum would differ, from a student’s standpoint, from a priestly curriculum.
 Students simultaneously take such classes and internalize the measures of both
 — as Evan Watkins puts it, as long 
as
 we give grades, whether we teach a con ­
servative or radical curriculum, we still circulate students through the same sys
­tem.” True enough, but I continue to believe, perhaps naively, that what we
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teach makes a difference (else why would economists assign Samuelson rather
 
than Marx?), and that how we approach our subject matters even more. Ask
­ing socio-historical questions of literary texts rather than limiting oneself to
 discovering what makes them aesthetically pleasing will not bring us to the
 brink of social revolution, but it can, in some measure, prepare students to rec
­ognize in literature a form of knowledge about societies past and present.
 Whether they draw conservative or progressive political lessons from that
 preparation will depend on many other factors, the majority of which we can
 neither predict nor control. About the progressive potential of cultural studies,
 and the general failure to realize it here in the United States, I have had my say
 in “We Lost It at the Movies.”
6.
 
The following discussion is informed by the Marxist Literary Group’s  
roundtable panel on “Teaching Marxism,” held the morning
 
previous to the day  
I delivered my original talk on the Yale strikes. A longer version of my remarks
 there, which will appear in the journal Mediations, contains specific recommen
­dations about what it means to teach marxism in the university and its poten
­tial contribution to progressive politics.
7.
 
In brief, faced with an organizing drive among its employees, the cor ­
poration responded by firing the organizers. When Michael Moore supported
 the workers, first by confronting the chain over its anti-union campaign, then
 by donating the royalties garnered from sales through Borders of his recent
 bestseller, Downsize This, he was summarily denounced by the corporation and
 barred from future book-signings at its outlets. As I write, Borders employees,
 including those already dismissed, continue to struggle for decent wages and
 benefits by organizing a union, while the company responds with the same line
 (and utilizes the same illegal tactics) that Yale did with GESO. You don’t have
 to be an old-fashioned marxist to recognize that the fundamental social conflict
 in our time remains that between labor and capital, however subtle the varia
­tions in its form.
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I must confess that
 
when first asked, in 1996, to par ­
ticipate in a MLA special session on the Yale strikes,
 I was doubtful that those strikes (as important as I
 think they are in numerous ways) had anything what
­soever to do with literary criticism. However, while
 reading the Fall 1996 MLA Newsletter I changed my
 mind as call after call for more stringent "fact-find
­ing” procedures in the resolution process passed
 before my eyes. There are more references to the
 need for "facts” in the "President’s Column” and the
 “Comments” of the executive council members in
 that publication than even Mr. Gradgrind could
 shake a stick at. This obsession with the "facts”
 piqued my curiosity from both a theoretical and 
a political perspective. For one thing, such a firm,
 uncritical faith in "the facts” seems at odds with the
 usual positions taken by humanists on these matters.
 Whether because they
 
ally themselves  with the Dick ­
ensian view that "the facts” can’t get at everything
 (which is why we need poetry, ethics, and humanistic
 thought in the first place), or because they have kept
 up with the most cutting-edge work in critical theo
­ry, which suggests that the processes of meaning-pro
­duction call into question any simple division of labor
 between "fact-finding” and "interpretation,” few lit
­erary critics these days would accept that "fact” bears
 any simple relationship to "truth,” or that either of
 these categories can be separated from problems of
 interpretation. Remarkably, however, nowhere in the
 Newsletter does anyone raise the possibility that we
 might be dealing primarily with a problem of inter
­pretation in the various controversies and disruptions
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that have ensued in the wake of the Yale strikes, and of Resolution 6 in partic
­
ular. Pursuing the reasons for this curious neglect might tell us something, it
 seems to me, about how the Yale strikes — to which most of this concern over
 “the facts” has been directed — shed some light on problems in literary criti
­cism (and vice versa).
As a starting place, I can cite one of the MLA
'
s own publications: Redraw ­
ing the Boundaries.2 An article on “Cultural Criticism” in that volume suggests
 that
[t]heory ... has become a name for the reflective or second-order discourse
 
that breaks out when a community’s previously unspoken assumptions are
 no longer taken for granted. These assumptions then become objects of
 explicit formulation and debate — very likely because the confines of the
 community are breached. Literary theory emerges when critics and teach
­ers of literature no longer share agreements on the meaning of terms like
 literature, meaning, text, author, criticism, reading, aesthetic value, history,
 teaching, discipline and department — and, of course, culture. (Graff and
 Robbins 428)
When there is agreement about the “keywords” used in a specific discourse
 
community, the definitions of these terms appear to be “common sense” or “the
 facts.” Disagreement, on the other hand, exposes a certain ambiguity about
 determining “the facts,” and reminds us that what we see 
is
 irreducibly depen ­
dent on our frames of reference.
Resolution 6 — I do not think anyone would dispute — has brought to the
 
fore numerous disagreements: about the mission of the MLA, the organization
 of the university, the relationship of
 
graduate students to universities, and the  
legitimacy of unions in an academic context. To read the Fall Newsletter, how
­ever, you would think
 
that the only issues it raises concern the mechanics of the  
resolution process: the difficulty of ascertaining “facts,” and the ethics of cen
­sure. I do not wish to belittle these concerns; what does trouble me, however,
 
is
 that they seem to have entirely overshadowed the substantive issues of Reso ­
lution 6. What we should be seeing in the Resolution 6 dilemma, it seems to
 me, is not primarily a problem with the resolution process, but rather a break
­down in fundamental assumptions, a disagreement about values and basic def
­initions. “Union,” “University,” “MLA” and “academic community” have
 become “community-breaching” concepts, in Gerald Graff and Bruce Robbins’
 terms. However, examination of disputes around these “keywords” has been
 rather peremptorily laid aside as the MLA officers direct us to the presumably
 more important work of “getting
 
the facts” — or, more accurately, talking about  
the importance of getting the facts (which takes us even further away from the
 important issues raised by Resolution 6).
To refresh your memory, here are a few examples of comments from the
 
Executive Council on the resolution process as they appear in the Fall 1996
 Newsletter.
— “I have serious doubts about the appropriateness of resolutions censur
­
ing individuals or institutions, since these imply quasi-judicial fact-finding pro
­cedures that the MLA 
is
 not equipped to conduct” (15; emphasis added)
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“I’d propose that all resolutions citing by name a specific person or edu ­




“Fact-finding takes time, and as scholars and in the interest of fairness,  




“Emergency resolutions seldom afford adequate opportunity for checking  
facts or soliciting other opinions and should therefore be abandoned in their
 present form” (16; emphasis added).
—
 
“When a resolution includes complicated and controversial issues, it is  




The headnote that introduces these comments helpfully points out that
 they
 
were generated in response to “questions about emergency resolutions and  
resolutions that censure institutions or individuals [that] came up after the
 1995 convention.”
The 1995 convention was, of course, the very
 
one at which Resolution 6, an  
“emergency resolution” censuring the administration (individuals) of a particu
­lar institution (Yale), came onto the floor. Although Resolution 6 
is
 not explic ­
itly mentioned in the comments by executive council members from which the
 above-cited quotations are drawn, the repeated references to “emergency reso
­lution” and “censure” keeps pulling it in as a subtext —
 
but not in order to con ­
sider any of its substantive issues; the council appears to see such resolutions
 only 
as
 dangers to be avoided. Indeed, aside from a repression of “Yale” while  
talking of it constantly, what all of the writers for the executive council seem to
 share is 
a
 fear that (1) because of resolutions like 6, the MLA is vulnerable to  
lawsuits if its resolution process 
is
 not changed, and (2) a proper defense against  
such legal challenge 
is
 to institute a committee (between the delegate assembly  
and the membership) to facilitate the collection and “checking” of “facts” in
 proposed resolutions. This is not so simple 
a
 proposition as it sounds in the  
abstract, as I will argue below, nor are its difficulties primarily ones of “amass
­ing” and “checking” as the executive council implies — but first, back to the
 “facts” at hand.




comments cited above — also manifests itself in the three let ­
ters from Yale senior
 
faculty that accompanied the printed texts of the 1995 res ­
olutions, circulated to the membership after the MLA that year. In the first of
 these letters,
 
Annabel Patterson establishes this theme in her opening sentence,  
which claims that she will reveal “the facts that lie behind the graduate stu
­dents’ inflammatory rhetoric” in Resolution 6. Likewise, Margaret Homans
 contends that Resolution 6 
is
 “factually erroneous, slanderous and personally  
motivated,” while Linda Peterson and Ruth Yeazell critique the Delegate
 Assembly for passing the resolution before “ascertaining the facts.” Homans
 additionally calls for the emendation of the MLA constitution to prevent the
 passage of such “groundless” resolutions in the future. I draw attention to this
 particular theme in these letters because we find it repeated so emphatically not
 only in the comments of the executive council that I quote above but also, even
 more forcefully and explicitly, in Sandra Gilbert’s analysis of the Yale situation.3
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In her “President’s Column” in the Fall 1996 Newsletter, Gilbert presents
 
numerous objections from the membership to the passage of Resolution 6 on
 evidential, political, and other grounds, including the claims that the accused
 were given insufficient opportunity to defend themselves, that the membership
 who voted in favor of the resolution improperly leapt to the conclusion that the
 complainant was right, and — the unkindest cut of all — that the presentation
 of facts in the case of Resolution 6 on the part of its proposers was so shoddy
 that it “betrays the ordinary standards of scholarship.” The bulk of Gilbert’s
 column 
is
 given over to the reported speech and writing of those MLA mem ­
bers who think that the resolution process in general, and Resolution 6 in par
­ticular, are silly at best, and perhaps even evil and destructive of our professional
 practice. Lurking behind all of these comments (reinforced by the constant
 repetition of this theme in the executive council members’ comments), is the
 assertion that “the facts” were never properly established in the case of Resolu
­tion 6, a view that Gilbert herself admits to holding: “I too am deeply disturbed
 by the same questions about standards of evidence that have troubled others
 who had procedural objections to the 
Yale
 resolution.” This announcement is  
followed by 
a
 paragraph in which she details in the most incriminating way  
possible the ostensible bad behavior of proponents of Resolution 6 at the dele
­gate assembly meeting. The story — for her column — ends there.
However, in the real world, as opposed to the “made for MLA Newsletter
 
version,” the story does not end there. Gilbert fails to mention the eight pages
 of dissenting letters from 
Yale
 faculty and administrators (cited above) which  
went out with the first mailing on the 1995 resolutions, a forum that gave these
 members of the Yale community ample opportunity — an opportunity denied
 to the “complainants,” it should be added — to present, at length, both a
 defense and “the facts” as they saw them, to the membership as a whole. Addi
­tionally, no mention is made by Gilbert that, in spite of the attempt by these
 
Yale
 faculty to discredit the resolution — which one would presume was  
through the best possible case that they could devise — the membership who
 voted was not convinced by their “facts.”
One possible explanation for why these two niggling little matters are left
 
out of Gilbert’s account is that if this longer story is told, it becomes rather
 more difficult to describe the Resolution 6 dilemma in terms of a crisis over
 “facts” and “standards of evidence.” Although they claim to be bringing the
 flaming sword of “the facts” to cut through to the truth obscured by the
 “rhetoric” of Resolution 6, the letters from the Yale senior faculty actually offer
 little evidence of disagreement about any significant “facts” whatsoever. If one
 does not assume from the get-go that unions are inappropriate at Yale, or in
 general, the letters actually corroborate Resolution 6 by
 
indicating  that  the strik ­
ing graduate instructors were motivated by an attempt to have their elected
 union recognized by the administration, that they had made many other
 attempts through less drastic means to gain this recognition, and, most impor
­tantly, that threats of firing and other repercussions were directed at these
 instructors.4 These are the crucial “facts,” the very
 
ones that  the National Labor  
Relations Board found easily determinable, and upon which they based their
 decision that the Yale administration behaved improperly.5 However, instead
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of focusing on the problem of interpretation raised by these issues — real dif
­
ferences about the relationship of graduate students to universities, the status of
 academic labor, and the value of unions for academic organizing — the presen
­tation of the resolution dilemma in the Fall Newsletter seems to claim that the
 3,828 members of the MLA who voted for Resolution 6 must be poor scholars,
 swayed by “passion,” who did not have the best interests of the profession, the
 MLA or “scholarship” in mind.
In order to see if there 
is
 any merit to such a view, let us examine the actu ­
al sites of disagreement as the letters of the Yale anti-union faculty indicate
 them. (1) The letter writers contend that the graduate instructors’
 
union is ille ­
gitimate and therefore cannot serve as an appropriate motivation to action;
 Resolution 6 contends that
 
the union is legitimate and is being thwarted unfair ­
ly by the Yale administration. (2) The letter writers aver that conditions at Yale
 are not so bad that they warrant 
a
 union in any case; Resolution 6 asserts the  
right of the graduate instructors to make their own decisions on this score. (3)
 The letter writers argue that threats of firing and academic blacklisting do not
 constitute inappropriate responses to what they see as unwarranted and inap
­propriate actions on the part of the graduate instructors; Resolution 6 sees these
 threats as union-busting “academic reprisals” in the sense that they disrupt the
 possibility of “academic community” in any but the terms of the Yale adminis
­tration (about which more below). These disagreements, I think it is rather
 easy to see, arise not at the level of “the facts” (in spite of the claims of the let
­ter writers), but rather at the level of interpretation.
Let us assume for a moment, then, that an MLA “fact-finding” committee
 
had been in place and that Resolution 6 had
 
been referred to it. On what exact ­
ly would they have ruled? On the simple “facts” (that graduate instructors did
 not hand in their grades; that they were threatened with disciplinary action and
 loss of jobs), there was no disagreement between the claims of Resolution 6 and
 those of the
 Yale
 senior faculty who  wrote their letters attempting  to undermine  
it. Indeed, a letter (from senior Yale administrators) threatening the striking
 student-instructors with the loss of their jobs is actually included (as an attach
­ment) with the materials sent out by the Yale senior faculty. Given this mass of
 “evidence,” what would a “fact-finding” committee decide? Whether or not
 unions were appropriate organizing agents for graduate instructors? Whether
 or not grade strikes were appropriate activities? Whether or not the Yale strik
­ers’ grievances were “real”? I for one would be extremely unhappy with the
 insertion of an MLA committee between the membership and the Delegate
 Assembly on these matters of interpretation — which would constitute a pro
­foundly undemocratic move. Before we shift to any such system, then, we
 should be clear about its potential implications, especially given the tendency
 the MLA leadership has shown to displace so very problematically issues of
 “interpretation” into issues of “fact” in the case of Resolution 6.
That so many of the anti-union commentators on the strike have failed to
 
notice this odd equivocation between interpretive problems and “factual” ones
 seems to stem from a fantasy that if only “the facts” were known, then the Yale
 administrators obviously would have been exonerated and the graduate instruc
­tors exposed as ungrateful, spoiled children who were acting up. Instead of
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admitting the possibility that conflicting visions of the relations of students to
 
universities are at stake here — and, in “fact,” that the world might look like a
 quite different place from the empyrean height of the Karl Young Chair and the
 more earthy plane of graduate life, even graduate life at Yale6 — many MLA
 officers seem to assume that those who voted in favor of Resolution 6 must
 have misunderstood, been deluded by, or blinded themselves to, the “actual” sit-
 uation. This astonishes and dismays me, not only
 
because my vote (and that of  
many others whom I know personally, and with whom I discussed these issues
 at length) was highly informed and thoughtful, and I am insulted by the impli
­cation that such a
 
vote necessarily indicates shoddy scholarship and “prejudice,”  
but also — more importantly — because I think that in the displacement of a
 question of “interpretation” into a question of “the facts,” one of the most
 important issues of the Yale strikes for the MLA 
is
 being occluded — namely,  
that the visions of “scholarly community” that underlie the various positions
 taken are radically different. On the one hand, the Yale senior faculty seem to
 assume that “academic community” 
is
 something that we already have, a given,  
and that a union is, thus, a threat to the very “ideals and standards” upon which
 that community is based. On the other hand, the striking graduate instructors
 seem to be suggesting that
 
we need to rethink “academic community” altogeth ­
er.
As I read the letters from the senior Yale faculty — which I did, very care
­
fully, many, many times before I voted — I was struck by their reliance on a cer
­tain vision of “academic community” as opposed to “corporate community” or 
a wage relation. The senior administration at Yale, for example, described its
 rationale for refusal to recognize the union 
as
 “educational reasons,” emphasiz ­
ing the difference between the university and other payers of wages. In other
 words, the university community is special and fragile and unions contaminate
 it. Margaret Homans puts it this way: “it 
is
 not possible for Yale students —  
in training, after all, to occupy professional positions — to constitute the pro-
 letarianized body they claim to be.” What both of these commentators take
 pains to assert 
is
 that the university in general — and Yale in particular — is a  
qualitatively different sort of space than a corporation and that its internal rela
­tions cannot, then, be ones of exploitation but must, rather, be ones in which its
 members will, in time, be able to work things out in “an atmosphere of mutual
 respect.” Annabel Patterson, after pointing out — emphatically
 
— early in her  
letter that unions are not conducive to “an appropriate relationship between
 students and faculty in a non-profit organization” concludes her letter with the
 observation that the faculty “regret that graduate student anxieties, especially
 about their future in a constrained job market, have led to such alienation” and
 offers the assurance that the Yale faculty “continues to work hard to improve
 morale and communication, and to persuade students that the teaching profes
­sion has ideals and standards which can never be identical with those in an
 industry or corporation.” It is easy to sympathize with such assertions; the
 myth of “academic community” 
is
 one of the most powerful ideologies in the  
academy — and it is attractive: a fantasy of the space outside of capitalism
 where scholars think deep thoughts and organize their mutual relations with
 receptive and supportive colleagues in an “atmosphere of mutual respect” with
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no exploitation or pettiness anywhere in sight.7 However, if we attempt to
 
examine this myth outside the sentimental haze produced by hooding cere
­monies and their appeal to the “ancient and universal community of scholars,”
 we can begin to ask questions of power that paint a different
 
landscape than the  
idyllic scene of the grove of academe (now disrupted, alas, by those unruly and
 indecorous graduate students) that the senior faculty from the putative Garden
 of Yale attempt to conjure up.
To consider these questions of power, it might
 
be helpful to recall that peo ­
ple can (and necessarily do) occupy multiple subject positions at the same time.
 It is possible to be “a student” and “an employee” simultaneously, and for the
 interests of each of these roles to conflict with the other, depending upon the
 structuring relations. For example, if we change the above formulation to “a
 woman” and “an employee,” it
 
probably would be relatively easier for most read ­
ers to see what I am getting at. Although as an “employee” a woman may be
 “well-paid” and have “good-benefits” as these are understood under conditions
 of capitalism, she might at the same time be treated in a patronizing or unpro
­fessional ways by male colleagues who rationalize their behavior by appeals to
 certain male and female “roles”
 
in the social order. Or, alternatively, an employ ­
er might claim he 
is
 treating a female employee “well” even while paying her  
less than men who perform comparable tasks, on all sorts of grounds that now
 seem questionable to most people but not so very long ago seemed perfectly
 “natural.”8
With this in mind, going back to my example of students who are also
 
employees, I want to open up the possibility of imagining that what might
 appear to be treating “students” well, according to a certain set of traditional
 hierarchical (even quasi-“feudal”) assumptions (for instance, that graduate stu
­dents are bound to the senior faculty
 
by ties of duty and should rely on them to  
manage their relations with the administration rather than act as agents on
 their own behalf), might well leave them exploited as “employees,” especially
 under current conditions in which so-called “apprenticeship” leads so infre
­quently to tenure-track employment. At Yale in 1994-5, for example, the com
­bined placement record of 10 humanities departments was only 27%, which
 must have left many students — not to mention the 73% of candidates who
 remained unplaced — doubtful, if not rueful, that they were “in training ... to
 occupy professional positions” (as Margaret Homans asserts) since painfully
 few of these positions seemed to exist (Young 184). In any case, surely the
 senior faculty at Yale can’t really believe that they are simply doing graduate
 assistants an “educational” favor by hiring them to grade papers for the large
 lecture classes, and that the department and the university benefit not at all
 from this arrangement? Only according to the logic of a Tom Sawyer tricking
 his friends into whitewashing the fence for him can we be expected to go along
 with such a ruse.
Of course it 
is
 important to be able to point out the ways in which the uni ­
versity is not exploitative in the same way that a factory is, but it 
is
 also helpful  
to be able to see the ways in which it is
 
like a factory, if one is interested in cre ­
ating a real alternative to capital, to whose needs the university, as well as fac
­tories, are subsumed. Willy-nilly, universities are increasingly taking on the
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practices and discourses of corporate capital. Jeff Williams recently catalogued
 
many instances of this trend, noting in particular an administrative fascination
 with “productivity” in publications from the New York Times to the Chronicle of
 Higher Education. One of my own former employers, Carnegie Mellon Uni
­versity, has even been praised by Business Week magazine as exemplary in its
 move toward corporate-style management: “Managing a university as if it were
 a business seems to pay off.... Research money pours into [Carnegie Mellon’s]
 computer science department. Industry pays for fully half
 
of the engineering  
department, with each professor bringing in an average of $215,000 
a
 year in  
outside research money” (Baker 116). In 1994 alone, Carnegie Mellon received
 over a million and a half dollars in royalties for its technological and other
 inventions. Lest you think that this performance was singular, I hasten to add
 that
 
thirty universities earned even more that year in this way — including Yale.9
Indeed, in spite of the confident assertions of the senior faculty in English
 that Richard Levin is one of them, and that he does not see Yale as 
a
 corpora ­
tion, the president’s actual practice suggests otherwise. A recent Business Week
 article reports that “Levin has for several years mulled what many of his peers
 have considered for their colleges — running the place like a business. 1 We
 have to manage this institution efficiently,’ he says, ‘we cannot do everything
 under the sun’” (Jackson 102). Only faculty and alumni resistance, the article
 goes on to claim — not a devotion to the singularity of academic community
 attributed to him by Annabel Patterson, et al. — have limited Levin’s efforts to
 downsize Yale as rapidly as he would like. Meanwhile, numerous other insti
­tutions are downsizing at a more or less rapid pace, increasing their use of part-
 time and graduate student
 
instructional labor with alacrity, as well as increasing  
teaching loads and course enrollment numbers.10 Hence, Evan Watkins has
 observed recently that though “the analogy [between a factory and a universi
­ty] doesn’t yield a point-by-point comparison,.. . there seems to me good rea
­son to suspect that the dominance of a capitalist mode of production has
 involved structurally comparable transformations of 'intellectual' work as well,
 such that it would be no more possible to imagine a university English depart
­ment as Samuel Johnson’s study writ large than to imagine a factory as a giant
 artisan’s workshop” (14). Watkins’ point is that while it might not be accurate,
 strictly speaking, to analyze English teachers as proletarians (a view he vehe
­mently rejects), it might be important to wonder how the structure of the uni
­versity as a workplace changes as capital restructures, and what impact these
 changes have on English — and other — teachers.
One of the changes that occurs in such a situation is that "academic com
­
munity” comes to signify differently as the vast majority of its members find
 themselves in an unanticipated position relative both to the institutions in
 which they work and to each other. Stanley Aronowitz has chronicled the
 declining power of faculty organizations relative to administrative staffs backed
 by boards of trustees over the past two decades as universities modeled them
­selves more on corporate and less on communal models. He observes: “Near
­ly all institutions of higher education maintain the formal apparatus of faculty
 sovereignty.... But in both public and private university sectors, power
 
to make  
decisions has slowly shifted to administrators who now retain final determina
­
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tion of nearly all university
 
issues” (91). Aronowitz, rightly I think, sees this as  
an assault on academic freedom — not in the sense of an individual's freedom
 to think, research and write as he or she sees fit, but rather in terms of “the
 rights of the faculty as a collectivity to retain sovereignty over the educational
 process” (91). This important reminder that “academic freedom” 
is
 an issue for  
a community and not just for individuals 
is
 salutary. At a time when, especially  
for humanists, the university 
is
 changing radically, we find ourselves in a posi ­
tion to rethink not just what the university should be but to whom it belongs:
 questions that crises such as recent labor unrest at Yale bring to the fore dra
­matically.
These questions of “belonging” confront the next (potential) generation of
 
scholars most immediately and painfully. When less than half of the advertised
 jobs in English — according to the MLAs own data — are tenure-track in any
 given year, it is not surprising that graduate students are unwilling to suffer
 their graduate years in silence.11 For many of them, unions have come to rep
­resent a chance at belonging, after all, to an "academic community” of which
 they too have dreamed but which seems increasingly elusive. To anyone who
 thinks that unionization is, of itself, the death of that community, and that
 unions, like the resolution process, incite divisiveness, this must seem misguid
­ed at best. But I would like to put forth another reading: that neither unions
 nor the MLAs resolution process cause divisiveness; they are, rather, symptoms
 of divides that are already here. To fail to recognize this is to continue to see
 an imperiled (but pure) community where there is actually already (to borrow
 from Graff and Robbins) a breach. For this reason, I found it disturbing that
 Sandra Gilbert refers (in the Fall MLA Newsletter) to the “sides” of the dispute
 in the Yale strikes as “the union” and “Yale,” with the unfortunate implication
 that the striking graduate instructors — most of whom had been at Yale longer
 than at least one of the letter writers among the full-time faculty — are not part
 of Yale. For the graduate instructors, however, the union is not a declaration of
 independence from an actually existing academic community called “Yale.” It
 
is
 rather an assertion of rights to some meaningful powers of self-determina ­
tion in a community-to-be called Yale to which they contribute their labor,
 pedagogic, scholarly, and political.
Hegemony theory offers us a way to analyze this situation in a more help
­
ful manner than accusing dissenters of inciting divisiveness (see note 3). It
 directs us to examine the dynamic among competing group interests and con
­sider why the “consent” of subordinated groups (such as, in this case, graduate
 students) to the rule of the dominant academic ideology of “community” has
 broken down (which is another way of saying that “the confines of the com
­munity are breached”). Seen from this perspective, the function of the call for
 “fact” collecting on the part of the senior faculty at Yale emerges as an attempt
 to “define the situation” in such a way that it can be resolved on terms most
 favorable to them, at a moment when dominant ideology is in crisis. Ideology
 works by naturalizing a partial view as universal and necessary: as “fact.”
 Hence, the senior faculty at Yale want to try to make it seem to be a “fact” that
 unions are inappropriate organizing vehicles for university teachers, that grad
­uate instructors are simply “students” and not
 
in any  sense “employees,” and that
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the university is somehow outside of capitalism. Other definitions of the situ
­
ation are, of course, possible. Graduate student unions disrupt the balance of
 power in the universities, including the power of the senior faculty to “define
 the situation.” Rather than relying on their advisors to see that they are looked
 after when departmental largess 
is
 handed out, or assuming that the very senior  
faculty who benefit from the pleasures of graduate teaching — and a decrease
 in their own work load provided by graduate assistants and instructors — can
 be relied upon to advocate student interests at all times, graduate students are
 increasingly taking matters into their own hands. In doing so they “define the
 situation” of graduate study and employment rather differently
 
than their senior  
colleagues. If the MLA senior staff and officers could manage for a moment to
 think of the ensuing disagreements as a struggle among competing “definitions
 of the situation” rather than a stark black and white of “facts” (a position so un-
 nuanced that they would be unlikely to bring it to their study of literature), they
 might be able to see how they have simply taken on in their discourse of “facts”
 the “definition of the situation” of one side in the 
Yale
 dispute. A more bal ­
anced perspective would prompt them to bring the interpretive skills and
 appreciation of complexity gleaned from their professional practice to bear as
 forcefully upon this social text as upon literary ones.
Of course if it 
is
 so, as I am suggesting, that the positions of the senior fac ­
ulty at Yale who wrote the letters, and those of the senior MLA staff as well,
 are “interested” rather than neutral “fact” amassing, then what of the striking
 students: are their positions “interested” too? Surely, yes. It 
is
 here that the  
question of
 
“justice” — and some recognition of the ways in which different  
relations to concrete, material conditions of existence can lead to quite differ
­ent “definitions of the situation” — must come into play. One of the striking
 students has described a moment of recognition and politicization in his grad
­uate career when, as a young and doubtful-of-unions newcomer to Yale, he had
 listened to the narrative of an older
 
graduate student who, because he had a wife  
and child who needed to be included in his health plan, ended up being forced
 to give “roughly half of his income back to Yale for health care” coverage. Com
­ing up against the hard realities of graduate life for himself and his peers caused
 him to conclude that “there really are issues of justice here. GESO [union] has
 the moral high ground; it’s not just
 Yale
 [the corporation] trying to do what 's 
in their interest and we re trying to do what’s in our interest” (quoted in Robin
 and Stephens 60; emphasis added). This sorting out of “interest” in a materi
­alist analysis proceeds by way of examining the relative structural positions of
 the speakers. In this instance, we might well ask
 
whether it might not be pos ­
sible that graduate students are in 
a
 better position than the senior faculty at  
Yale to see the “facts” that matter and the interpretations that matter for justice
 in the case of Resolution 6.
So what is to be done? I propose foremost that
 
we think about what “aca ­
demic community,” as we wish to have it, means in explicit terms, without
 assuming that “academic community” is some timeless, obvious and perfect
 thing that we already have, that has somehow suddenly become threatened by
 unruly graduate students and pesky unions. Community is, rather, what we
 must imagine and work for, with clear-eyed analysis of the complex material
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conditions in which we all (at present, unequally) work. Moving the debate in
 
this direction will push the emphasis from the local divisiveness that unions
 supposedly generate to the long-term possibilities for an academic community
 that is democratic and broad-based in ways we might not yet be able to com
­prehend fully. This 
is
 not to say that there is — pluralistically — room for  
everyone; the Annabel Pattersons of the world, who confuse the capitulation
 of graduate students to administrative interests with "mutual respect,” are, it
 must be said, not
 
very promising candidates. In the meantime, we cannot give  
in to a fear of taking stands because powerful groups (such as the Yale admin
­istration) might be unhappy about it and threaten lawsuits (which would be
 possible no matter how many "facts” are collected so long as fundamental dis
­agreements about how to interpret them are in force). Dismissing the perspec
­tive of an opponent as due to "passion” rather than "reason,” “rhetoric” rather
 than "fact,” and "prejudice” as opposed to objectivity — as the senior Yale fac
­ulty
 
and MLA officers have attempted  to do —  stops the debate to be sure. But  
at what cost? Surely it 
is
 not impertinent at this juncture to consider the power  
relations that have structured the MLAs representation of what counts as "fact”
 and what does not, what counts as "reasonable” and what does not,
 
what counts  
as "neutral” and what does not, in the case of Resolution 6.
This said, let me be perfectly clear about what. I am not saying. I am not
 
suggesting that "evidence” 
is
 unimportant and that resolutions should be free-  
for-alls in which anyone can say anything whatsoever and that the membership
 should simply go along. Resolutions should be carefully scrutinized by the
 membership, and as much information should be circulated concerning them 
as 
is
 possible. The recently-instituted revision to the resolution process — which  
provides a forum for members to comment
 
on the resolutions prior to voting —  
is very helpful. Given that safeguards such as this are already in place, howev ­
er, what I am suggesting is that a situation in which a resolution composed of  
out-and-out lies would be proposed strikes me as extremely unlikely; establish
­ing the “facts” is not so much of an issue 
as
 the executive council and president  
of the MLA are claiming.
The vague and obsessive focus upon "the facts” seems to function as a dis
­
traction, a red herring, more than anything else, especially since Resolution 6,
 the motivating case for "reform” of the resolution process (in ways that renders
 it less democratic), does not really fit the "lack of facts” thesis when examined
 carefully. MLA members are sophisticated readers of text, and those who actu
­ally vote on resolutions have numerous means to become well-informed on the
 issues under discussion (which in these days of the computerized databases and
 e-mail is easier than ever before). I myself read the (anti-union) comments on
 Yale's official web page and every article in major US papers written on Yale and
 strikes since 1984 to get a sense of its administrations past behavior in labor
 disputes (not very nice). I also saw a great deal of diverse and thoughtful mate
­rial written on the strikes, including a widely circulated letter penned by Yale
 senior faculty who supported the striking instructors (a view not explicitly rep
­resented in MLA publications at all). Given a highly literate, engaged, and
 research-skilled membership, I think a case of outright fraud in a resolution
 extremely unlikely, and its passage even less likely.
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What is likely, however, is that numerous issues will arise that will be con
­
tentious, and in which each side’s position might well look outrageous, unfair,
 and impossible to the other. The NLRB
'
s list of faculty and administrators at  
Yale who threatened students during the strike is unlikely to convince those
 faculty that they acted improperly if they do not accept the students’ right to
 organize and strike, however incriminating the list might look to those readers
 who see the strike differently. On the other hand, the declaration of Yale’s PR
 department on its webpage that “
Yale
 is a good employer!” with its list of  
aspects of life at Yale that support this contention to its own satisfaction, is
 unlikely to convince unsatisfied workers (or their supporters), whether they are
 in the library, the classroom, or the kitchen. The point here is not that there
 are no “facts” but rather that no amassing of “facts” — without attention to the
 underlying issues through which we “see” them — is going to get us very far in
 the debate over how to conduct the resolution process.
So I think it is lamentable that the important issues raised by Resolution 6
 
(about the status of graduate students in the universities, their labor, the
 restructuring of universities, the possibilities of new
 
ways of imagining “acade ­
mic community”) have been displaced onto an argument about how the resolu
­tion process should be conducted — an argument that seems to keep us from
 looking at the issues of the resolution as we go around and around about the
 process of generating them. (This is not to say that these issues are not being
 discussed by MLA officers, or in forums the MLA provides; I am simply sug
­gesting that it is unfortunate that Resolution 6 has been excluded as a site for
 these discussions.) It is, of course, much easier to debate how
 
we should make  
resolutions than to debate what they say, at least in the case of the really con
­troversial ones; there are, surely, no simple answers to the issues raised by Res
­olution 6.
In “fact,” I’m not entirely convinced myself that unions (as we know them)
 
are the best way to achieve “academic community,” or that grade strikes are the
 best possible strategy for academic unions to deploy. But I am convinced that
 my vote to censure the Yale administration was well-informed, thoughtful and
 in good faith; I still think that graduate students should have some rights of
 self-determination, and thus that the administration at Yale behaved badly to
 thwart their unionization efforts. This is, I maintain, a reasonable conclusion
 to come to from the “facts” available for review, as produced by both the uni
­versity’s administration and their supporters, as well as the critics. I am also
 convinced that Resolution 6 should have marked the beginning of an ongoing
 public discussion of these issues — not the end of “emergency resolutions.” It
 is unfortunate that
 
the interpretive grid provided by MLA officers suggests that  
a vote to censure Yale’s administration was tantamount to a declaration of pro
­fessional incompetence, and hence that no one need take the issues raised by
 Resolution 6 (other than the purely formal ones about the resolution process
 itself) seriously at all. Those thousands of us who voted (thoughtfully, careful
­ly) "yes,” deserve better. Those who voted (thoughtfully, carefully) “no” do too.
 In this life, all of us want 
a
 lot more than facts.
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An earlier version of this essay was part of the panel, “What does Literary Crit
­
icism have to do with the 
Yale
 Strikes?” at the 1996 MLA Convention. It was  
organized by the Division on Literary Criticism in order
 
to consider the impact  
and meaning of
 
the Yale Strikes12 of 1995-6, and how their lessons might be  
useful to thinking through problems facing higher education today. To these
 ends, in this essay I was particularly concerned with the Fall 1996 MLA
 Newsletters representations of Resolution 6 (censuring the
 
Yale administrations  
behavior during a “grade strike” waged by graduate student instructors) and
 with how these representations seemed to foreclose the complex analysis of the
 situation necessary to gleaning any lasting lessons from that resolution. I
 attempt to open up the possibility for an ongoing conversation on some of its
 fundamental issues in these remarks.
1.
 
The title is borrowed from Mr. Gradgrind in Dickens’ Hard Times, a  
book that reminds us that there are more than “facts” in this world. I am grate
­ful to Andrew Ross for asking me to participate in the MLA panel for which
 this paper was originally written, and to those colleagues, especially Tim Bren
­nan, Lisa Frank, Keya Ganguly, Paula Geyh and Jeff Williams, who comment
­ed on it before and/or afterwards. Thanks also to Ivo Kamps, who solicited this
 essay for Jx when he got wind that it had (unsurprisingly) been turned down by
 Profession, In the rejection letter from Profession, Phyllis Franklin suggested
 that “more space than was needed” was given in this article to the critique of




I chose to cite this text primarily because it is collected in an MLA pub ­
lication; its position would thus presumably carry at least some weight and
 legitimacy with members of that organization, whether they agree with it or
 not. My own position on theoretical work, which I will develop through the
 argument of this 
essay,
 is actually closer to Stuart Hall’s neo-Gramscian “ideol ­
ogy critique” which relies upon a complex theorization of hegemony. See, for
 example, “The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees.”
3.
 
I am not implying that this similarity necessarily points to “collusion” on  
the part of the MLA officers and the Yale faculty who wrote the letters com
­plaining about Resolution 6 — ideology does not work that way for the most
 part. What interests me is that so many MLA officers — probably with the
 best of intentions — consciously or
 
unconsciously bought into, and reproduced,  
the claims of the senior Yale faculty as “true” when these same claims appear to
 be patently “rhetorical” to other readers. Leaving open the possibility for the
 moment that the attempt to place all the “facts” on one side and all the
 “rhetoric” on the other in this dispute simply will not bear up to scrutiny, we
 must consider, then, the implications of
 
the MLA officers’ discursive alliance  
with the Yale senior faculty, as I attempt to do in this essay.
4.
 
Linda Peterson and Ruth Yeazell note in their letter, for example, that  
“for a number of years now, some graduate students at
 
Yale have been agitating  
in various ways in support of a union — meeting, pamphleteering, picketing,
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even engaging in temporary job actions?” Annabel Patterson points out that a
 
letter from senior administrators at Yale “explained to the part-time acting
 instructors that those who failed to turn in their grades [that is, participated in
 the grade strike] . . . would not be allowed to teach in the spring.”
5.
 
The New York Times  reported in November of 1996 that “lawyers for the  
National Labor Relations Board . . . plan to charge Yale University
 
with acting  
illegally by punishing teaching assistants who staged a grade strike last Decem
­ber in a drive to unionize” (Greenhouse 6). The Board’s determination to pur
­sue this course was based on the collecting of evidence of numerous threats by
 various members of the senior faculty and administration of Yale toward strik
­ing graduate assistants. Representatives of the administration never have
 denied the making of these threats; their position was rather that, as the New
 York Times article notes, “in the past, the board’s lawyers treated graduate assis
­tants as students rather than employees” and thus that their treatment of
 
the  
striking teachers was justified.
6.
 
The thorny question of how to deal with the relatively  elite status of Yale  
graduate students in relation to other graduate students (which they would
 hardly
 
deny) raises itself here. One thing that is clear, however, is that no mat ­
ter how privileged they may be in relation to graduate students in other sites,
 they are not privileged in relation to the senior faculty in their departments.
 Furthermore, I think that an important analogy can be drawn through an
 examination of labor history. It has often (though, of course, not exclusively)
 been the case that relatively well-off groups were organized before other groups
 (northern factories before southern ones; “Big Steel” before the small plants) —
 and that the organizations established by the somewhat more secure workers
 provided a structure for the more vulnerable groups to join, offering them an
 otherwise unavailable margin of
 
protection. Without claiming that graduate  
students are exactly like steel workers (obviously not so), I think that one can
 claim that elite graduate students are in a position relative to more exploited
 graduate students which is analogous to Big Steel
'
s relationship to smaller  
plants earlier in the century. If it succeeds in unionizing the teaching staff at a
 major private university, GESO will have set an important precedent that will
 be helpful not only to graduate student organizing but also to the organizing of
 part-time faculty and even full-time faculty at private schools far less privileged
 than 
Yale.
 Hence, Margaret Homans misses the point in her observation that  
“it would be appropriate for students to unionize at those schools where teach
­ing loads are much higher than at Yale and where reliance on graduate teach
­ing 
is
 greater. Part-time and adjunct faculty with Ph.D.’s present an even more  
legitimate motive to unionize, although they are not part of
 
the union move ­
ment at Yale. But it is not possible for Yale students — in training, after all, to
 occupy professional positions — to constitute the proletarianized body they
 claim to be.” The unionization of Yale students might well 
enable
 the union ­
ization of the other groups Homans names. In any case, “students ... at those
 schools where teaching loads are much higher than at Yale” are also in “train
­ing .. . to occupy professional positions” — so it 
is
 not entirely clear why it is 
proper for them to unionize but not Yale students on that ground alone. But
 more importantly, while Yale students are undoubtedly better off financially, in
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work conditions, and even in future prospects than many of their graduate stu
­
dent colleagues at other schools, this by no means suggests that within the local
 power dynamic they have no legitimate grievances. In addition, the part-time
 workers with Ph.D.’s, who Homans admits are an exploited group at Yale, can
 certainly benefit from a graduate instructors’ union, which, should it ever be
 recognized, would provide a site in which they could organize in relative safety
 from reprisals (such as being fired), fear of which no doubt contributes to their
 current non-participation in GESO.
7.
 
Jameson’s dialectic of ideology and utopia is pertinent here. At the con ­
clusion of The Political Unconscious, he argues that even retrograde ideological
 positipns can contain the germs of utopian hope, and thus that they should be
 read in such a way that “a functional method for describing cultural texts
is articulated with an anticipatory one” (296). In other words, one might (and
 should) explore the work performed by particular texts toward reproducing the
 status quo, or a specific nexus of interests, while also recognizing the desire for
 
a
 non-exploitative, democratic “collective-associational” future that might be  
expressed simultaneously with it (in concepts, to take the case in hand, such as
 "academic community”). Problems arise in assuming that the latter already
 exists in the guise of the former.
8.
 
One of the main issues of the staff strikes at Yale in the mid-80s was, as 
a matter of fact, such gendered discrepancies in pay. Though hotly disputed at
 the time, the case for equal pay now seems practically incontrovertible, and the
 case against it preposterous (which does not, alas, mean that inequalities do not
 persist). On such a model, one wonders what the case against graduate student
 unions will look like in ten years time!
9.
 
Data culled from the Association of University Technology Managers’  
survey of “Gross Royalties Received ... for Fiscal year 1994” — part of its
 Licensing Survey for that year.
10.
 
See Cary Nelson’s much-cited article for Social Text, and the essays col ­
lected in Higher Education Under Fire, edited by Berube and Nelson.
11.
 
If these figures are “disquieting” (as she puts it) to Sandra Gilbert,  
imagine what they must be like for those people more immediately affected.
 The passage in which she makes this admission bears quotation in all its grim
 detail: for the 1993-4 graduating Ph.D.s who got
 
postsecondary academic jobs  
(75%) “only 45.6% of the
 
jobs in English . .. were full-time tenure-track posi ­
tions. The smaller percentage of tenure-track jobs 
is
 especially disquieting... .  
I remind myself that the placement survey 
is
 several years old and the number  
of advertised positions has dropped since then!” (4).
12.
 
For an excellent general overview of the issues posed by the strike, see  
the essays collected by Cary Nelson in Will Teach for Food: Academic Labor in
 Crisis, The title of the MLA panel in which I participated refers to Yale striker,
 not just the graduate instructors’ strike, even though, because of the particular
 emphasis of Resolution 6, the graduate instructors have received most of the
 attention among MLA members. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that
 students were not the only group engaged in strike action recently at Yale; cler
­ical workers, librarians and dining hall workers were striking 
as
 well. In join ­
ing a union, the graduate instructors have allied themselves with these workers
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(and vice versa), as well as with a long history of labor struggle both at Yale and
 
in the US. They have opened the possibility of forging an “academic commu
­nity” that includes all university workers, professor and kitchen staff, librarian
 and secretary, as our colleagues in Britain have done in the General Strike of
 the universities in November 1996 (see Guardian, November 19, 1996). They
 have forged lateral alliances with other universities where students are union
­ized (or hope to be) rather than thinking of their own predicament or the
 predicament of others as isolated and isolatable. The problems that confront us
 are collective problems, requiring collective solutions. As capital and the uni
­versity restructure themselves over time, we will find ourselves in the position
 of having to reassess assumptions, concepts and relations previously taken for
 granted. Unions might not be the only, or even, the best, solution to the prob
­lems we confront along the way, but at the current conjuncture they have pro
­vided 
a
 collective structuration for thinking and organizing  that for too long has  
gone on in an atomized fashion.
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Pleasures lie on the other side of attentiveness. The
 
physical act of reading, the focus, the posture, and the
 suspension may at times approach levels of pain,
 although this discomfort, usually no more than the
 awkwardness of elbows in the
 
dark, is  fleeting. What  
a text solicits is not attention, but distraction. The
 text provides leave, it asks that you walk alone, and
 accuse the world that
 
possesses you, including your  
own cognitive resources, of insufficiency. After all,
 with the page in hand, you are looking
 
for something,  
listening for it. If the reading fails, if distraction is
 not rewarded with even the slightest increase in the
 capacity to endure the world that commands atten
­tion, you will retaliate, and someone will suffer
 
for it.
In 1936, Willa Cather wrote a letter to The Common
­
weal defending the function of
 
writing and reading  
literary texts. The letter is included in the volume,
 Willa Cather on Writing, with a 1930s left-baiting
 title, “Escapism.” Cather's central argument 
is
 that to  
accuse art and literature of being escapist 
is
 to engage  
in tautological thinking. “What has art ever been but
 escape?”, Cather asks, and what possible purpose can
 literature otherwise serve?
Nearly all the Escapists in the long past have
 
managed their own budget and their social rela
­tions 
so
 unsuccessfully that I wouldn’t want them  
for my landlords, or my bankers, or my neigh
­bors. They were valuable, like powerful stimu
­lants, only when they were left out of the social
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and industrial routine which goes on every day all over the world. Indus
­
trial life has to work out its own problems. (21)
Literary criticism in the twentieth century has been engaged in a quest for rel
­
evance that invites failure and brings displeasure and aggravation to its practi
­tioners. Deans and accreditation boards want to know about outcomes. Career
 planners want to know about options for undergraduate majors. Meanwhile,
 the ambitious graduate student 
is
 at work to prove that the past ten years of  
criticism on My Ántonia is false or windy and the true interpretation 
is
 at hand  
— his hand. Or the even more ambitious assistant professor is set to establish
 how
 
the intricate puzzle of gender relations in her culture is exposed in the text,  
which she explicates. The quest for relevance in literary studies has resulted in
 a succession of theoretical approaches, arguing everything from all the world’s
 a text (and thus the province of formalist literary scholarship) to all the world's
 social ills exist in some particular text, or canon, or tradition. Meanwhile, the
 function of literary criticism within the structured performances of public
 thinking has eroded steadily, and the only voices that are certain to reach the
 public at large are those that attack the institution and the practice of literary
 scholarship.
Willa Cather's letter to The Commonweal addresses the question that every
 
generation of literary scholars must answer: Why study literature? The implic
­it answer in recent decades has been anything but Cather
'
s invitation to escape.  
Cather opens her letter with an account of primitive Southwest Native Amer
­ican women, living “under the perpetual threat of drought and famine,” who
 nonetheless invest hours of effort to paint geometrical patterns on their earth
­enware jars and pots even “when they had nothing to cook in them.” The urge
 to make the world aesthetically pleasing, according to Cather, springs from “an
 unaccountable predilection” of human behavior (19). Nonetheless, the question
 of the usefulness of such activities dogs us, especially in United States civiliza
­tion, where our attention is turned so persistently to productivity. Here is
 where Cather takes a less than genteel turn. All true poets are “useful,” she
 argues,
 
“because they refresh and recharge the spirit of those  who can read their  
language” (20). Cather retreats quickly from the second point, referring instead
 to the “powerful stimulants” in literature and defending literature against calls
 for immediate social relevance. The point she does not pursue is her assertion
 that whatever escape literary artists provide, they do so only for those who can
 read their language.
The women who painted intricate patterns on pots and jars saw past the
 
practical utility of these items to something more — not necessarily more pro
­found, but certainly less immediate. At the very least, the etched shapes reflect
 a power of cognition that refuses to limit itself to water-carrying, that by its
 artistic endeavor asserts that the limits of its attention are not met merely by
 toting water up the hill and toting human waste back down. The basis for read
­ing the language of
 
arts is to recognize how their attention has been focused,  
and then to read past representation to the cognitive quality
 
of the impulse that  
produced it. The inability to read their language produces charges of irrele
­vance and uselessness because such readings read the text but cannot read past
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it. Likewise, the insistence upon reading the language of art as if it were lim
­
ited to its representational or performative functions leads to successive, dis
­posable interpretive gestures, resulting in higher-level charges of irrelevance
 and uselessness. It is as if to say, how nice that those Pueblo Indians decorat
­ed their pots, they must have had plenty of leisure time to make such pretty
 shapes.
In Moby Dick, Melville invites the process of reading past on a number of
 
occasions, extracting from everyday whaling operations richly evocative con
­tent. The narrative itself reads past the business of whaling to a succession of
 complexities embodied in the purposeful actions of sailors. In the following
 passage, Melville describes the whale line, tied to the harpoon:
Again: as the profound calm which only apparently precedes and prophe
­
sies of the storm, 
is
 perhaps more awful than the storm itself; for, indeed,  
the calm 
is
 but the wrapper and envelope of the storm; and contains it in  
itself, as the seemingly harmless rifle holds the fatal powder, and the ball,
 and the explosion; so the graceful repose of
 
the line, as it silently serpen ­
tines about the oarsmen before being brought into actual play — this is a
 thing which carries more of true error than any other aspect of this dan
­gerous affair. But why say more? All men live enveloped in whale lines.
 All are born with halters round their necks; but it is only when caught in
 the swift, sudden turn of death, that mortals realize the silent, subtle, ever
­present perils of life. And if you be a philosopher, though seated in the
 whale-boat, you would not at heart feel one whit of terror, than though
 seated before your evening fire with a poker, and not a harpoon, by your
 side. (306)
The useful whale line 
is
 explained metaphorically, as it shares the qualities of  
the quiet that precedes a storm, or of the unheld, loaded weapon — harmless
 and calm until its potential function commences. These images are enough to
 know the whale line, and to appreciate its utility and its purpose in the narra
­tive. But to read past the whale line 
is
 to recognize the thought processes con ­
tained within those metaphors. If all men live enveloped in whale lines, living
 day to day might be understood as the storm's calm prologue, or the uncocked
 weapon, so that we might offer the interpretation that grace, dignity, and even
 the larger structures of civilization simply give form to human illusions of per
­manence. Here, with Melville s language, we begin to read past his image, but
 not quite. We are still at the level of the image of the whale line and its applic
­ability to human nature, still thus at the symbolic function.
The last line of the passage invites the process of reading past its interpre
­
tive possibilities. One does not need to sit in a whaleboat and hold 
a
 harpoon  
to attend to the terror of the image created by the whale line. If you are philo
­sophical, if you can read their language, then “seated before your evening fire
 with a poker, and not 
a
 harpoon, by your side,” you will gain access to the cog ­
nitive horrors tapped by the coiled whale line. The gesture of poking the fire
 thus emerges as an attenuation of the harpoon thrust (as well as a hundred
 other such outward gestures), and the safety of the domestic hearth a delusion
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equal to Ahabs ambition of control over natural forces. Linked this way to the
 
Pequod's mission, fire poking becomes a task worthy of pleasured distraction,
 like toting water in decorated pots. The material circumstances of an action
 obscure but do not change the precarious nature of the chain of circumstances
 to which it ultimately contributes. To read past the whale line 
is
 to read past  
whaling as a whole toward the cognitive processes that led Melville
'
s imagina ­
tion to be filled so deeply with harpoons, vessels, and madmen.
In Moby Dick, Melville consistently documents and reads past the utilities
 
of whaling, and the whale line passage 
is
 exemplary, not exceptional. Nonethe ­
less, to read past Melville is to contemplate the turn of his attention to whaling
 in order to capture images sufficient to the imaginative direction of the text. To
 read past the juxtaposition of harpoon and fireplace poker, for example, might
 lead one to recognize subsequent correspondences between images in the text
 and gestures contained within the reader’s own daily performances. Thus, the
 existence of Ahab’s quest for the great white
 
whale exists over the facts of whal ­
ing like those geometrical patterns on earthenware pots. The women need
 those pots,
 
but they don’t need the geometrical designs except as an escape from  
the needed pots. Ahab and the crew of the Pequod need whales, but they don’t
 need Moby Dick except as an expression of their need to transcend or escape
 the business of whaling. The limits of this crew’s attention are not met, in other
 words, merely by killing whales. If one’s sense of the now 
is
 expansive, it con ­
tains room in it for the day-to-day functions of whaling and pot-toting, and
 also for great white whales and geometrical figurations. Throughout the text,
 Melville probes the unaccountable predilection of human beings to project the
 forms and structures of their thoughts on wider canvases than circumstances
 provide, to become creatively, and at times destructively, inattentive to the prac
­tical content of their thoughts and the tasks at hand. The continuous move
­ment
 
by Pueblo Indian women, up and down the cliffs, from their rock-perched  
homes to sources of
 
water far below, most surely influenced the geometrical  
patterns of their aesthetic impulses, reified on their pot burdens. The continu
­ous movement by New England whalers, further and further out to sea, to
 destroy life for commerce and for illumination, worked on Melville’s mind 
so that every operation, from signing on to the ship to harpooning the whale,
 became invested with a significance to those who could read its language. Plea
­sure arises from the discovery that through inattention labor may come to pos
­sess value, even significance, far beyond our capacity to comprehend fully each
 gesture, each toting. In every case, the literary emerges from these forms and
 structures of distraction, and it is in this mode of cognition that literary critics
 find their vocation.
Distraction is serious business in literature. At its very best, the literary 
is 
the art of reading past. It 
is
 not the study of history, or the study of social con ­
ditions, or the study of any particular representation of reality but the study of
 how one reads past every one of these phenomena. Reading past means over
­passing the mimetic detail — a whaling venture, a pattern of conflict, a social
 issue — to a consideration of the particular representation as imaginative stim
­ulus within the larger system of meaning created by the work. And even then,
 it is not the system of meaning that one settles on but the creation of meaning,
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the action, or movement of the system towards expansive meaning. One reads
 
literature to be present at the creation, and then to move past what has been
 created toward the something more that informs, in essence, the literary. Those,
 who cannot read the language of literary texts, or whose minds are satisfied
 with lesser works, or who prefer the seemingly less mediated language of histo
­ry or social science, may not be comfortable or find use in reading past but read,
 rather, for the mimetic or informational quality of the text. This 
is
 under ­
standable, as we seem to lack an articulate rationale for the study of literary
 writing, and much of what passes as literary criticism 
is
 really history, sociolo ­
gy, or cultural commentary.
Reading precedes comprehension, interpretation, and criticism. The ques
­
tion of how one reads is not a simple one, and its complexity has become
 increasingly apparent as reading habits shift at the end of this century and as
 literary criticism loses its public relevance. Charles Altieri thus proposes “that
 we shift our attention from the relations between interpretive statements and
 their objects to the positions that works of art make available for reflecting on
 ourselves as interpreting subjects” (291-2). Altieri proposes a move away from
 concern with the constellation of interpretive paradigms surrounding literary
 texts and toward greater attention to textually-based extensions of the readers
 own imaginative capacities — and then to construct a language and a means of
 explaining this process. “The problem for contemporary theory is to show how
 .. . imaginative activity can at once be assessed within a common language and
 have some influence on the principles adapted for those assessments” (16).
 Similarly, Michael Bérubé finds that “while we academic readers have been
 devising more and more exacting ways of reading our texts, our worlds and our
 critics, the reading skills and reasoning facilities of [even the college-educated
 mass public] have become cause for national alarm” (65). It may be that the
 ways in which academic readers read are ill communicated by the rituals of crit
­ical presentation and poorly represented within the discourse of college and
 university curricula. It is not likely, for example, that the demands of reading
 imaginative literature and the skills required to read an executive summary are
 properly or usefully conflated in assessing facility with language. John Guillo
­ry correctly dismisses the internecine battles within the literary establishment
 over canons and cores as a symptom of a much larger problem, a crisis shared
 by conservative and radical academics alike. Two distinct forms of “cultural
 capital” are pitted against each other in the processes of contemporary intellec
­tual formation, “one of which 
is
 ‘traditional,' the other organic to the constitu ­
tion of the professional-managerial class” (45). The literary establishment has
 not performed well in defending the place of traditional literary study (in any
 form, from Great Books to postcolonialism) within the context of the intellec
­tual demands of corporate capitalism. “It has proven to be much easier to quar
­rel about the content of the curriculum than to confront the implications of a
 fully emergent professional-managerial class which no longer requires the cul
­tural capital of the old bourgeoisie.” Nonetheless, Guillory's sense of "cultural
 capital” stresses the content over the active demands of imaginative literature.
 When academic readers become entrenched over issues of what to read, they
 sidestep and become mournfully inattentive to issues of how to read.
114
Journal X, Vol. 2 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/8
242 Journal x
“Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them
 
hitting.” The sentence is the opening
 
line of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury.  
It makes little sense, literally, to talk about curling flower spaces or what lies
 between them. Explication can 
fix
 this problem, and maybe a drawing of a pair  
of curled flower stems, showing how the space bordered by the stems also curls
 (like one of those pictures of a lamp that turns out to be two profiles facing one
 another) will settle the issue once and for 
all.
 But after all that, we still have  
this confused sentence and the question: Why was it written this way? To
 demonstrate how perception can be deceiving, psychologists use the trick pic
­ture with the lamp and the twin profiles. Is Faulkner
'
s sentence meant to  
deceive? Unlike the profile/lamp, the sentence does not represent two images
 simultaneously. There is the fence, the curly spaces between the flowers, and
 the “I” who could see them hitting. More explication can help. The “I” is the
 voice of an idiot, the character Benjamin Compson, a retarded man whose per
­ceptions are thus discordant with conventional narrative methods. Of course,
 we would have to forewarn anyone who might think that Faulkner’s book is an
 accurate depiction of the consciousness of a retarded man. Such representation
 would be impossible, since only
 
the retarded man would be in a position to ver ­
ify the text and no one as retarded as Benjamin Compson can read The Sound
 and the Fury. This, then, returns us to the sentence, which, divested of mimet
­ic qualities and any test of credibility, remains senseless. We must read past the
 representational sense of the sentence toward something else.
With Faulkner, there 
is
 often the problem of making sense and the chal ­
lenge to read past this problem. Not everyone has seen it this way. Edmund
 Volpe, in A Reader’s Guide to William Faulkner, provided 
a
 number of charts,  
graphs, and genealogies to make sense of Faulkner
'
s texts. Volpe 's project has  
continued over the years, with guides, notes, interpretations, approaches, and
 book-length readings produced regularly to aid the uninitiated in making their
 way through the text.1 There are fifteen time shifts in Benjamin Compson
'
s 
narrative, and Volpe charts them. The implication is that once the reader mas
­ters the time shifts, the meaning of the text is clear. But this is not necessarily
 so. Knowing all the time shifts introduces an entirely new level of meaning to
 the text. To make schematic logic of Benjamin’s narrative is to establish a level
 of meaning that knows what the chapter, and the narrator, does not know: the
 schematic meaning of the text’s opening narrative. Clearly, even in an age when
 we do not talk about authorial intention, this text was meant to be confusing.
 If we eliminate the confusion by charting the time shifts, we are damaging the
 text no less than if we rewrote Dickens to make him more confusing: “Times
 the best it
 
was of, worst the times it was of.” Why would anyone do that? The  
revision doesn’t help clarify what happens when the text 
is
 read as written. The  
same is true of the curling flower spaces, where making sense, of the narrative
 destroys its effect and its meaning. Rather than making sense, the reader must
 read past.
Much of literary criticism proceeds in the same manner as Volpe’s famous
 
(and admittedly seductive) guidebook. The critic’s method 
is
 often “this means  
this” and “this says this but really means this” and “this 
is
 meaningless unless  
you know that and once you know that then this means this” or, ultimately, “this
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says this but really means this.” It 
is
 no wonder that the general readership for  
literary criticism — unlike that for history or the social sciences — has nearly
 disappeared. Who wants to be told what a book means? And worse, if you
 can’t know one book without reading another, why read either? “You don’t
 know about me,” announces the narrator on the first page of Mark Twain’s
 Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, “without you have read 
a
 book by the name of  
'The Adventures of Tom Sawyer,’ but that ain’t no matter.” It’s no matter
 because there is little about Huck Finn in the other book that is necessary to
 the experience of reading his emergence in the book he narrates. The self-
 defeating quality in much of literary criticism 
is
 that criticism is too often tied  
to explication — efforts to make the meaning plain are inevitably doomed to
 disposability because meaning changes with context, with readers’ sensibilities,
 and with shifting political, cultural, and social priorities. It is no wonder that
 the guidebooks keep coming, each decade making sense, again, of the tales told
 by idiots and artists. For literary studies to reassert its value in the present, it
 must get past, or read past, the meaning of texts.
To read
 
past — say, to read past a common literary theme, such as social tol ­
erance — is to experience a transformation of intellectual capacities so that the
 mimetic question, what
 
is this book about? is supplanted by the reactive, or com ­
pensatory, question, what is this book doing to me and my distracted sensibilities?
 There is no other question wholly appropriate and wholly exclusive to the lit
­erary. Consider the hypothetical example of a novel about social tolerance. To
 read past tolerance 
is
 to expiate a prior understanding — not merely to recog ­
nize one’s own thinking but to have one’s thinking suspended, distracted — 
so that the mind 
is
 cognizant of the parallel, or the literary equivalence, to the  
intellectual energies that tolerance necessitates. It may well be that a novel that
 depicts an intolerant man would be wholly beside the point. Our attention,
 then, might be more productively focused on “expressions of certain modes of
 intelligence, thought, and feeling” in the novel, expressions unavailable else
­where, in other discursive practices (Parker 38). David Parker thus directs the
 reader to attend to “the spirit, the ethos or character of a literary work’s creative
 thinking” and not to become snagged on its subject matter, its theme, or its
 mimetic qualities. What Parker is describing 
is
 a land of inattention, where one  
willfully attends not to what is literally depicted but to the cognitive energies
 and structures that produced or gave rise to the representation. This kind of
 thinking is not always polite because it is often mistaken for irrelevance or
 taken as a form of hostility toward pressing business. “Reading is a judgment,”
 according to Sven Birkirts. “It brands as insufficient the understandings and
 priorities that govern ordinary life” (85). Unless one holds that literary texts are
 simply decorative, or that the geometrical shapes serve no cognitive purpose
 either
 
in the drawing or  the repeated, daily viewing, one must confront seriously  
the mode of attention demanded by literary distraction. To enter into the world
 of the curling flower spaces, one must become inattentive to the world where
 such utterance would interfere with business or be disruptive, and .one must
 decide, for the time, that that ain’t no matter.
inattention n.
L17. [f. IN-3 + ATTENTION.]
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Failure to pay attention or take notice; heedlessness, negligence. L17.
 
Lack of courteous personal attention. L18.
The OED traces inattention to the late seventeenth century, when it signaled a
 
“failure to pay attention or take notice” and the resultant judgment of “heed
­lessness, negligence.” One hundred years later, the inattentive were judged
 more severely and held more specifically responsible for their actions, as the
 term since then has indicated “lack
 
of courteous personal attention.” Thus what  
starts as an observable human tendency (“failure to pay attention”) linked to
 irresponsibility (“negligence”), becomes, by the end of the eighteenth century, a
 form of misbehavior and a breach of etiquette 
as
 well (“lack of courteous per ­
sonal attention”). In the twentieth century, inattention has evolved into a diag
­nosable intellectual malfunction, marking its complete metamorphosis from
 tendency to pathology. Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) 
is
 a psychological  
ailment commonly associated with childhood but also diagnosable in adults.
 Current research on the disorder, however, finds that far from indicating a
 deficit, the symptoms associated with ADD may signal an excess of attention.
 “The irony is that behavior interpreted as ‘thoughtless’ probably is a result of
 too much awareness and the desire to cope” (Cherkes-Julkowski et al. 6). The
 desire to conform to expectations and to cope with felt inadequacies produces
 behavioral irregularities, such as hyperactivity. Significantly, the person with
 ADD is more comfortable in an environment characterized by rapid shifts in
 stimuli and less comfortable in environments that call for sustained attention or
 the practice of repetitive tasks (9). The disorder may well be an advance indi
­cation of human adaptation to current trends in the social and intellectual envi
­ronment. As the volume of sensory stimuli increases, the mind must spend
 more and more of its energies prioritizing its attentive capacities.
The issue, of course, involves what one ought to attend to. The processes
 
of socialization and education involve directing ones attention in socially
 acceptable,
 
preferably productive ways. It is no coincidence that issues of atten ­
tiveness should fall within the provinces of medical science in the late twenti
­eth century; the environment produced by technology makes the phenomenon
 particularly problematic, and thus “inattention” joins drinking, drug use, and
 smoking as medical
 
illnesses, not rational  social choices. Anyone  who writes on  
a Windows-based word processing and personal computing system and feels
 the need to check e-mail periodically knows that communication technology
 works at cross-purposes to the art of sustained attention to single tasks. On the
 contrary, Windows technology specifically functions against focused attention
 and actively encourages a “multi-task” desktop ecology. The use of internet
 technology to foster reading skills also acts quite explicitly against sustained
 attention, as web sources are predicated on the fact that alternatives, or linked
 texts and images, are always one mouse-click away.2 These are not incidental
 matters. Indeed, forms of attention have been recognized for decades by com
­munication scholars to lie at the very core of civilization. “Attention^ structure
 is a way of understanding social organization in terms of the structure of the
 
sys ­
tem of communication, rather than solely in terms of the nature of the signal,
 its content and behavioural effects” (Chance and Larsen 2). Hence, the divi
­
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sion of attention within social groups 
is
 fundamental to the power structure and  
future development of the social order. For example, the way in which one
'
s 
attention is deployed may define one
'
s relationship to the larger group — inat ­
tention may indicate anything from lack of concern to hostility, but it may also
 signal a position of leisured power. Similarly, the function exercised by some
 agencies to direct our attention, such as the power of news corporations and
 television broadcasts to set the agenda of public concern, far exceeds the con
­tent of any particular message conveyed. Chance and Larsen conclude that
 “[b]ecause of the central role of attention in the control and coordination of
 social behaviour, it is probable that the social organization of attention has been
 a crucial
 
factor in human evolution?
How does a literary text direct our attention? Birkirts identifies the asocial
 nature of reading, where reading is understood as an implicit rejection of the
 demands of the social world — whether it be the pressures on children to go
 play outside because it is 
a
 nice day, or on adults to interact with others or  
engage in some productive activity, such as going to the office or mowing the
 lawn. Reading 
is
 like walking alone, in Emerson s terms: “Whoso goes to walk  
alone, accuses the
 
whole world; he declares all to be unfit to be his companions;  
it 
is
 very uncivil, nay, insulting; Society will retaliate” (100). Unlike a self ­
improvement book, 
a
 gardening manual, or a study of childhood development,  
the literary text 
is
 not read to prepare for more efficient, subsequent activity.  
Literary reading is more accurately understood as studied inattention, as it
 argues implicitly for a conception of the meaningful that may discount shared
 values of efficiency, including linear conceptions of time, the privileging of
 immediate, present concerns, and the injunction that one be accountable,
 always, in one
'
s activities. When one reads literature attentively, one loses time,  
is unaware of present concerns, and is unaccountable. It 
is
 no wonder that lit ­
erary employments — reading as well as writing — are seen as an affront to
 those with schedules to attend to, or to those who seek to maintain efficiency
 standards. Society will retaliate. One cannot claim to need to know about
 Benjy
'
s curling flower spaces, or Ishmael 's whale line, in order to do one 's busi ­
ness or attend to one
'
s obligations properly. However, it is more likely that one  
cannot make these claims credibly because literary critics have not articulated
 their validity.
Reading literature mirrors the kind of social rejection necessary to the cre
­
ation of imaginative fiction. When readers engage in the forms of distraction
 demanded by the text, they participate in a ritual of inattentiveness set into the
 fiction by its creator, its author. The twentieth century has not always proved
 so hospitable to literary distraction. On the eve of the century, Sarah Orne
 Jewett envisioned the quest for literary space as one that involved travel to the
 more remote regions of geographical consciousness. In The Country of the
 Pointed Firs (1896), a woman travels to Maine in order to find “all that mixture
 of remoteness, and childish certainty of being the centre of civilization” (5) that
 makes reading and writing possible. Hunting seclusion, she goes to Dunnet
 Landing to escape the social
 
world and find the privacy and certainty necessary  
to artistic creation. However, when she arrives she becomes enmeshed in the
 community through her landlady’s herb business and thus must struggle to cre
­ate space for inattention:
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To have been patted kindly on the shoulder and called “darlin’,” to have
 
been offered a surprise of early mushrooms for supper, to have had all the
 glory of making two dollars and twenty-seven cents in a single day, and
 then to renounce it all and withdraw from these pleasant successes, needed
 much resolution. Literary employments are so vexed with uncertainties at
 best, and it
 
was not until the voice of conscience sounded louder in my ears  
than the sea on the nearest pebble beach that I said unkind words of with
­drawal to Mrs. Todd. She only became more wistfully affectionate than
 ever in her expressions, and looked as disappointed as I expected when I
 frankly told her that I could no longer enjoy the pleasure of what
 




The act of committing oneself to literary employments is explicitly unkind: it
 
shows a willed lack of consideration for others and represents a breaking with
 the social rewards that come from attentiveness. Reading past the predicament
 of the writer in Jewett’s passage, past the entangling seductions of the immedi
­ate world (being someone’s darlin
'
, sharing supper, making $2.27), we find that  
literary employments are made possible by renunciation, withdrawal, and reso
­lution. Furthermore, these acts of unkindness and resolve are issued in order to
 gain entry into a world of certainty (although a certainty precariously vexed by
 uncertainty), and so naturally, it would seem, the recipients of these acts would
 misconstrue them and suffer the kind of disappointment experienced by the
 abandoned Mrs. Todd.




those forms of behavior produced by literary modes of thought. One  
cannot plead human nature here, which seems to be social. On the contrary,
 literary employments are located outside the natural inclinations of human
 beings and within the proclivities of conscious effort. Literary employments
 thus renounce natural connections, from the transcendent human identification
 with such natural forces as the sea to the sensual pleasures of being loved, cared
 for, and needed by someone else. To attend to the book, one must renounce the
 world at hand for the “uncivil” world of the distracted mind. The impulse
 places the imagination at the core of consciousness, 
as
 it was in childhood,  
before knowledge made its inroads and adult provisionality replaced the child’s
 sense of being securely centered. With creative energies at the core and not at
 the fringe, the imagination is temporarily restored to a position of conscious
 dominance while the book is read and contemplated. Freed from the recipro
­cal obligations of
 
sensual, interpersonal attentions, the imagination returns to  
its primary function, which is to provide the self with its pleasured sense of
 security and reality. When the “lover of Dunnet Landing returned to find the
 unchanged shores of the pointed firs,” she returns like a reader to a book, and
 discovers something constant about herself.
Still, the price of discovery is the act of unkindness that makes literary
 
employment possible. In Jewett’s novel, the narrator renounces her home in
 New York for Dunnet Landing, and then must renounce Dunnet Landing for
 a one-room schoolhouse, where she sets up her writing desk. The gradually
 more severe renunciation signals the obstacles that the twentieth century would
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place before literary employments, as “Dunnet Landing” would become
 
increasingly more difficult to locate on the psychic landscape. The need to pay
 attention — to broadcasts, motorists, and communication devices — exacts a
 continuously rising price on imaginative impulses and foreshortens the amount
 of time when the imagination rules consciousness. While childhood shrinks,
 adolescence is lengthened, and this protracted period of powerless attentiveness
 results in a range of anxieties, social disorders, and learning disabilities. Chron
­ic inattentiveness is tolerated in childhood only, although what it represents to
 the mind is necessary to all of us. Of course, reading is only one form, perhaps
 the most difficult and most encompassing form, of distraction. Television,
 magazines, sporting events, video games, the internet: these are all forms of
 distraction in which the imagination is only partially ascendant, where atten
­tion is divided but not obliterated, so as to allow the maintenance of social
 obligations. Nonetheless, the popularity of such forms of partial inattention
 indicates the limited satisfaction provided by continuously paying attention.
In a remarkable book devoted to the mysteries of attention, James Hans
 
explains the “psychic economy that depends on inattention”:
If we say that we need inattention because we require states of being that
 
take us away from the anxiety of living, we are conceding that the burdens
 of being a self-aware creature are too great for us to bear for any length of
 time. And if we see the ways that our desire for inattention has created a
 series of
 
social forms that are designed to take our minds off of  our anxi ­
eties, then we can see how the two coalesce to provide us with a life that
 inclines toward inattention rather than full awareness. (34)
The extraordinary burdens of self-awareness can be and are relieved in count
­
less ways, some of which are physically debilitating. Tremendous resources are
 expended on forms of attention — education, preparation, development of
 skills — but when it comes to inattention, most people are on their own or at
 the mercy of entertainment industries, drug dealers, and liquor stores. The fact
 is that educational institutions fail to attend systematically to modes of inat
­tention because, like Cather
'
s critics in the 1930s, they equate inattention with  
escapism, and escapism with irresponsibility. The cliff-dwelling women need
­ed to apply geometrical patterns to their earthenware just as, in Hans’s words,
 we need inattention because we concede “that the burdens of being a self-aware
 creature are too great for us to bear for any length of time.” And more than
 that: we concede that if we are to go on toting water up the hill we are going
 to have to get past the drudgery of attending to the task. We move with dis
­traction past our predicament and turn inattention into art — we require inat
­tention as a mode of survival. Distraction is more than a form of anxiety
 release; it 
is
 a crucial component of the solution to a psychic dilemma as old as  
human recording. “Why are we here?” 
is
 always, in part, answered by, “So we  
do not have to be here.” The relation between the two heres is the province of
 literature. Distraction, even coarse forms such as mass entertainment and alco
­hol, is never mindless; on the contrary, it is an escape from frittering mindless
­ness, 
a
 mindful compensation for the dullness that enforced attentiveness pro ­
duces, achieved through pleasured inattention to its sources and causes.
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The heedlessness and negligence of inattention, and the departure from
 
social modes of courteous attention represented by literary endeavors, provide
 the grounds upon which we may begin to defend what it 
is
 we mean by the  
value of literary study. Formalist criticism has long argued the capacity of lit
­erature to defamiliarize the real, to make it strange, as a preparation for renewed
 insight and greater understanding of reality. Social criticism values works of the
 imagination as lenses into the complexities of race and gender, historical forces
 and class structures. The two modes of analysis — formal and social — have
 been pitted against each other through most of the twentieth century, although
 both share a devotion to imaginative structures of knowledge. Distraction
 floats past all of these categories of analysis, like the student whose gaze directs
 his face outside, through the window in the schoolroom, although he 
is
 not  
looking at anything and nothing has his attention. It is the teacher, not the stu
­dent, who labels such inattentiveness discourtesy. Genuine inattention does not
 signify the absence of interest or even the presence of disinterest; rather, what
 we assign 
as
 inattention more likely signals an excessive intake, like sleeping  
scholars in midnight library carrels. To dismiss such actions as forms of negli
­gence is to burn the book, as it were, as an evil influence or inappropriate stim
­ulant. The literary tradition in all of its evocations and critical paradigms is, at
 base, the verbal manifestation of the human need for modes of distraction.
 Labeled “escapist” by those with authoritarian agendas, the need to pay atten
­tion where it yields the most pleasurable cognitive return is at the heart of the
 literary experience. Distraction 
is
 serious business, representing more than dis ­
courtesy. Our management experts, our social scientists of every stripe, would
 like the world to be a courteous and heedful place where rules govern human
 behavior — except for an occasional, structured retreat or brainstorming ses
­sion. But the world is influenced more by its record of inattention than by its
 commitment to any particular intellectual regime. According to the OED, dis
­traction signals a change in direction:
distraction n.
LME. [(O)Fr., or L distractio(n-), f. as DISTRACT v.: see-ION.]
Diversion of the mind, attention, etc., from a particular object or
 
course; the  
fact of having ones attention or concentration disturbed by something;
 amusement, relaxation. LME.
An instance or occasion of this; something that distracts or
 
diverts the mind  
or attention; distracting sounds, events, etc. E17.
The fact or condition of being physically or mentally drawn in different
 
directions by conflicting forces or emotions. 
L16.
The best of what we read — and here we come upon core issues of canon
 
formation — specifically addresses our attention-paying capacities. The realm
 of the imagination is contested space because all social reality
 
flows from it, and  
all social potentiality depends upon it. Unless one considers the world a par
­adise and desires no changes, all distraction, including literary representation,
 will be of signal importance. However, it is not mimesis that interests me but
 the structure of distraction built into the text. The strong women-centered
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community in Jewett’s novel does not, finally, gain the attention so much as the
 
equation of that community with remoteness and renunciation, suggesting the
 ways in which the world of the writer has been defined as 
a
 distracted, absent ­
ed, male world, closer to that of the sailor than that of his wife. Reading past
 representation, we come upon the cognitive links of imaginative attention and
 witness the recasting of the world that renunciation brings to the fore. Like a
 lost vessel, drifting is a necessary prelude to the redefinition of one
'
s sense of  
direction. And there is no greater pleasure than the sense of floating above,
 transcending physical and intellectual confinement, and starting or becoming
 anew.
At one point in Willa Cather’s novel, My Ántonia, the narrator, Jim Bur
­
den, agrees to sleep where Ántonia Shimerda is house-sitting because she has
 become fearful of Wick Cutter, the man who owns the house. She fears for her
 physical safety. During the third night that Burden is sleeping in the Cutters’
 house, the man returns, ostensibly to rape Ántonia. “A hand closed softly on my shoulder,” Jim reports, “and at the same moment I felt something hairy and
 cologne-scented brushing my face.” When Cutter discovers Jim has replaced
 Ántonia, he 
is
 enraged and begins choking and beating Jim. After the beating,  
Jim runs back home and goes to sleep.
Grandmother found me there in the morning. Her cry of fright awakened
 
me. Truly, I was a battered object. As she helped me to my room, I caught
 a glimpse of myself in the mirror. My lip was cut
 
and stood out like a snout.  
My nose looked like a big blue plum, and one eye was swollen shut and
 hideously discolored. Grandmother said we must have the doctor at once,
 but I implored her, as I never begged for anything before, not to send for
 him. I could stand anything, I told her, so long as nobody saw me or knew
 what happened to me. (189)
As for Ántonia, Jim testifies that he “hated her almost as much as I hated Cut
­
ter. She had let me in for all this
 
disgustingness.” Properly explicated, this  
scene 
is
 read as a classic reversal of roles. Hence, we witness the education of  
Jim Burden, as he learns about what he calls the disgustingness of the aftermath
 of a rape — the quality of degenerated self-awareness that follows sexual
 assault. Jim is thoroughly feminized by the experience, even to the point of
 worrying “what the old men down at the drug-store” would say about it all.
To what extent can 
a
 man take the place of a woman, have her experiences,  
know the world as she knows it? These are not uncomplicated questions. My
 Ántonia 
is
 written from the perspective of Jim Burden, the male narrator and  
substitute rape victim. And although Jim takes Willa Cather’s place in this
 novel, critics have differed in their reactions to this literary device (see for
 instance Donovan; Fetterly; and Lambert). Can a woman write through the
 perspective of a male narrative voice, and if she does, is her male voice really a
 female voice masquerading as male? The issue 
is
 foregrounded in a brief intro ­
duction that forms part of the novel, where yet another narrator (frequently
 understood as Cather herself) claims to have received the manuscript of “My
 Ántonia” from Jim Burden. But Jim Burden is a fictional creation of Willa
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Cather, a product of her imagination. Readers encountering the novel for the
 
first time often wonder, 
is
 this really something that was given to Cather —  
that is, did she not write this herself? The question is a good one. The novel
 begs its readers to read past gender, past the facts of “herself,” and to pose the
 question: If I had that body, and that set of experiences, what would the world
 look like and feel like to me?
Jims response to his experience is heavily coded as female, as if he had been
 
made into a woman by the assault on his physical 
self.
 The formal strategy  
Cather employs in this novel, where the male narrative voice gives her the text,
 and the text is informed by his voice, and the voice in turn becomes Cather
'
s 
text, must be read past in order to be comprehended fully. If a man could take
 a
 
womans place, in the logic of the Burden/Cutter scene, if he could experience  
the world as she experiences it, he would act and react as she does. Further
­more, the “if” 
is
 easily removed from the previous statement  when the man (or  
the woman) 
is
 willing to suspend his sense of himself and enter into the expe ­
rience of another, imaginatively. Our experiences author us, in other words,
 including those experiences we have when we are inattentive to our daily lives.
 These speculations are enforced by Cather’s own effort in the novel to read past
 her female self and imagine, in the narrative, the male voice. The assault
 
on Jim  
is a restoration of the original reversal, where Cather becomes the male narra
­tor, and then the male narrator becomes the female victim.
The costs incurred in not attending to who we are may be psychically
 
severe. As Stanley Aronowitz reminds us, “loyalty to the nation-state, conven
­tionally tied to the meaning of citizenship itself, 
is
 shifted to subculture or gen ­
der, often taken as subculture” (62). Literary study in today’s classroom does,
 and always has done, the work of political culture, particularly
 
by the process of  
reading for recognition. Readers wish to see themselves — their sexuality, their
 race, their people — reflected in what they read; and, if possible, they prefer to
 see themselves as they would like to be: articulate, consequential, recognized.
 If the course of study is American literature and I am an American, I (or some
­one like me) ought to be recognizable on the syllabus. What Cather’s text does
 
is
 to question this method of reading. Who recognizes Jim Burden, the male  
or the female reader? The males will say, that’s not me because the female
 author cannot know my experiences, even if she calls her narrator “Jim.” The
 female reader will say, that’s not me because this particular female author must
 mask herself as “Jim” and I am not so masked. But once the literary mode of
 cognition abandons the ability to attend to matters outside its physical bound
­aries, it has little left that exceeds confession.
As we come to accept, with increasingly less reflection, the social equation
 
of reading and recognition, we lose sight of the fundamental value of the liter
­ary experience, which has only partially and pot always to do with recognition
 of one’s own nonliterary existence. I do not mean that literature must decenter
 us, or make the familiar strange, or expand our horizons, or make us more sen
­sitive to others — well, I mean all of these formalist things, of course, but also
 something more. My refrain: Literary study 
is
 the study of how one reads past.  
It is not the study of maleness, or the study of the female voice, or the study of
 any particularly decentered representation or estranged reception of reality but
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the study of how one reads past every one of these phenomena to the structures
 
of cognition that produce and sustain them. In My Ántonia, Willa Cather
 escaped the confines of gender as an unproblematic determinant of artistic pro
­duction — that is, she enveloped the voice of the male and spoke it back.
 Cather
'
s escape, no matter how we assess it, brings the pleasurable prospect of  
our own escape from confinement.
The most difficult thing for the human mind to envision is another mode
 
of thought, a mode of consciousness that will render its own thought processes
 obsolete. And yet, historically, we know that such paradigm shifts have
 occurred with epochal regularity. Today’s common sense evolves into the next
 eras idiocy, when what we accept as articulate expression is reinterpreted as
 bobbing, moaning, and slobbering. “Books that exceed our customary uses of
 language can teach us not just new facts — something
 
we did not already know  
— but new forms of life: something we did not necessarily know we wanted or
 needed to know (Carafiol 168). Peter Carafiol claims that such books “do not
 change the world. They are changes in the world that prompt changes in the
 reader.” My Ántonia is something of an intrusion, 
a
 work of fiction whose fic-  
tionality includes not only the circumstances of its emergence but the assaults
 it made upon the mind of its author. Reading past its narrative incidents and
 details brings us to a realm where experience and essence cross. The relation
 between Jim Burden and Willa Cather lies between the curling flower spaces of
 our imaginative capacities, within the ellipses of consciousness, in the spaces
 left out of the current configuration of human perception and articulation.
Dilsey says of the Compson landholdings, “We aint got the room we use to
 
have.” One must travel to far-off places, further than Dunnet Landing, for a
 psychic landscape that has room for Benjamin Compson. As a result, Dilsey
 says, Benjamin “cant stay out in the yard, crying where all the neighbors can see
 him” (60). The closing in of private space (or the expansion of the public,
 mediated community) and the increasingly insistent demands to pay attention,
 make Benjamins voice intrusive on others who don’t want to attend to its wail.
 The meaning of human speech changes with every shift in context, and what 
is a sympathetic plea in one set of circumstances becomes a pathetic annoyance in
 another. Rodney King asks, “Why can’t we just get along?” after his beating by
 Los Angeles police, and the utterance eventually becomes a trope for clueless
­ness on the comedy club and morning radio circuit. What Benjamin Compson
 says, what he has to say, is of no value to the neighbors, even if they
 
were to be  
told about all time and injustice and sorrow and all voiceless misery under the
 sun. The neighbors just don’t want to know about it, don’t want their inatten
­tion filled that way because, as we know, Benjy is pretty disgusting and the
 change in the world represented by his voice 
is
 not pleasant.
Literary texts, despite the private nature pf reading them, are public docu
­ments, and they inspire and inform public discourse. The detail of the Comp
­son neighbors not appreciating Benjamin’s wail signals an ethical issue to the
 reader: should Benjamin be hidden away? The guidebooks make it clear that
 at the very least, he must be explained away, so that the reader’s attention 
is
 not  
piqued to the point of exhaustion by the narrative’s formulaic uncertainty. The
 neighbors are well within their rights to demand a quiet neighborhood; cer-
124
Journal X, Vol. 2 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/8
252 Journal x
tainly, readers of the text will demand the same from their own neighbors. The
 
ethical issue has nothing to do with the neighbors, finally, but with Benjamin
 and his narrative. What is to be done with the man who is a completely aso
­cial, noncomprehending, inarticulate, compulsively needy sibling, whose words
 require that we read another book to make sense of them? Caddy hugs him but
 leaves him; Quentin gets him drunk; Dilsey feeds him; Jason has him castrated
 and committed. Each act, alone, and in certain combinations, represents a
 social option, and each act mirrors a critical intervention. However, in order
 truly to make room for Benjamin Compson, we need to resist every effort to
 rationalize his discourse. We must renounce every hug, drink, and incision
 available to us as readers; Benjamin cannot be absorbed, obliterated, or edited
 to suit the structure of thought we bring to bear on his textual existence.
Literary encounters provoke intellectual restructuring. Martha Nussbaum
 
has found literary texts useful on law school reading lists because “[literature
 focuses on the possible, inviting its readers to wonder about themselves” (5).
 Nussbaum 
is
 not thinking about subject matter so much as the more formal  
aspects of literary texts. “In their very mode of address to their imagined read
­
er,
 they convey the sense that there are links of possibility, at least on a very gen ­
eral level, between the characters and the reader.” As a result of these affinities,
 the reader's speculative imagination 
is
 piqued to envision alternative modes of  
being: what would it be like to be Benjamin Compson, and in what ways are
 we like him already? The imagination of alternatives 
is
 vital to the practice of  
law and to the health of a democracy in general,
 
which is why  Nussbaum brings  
literary texts to the preprofessional legal curriculum. “The reader
'
s emotions  
and imagination are very active as a result,” Nussbaum concludes, “and it is the
 nature of this activity, and its relevance for public thinking” that merit critical
 scrutiny. The capacity of literary study to lead the mind toward breaking
 through barriers of thinking, to make more space where it seems “we aint got
 the room,” is the pleasure of the well-flung harpoon, or the perfectly wrought
 earthenware jug.
Faulkner’s novel is difficult to read and requires sustained attention; or,
 
more accurately, it requires periodic inattention. The reader must interrupt
 reading the novel and consider what sort of sense to make of it. There comes
 a point where “we aint got the room” and we, as thinking subjects, must divert
 our attention from the spasmodic narrative. The Sound and the Fury seems
 aware of
 
the demands it makes on human attention because it structures dis ­
traction into its narrative. Consider the following passage, in which Quentin
 Compson 
is
 fighting (unsuccessfully) with his sister 's lover:
I hit him my open hand beat the impulse to shut it to his face his hand
 
moved as fast as mine the cigarette went over the rail I swung with the
 other hand he caught it too before the cigarette reached the water he held
 both my wrists in the same hand his other hand flicked to his armpit under
 his coat behind him the sun slanted and a bird singing somewhere beyond
 the sun we looked at one another while the bird singing he turned my
 hands loose (160)
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The bird evoked at the end of the passage signals a lack of room in Quentins
 
mind, and a need to think past his predicament. His sister Caddy is pregnant
 by this man, Dalton Ames, and Quentin wants to run him out of town because
 of it. However, Ames proves to be a considerate lover, asking about Caddy, and
 for all we know he has no interest in deserting her. Furthermore, Quentin is
 not up to the task of physically forcing the man to do anything, as seen in the
 passage above. At the point when Quentin 
is
 “caught” (with both wrists held  
in one of Ames’s hands) his mind departs from the immediate situation and he
 
is
 distracted by “a bird singing somewhere beyond the sun.” Hence, Quentin is  
not paying attention to his immediate business with Dalton Ames. With the
 bird in mind, Quentin has the potential to read past his predicament, realizing
 what he must do to survive, if not prevail, in this circumstance. And so “we
 looked at one another while the bird singing he turned my hands loose.”
 Quentin doesn’t quite make it, by the way — he soon assaults Ames again and
 is subdued, again gently, by the kind lover, who leaves quietly to save Quentin




I leaned on the rail looking at the water I heard him untie the horse and
 
ride off and after a while I couldn’t hear anything but the water and then
 the bird again I left the bridge and sat down with my back against the tree
 and shut my eyes a patch of sun came through and fell across my eyes and
 I moved a little further around the tree I heard the bird again and the water
 and then everything sort of rolled away and I didn
'
t feel anything at all I felt  
almost good . . . after a while I knew that he hadn
'
t hit me that he had lied  
about that for her sake too and that I had just passed out
 
like a girl but even  
that didn
'
t matter anymore (162; ellipsis added)
I would equate Quentin’s attention to the bird with the reader’s attention to lit
­
erature and with the potential for
 
public thinking held by literary studies. In a 
bind, such 
as
 finding out that the villain is no blackguard, or trying to fight and  
finding the opponent is not only more powerful than you but also does not con
­sider you an enemy and has no interest in fighting, the mind has some options.
 It can shut down in despair. It can go on fighting, insisting that the enemy
 become an enemy (at one point Ames offers Quentin a pistol), making the fight
 itself the point of contention, rather than the issue which gave rise to the con
­frontation. Or the mind can depart, read past its predicament to something
 else, another level of consciousness, through the fictional to a structure of con
­sciousness capable of transcendence. In short, it may decide not to pay atten
­tion for a while — to be distracted, that is, by its desire for pleasure even in the
 midst of turmoil, secure in the knowledge that distraction (“diversion of the
 mind, attention, etc., from 
a
 particular object or course”) may in fact be the  
solution.
The value of literary study is precisely in the function of reading past the
 
necessary and mechanical depictions of the real and providing room for readers
 to do the same. The solution to an intellectual problem is seldom located in the
 kind of thinking that produced the problem in the first place. Academic liter-
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ature programs maintain their place in higher education because, frankly, of
 
their irrelevance to the research and teaching objectives of preprofessional cur
­ricula. Like Quentin’s bird, literary studies are there for the attention of those
 who realize, finally, that the human mind is nurtured very much by what it does
 not need to know. Reading past Tie Sound and the Fury, we find that when
 faced with an incontrovertible fact, a barrier, an unresolvable problem, the
 answer is to look elsewhere, past the immediate toward the irrelevant — per
­haps to engage another sense, another source of pleasure. Literature distracts;
 it directs our attention elsewhere, as a release from the confinements of yester
­day’s insight, the hands of Dalton Ames, the body of Ántonia Shimerda. From
 such constraints we crave the pleasures of distraction, to be “physically or men
­tally drawn in different directions by conflicting forces or emotions,” to enter
 the realm between the curling flower spaces of our expectations.
Then again, there 
is
 some danger in this process. Quentin Compson, who  
hears the song of the invisible bird, goes to Harvard, where he ultimately com
­mits suicide. Is literary studies a parlor game, or do we face danger when we
 ask minds to read past their predicament? In Sanctuary, Faulkner juxtaposes
 the killer’s gun and reader’s book in the novel’s opening scene, where a man





was about four oclock on an afternoon in May. They squatted so, fac ­
ing one another across the spring, for two hours. Now and then the bird
 sang back in the swamp, 
as
 though it were worked by a clock; twice more  
invisible automobiles passed along the highroad and died away. Again the
 bird sang. (5)




each from four until six p.m. The reader is quite likely to ignore it. How ­
ever, if we read
 
past the duration, we have two unlikely details juxtaposed. First,  
there is the two-hour encounter. But the second and even less credible repre
­sented fact is that the one man’s gun is checked, or held in abeyance, by the
 other man’s book. The incomprehensible nature of the encounter amounts to
 an overloaded set of stimuli — there isn’t room in the mind to make sense of it
 — and rather than attend to the encounter, we attend to the sound of the bird,
 and note its clockishness. The province of literature is in the bird’s song, and
 when we read, in attentive inattention, it 
is
 always a face-off, while the bird  
singing, within someone else's powers of cognition. The particulars of repre
­sentation, whether of Dunnet Landing or Yoknapatawpha County, are sec
­ondary and often irrelevant to the processes of creation and escape embedded
 in the modes of attention demanded by the text. In any case, it is always the
 book versus the gun, the lure of distraction in a standoff against those stimuli
 that demand our attention.
The result of attending to the song of this bird may lead to deaths of all
 
kinds — the death of certain ways of thinking, the death of solidly held con
­victions, the death of impassable thoughts — not all of which are, by progres
­sive standards, bad things. Like a bird sent into 
a
 mineshaft, we look to it as a  
harbinger of survival. However, there are no guarantees. Literary studies has
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no programmatic mission outside of making room in the mind. Hence, liter
­
ary politics are always chaotic, unsystematic, and volatile, while literary study
 — the experience of making room in the mind — brings pleasure to those who
 can read its language. It feels good to clear space, to engage those senses dulled
 by attentiveness, to engage in studied distraction. However, once room is made,
 what moves in is not predictable. Reading literary texts makes the mind vul
­nerable to potential assault as well as to potential liberation. Unkind words may
 and often do result from literary employments. Once we have imagined our
­selves as someone else, as Jim Burden perhaps, or once we have let someone or
 something else control our cognitive processes, we may find our moorings
 revealed as whale lines, linked to monstrosities. A simple gesture, innocent as
 the bird’s song, is thus revealed in the reading
 
of it as participating in something  
demonic, in the destruction of worlds. Quentin, at Harvard, managed to read
 past his sense of himself as brother, to lover, and then to victim; he then, as
 Quentin, ceased to exist. “So we die before our own eyes,” Jewett’s narrator
 says, 
as
 she leaves Dunnet Landing; “so we see some chapters of our lives come  
to their natural end” (100). Reading literature 
is
 always a judgment on the real.  
To choose the novel over the newspaper, over the book of nonfiction, or over
 the television (which, even if fantasy, is punctuated regularly with commercial
 calls to attention), is to say No to the actual and Yes (as it were) to the bird’s
 song, beyond the sun. So we choose to die before our own eyes. But even if
 nature will not suffice, our most durable myths tell us that from death comes
 new life.
The habit of reading past can be taught, but only if literary pedagogy
 
remains distinct from most other forms of teaching, forms that rely upon the
 importation of knowledge, and upon making clear what is to be known. Liter
­ary
 
study is often sabotaged by instructional methods that call upon students to  
read texts as sociological or psychological cases, or 
as
 formalist or linguistic  
puzzles. These methods barely read, let alone read past, their texts. As profes
­sors of literature, we would serve our interests better if we claimed to teach
 methods of distraction. The feeling of Friday afternoon to the nine-to-five
 worker, the anticipation of the bell to the public school child, the embrace of
 the infant after the absence of the parent, the lover’s eyes across crowded pub
­lic spaces: these are the pleasures of welcomed distraction, promising escape
 from here and access to another level of existence, where muted senses are
 brought back to life. The purpose of literary study is to make room in the mind
 now for such pleasures of renewal, so that it can read past what it knows, or 
is expected to know, and migrate to other cognitive structures of knowledge.
The title character of Bharati Mukherjee’s 1989 novel, Jasmine, narrates a
 
tale of immigration to the United States from India. Jasmine arrives in Flori
­da and is raped by a degenerate figure called Half-Face, whom she kills. She
 then flees to New York, becomes an au pair (and falls in love with Taylor, the
 father in the family for whom she works), and finally moves again to Iowa,
 where she lives with a paraplegic man named Bud. The novel culminates, on
 its last page, in a scene where Taylor reappears with his daughter to take Jas
­mine to California. This is the novel’s final paragraph:
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Then there is nothing I can do. Time will tell if I am a tornado, rubble
­
maker, arising from nowhere and disappearing into a cloud. I am out the
 door and in the potholed and rutted driveway, scrambling ahead of Taylor,
 greedy with wants and reckless from hope.
By its placement in the text, it would seem that the conclusion to the novel is
 
Jasmines decision to move again, to leave Bud for Taylor. The novel, however,
 is not written in a linear fashion. Instead, its narrative proceeds kaleidoscopi-
 cally, with scenes from India, Florida, New York, and Iowa interspersed, mak
­ing a text that is “pitted, pocked, and broken up,” according to its epigraph.
 Furthermore, at the end of the first chapter, the narrator explains, "I am twen
­ty-four now, and I live in Baden County, Iowa” (3), 
as
 if the novel were about  
to unfold from this particular perspective. However, if Jasmine 
is
 twenty-four  
and in Iowa “now,” at the novel’s writing, then where exactly
 is
 the “now” of the  
text’s conclusion? The last paragraph casts her "out the door” and “scrambling
 ahead of Taylor,” off to a place that will not be Baden, Iowa. Hence, what fol
­lows Iowa 
is
 the only perspective from which the entire novel, including the  
conclusion, can be written. Otherwise, the “now” of the first chapter must be
 ignored.




s novel cogitates on what it ever means to say, “I am this old now  
and I live here.” The text thus echoes Cather
'
s Southwest Native American  
women, whose now was filled with geometrical expressions of the aesthetics of
 their duties as pot bearers. Jasmine
'
s sense of now overflows with greedy wants  
and reckless hopes. Like Platos concept of becoming, the now of Mukherjee’s
 novel is eternally and defiantly emergent, and “there 
is
 nothing [anyone] can  
do” about it. To Mukherjee, one answer to the question, “why are we here now”
 (living here; toting here; whaling here; listening to the bird
'
s song here) is 
always, “so we do not have to be here now.” The pleasure of escape is eternal
­ly on the tip of human consciousness, and always the subject matter of literary
 expression, for those who can read its language.
Literary modes of thought expand commonsense notions of the now, and
 
extend the content of now as cognitive space. The now of reading is always
 elsewhere, else-when, distracted. If, in Jasmine, time will tell what the final
 paragraph means, then the paragraph defies mimetic significance, as there 
is
 no  
time past the ending of any novel. The narrator says, “I am twenty-four now,
 and I live in Baden, Iowa,” and the novel ends with the narrator no longer liv
­ing there. Hence, the entire novel consists of a geometrically, or spatially
 extended now, as if a moment of intense decision can encompass a
 
lifetime. Jas ­
mine s decision to abandon Bud (made even more pivotal by the fact she 
is pregnant) is charted and prefigured by twenty-four years of abandonment,
 reversal, and trauma. Reading past any moral or ethical reading of Jasmine’s
 decision to leave the father of her unborn child (as if a fictional character could
 exercise judgment worthy of anyone’s contemplation), Jasmine enriches our
 sense of what we mean by now whenever we consider its meaning. Far from
 being emptied, far from a blip between one’s sense of the future and one’s past,
 between desire and memory, Mukherjee’s now 
is
 spatially resonant, “greedy  
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with wants and reckless from hope.” A major decision 
is
 thus explained neither  
ethically nor morally 
(as
 in, "one does not desert ones lover”) but geometrical ­
ly, by placing the cognitive process on a chart of personal experiences — expe
­riences which are always possessed as the defining characteristics of one
'
s sense  
of now.
Literary critics use the present tense when they discuss texts, because liter
­
ary enactment always exists in the present, in the now. Benjamin Compson
 moans and slobbers eternally, and holds the jimson weed for comfort. In the
 now, with Jasmine, are Benjamin Compson, Jim Burden and Ántonia Shimer-
 da, the
 
whale line, Dunnet  Landing, Quentin 's bird, Popeye’s gun, and the curl ­
ing flower spaces. In a prolonged and extensive now
 is
 where literary texts place  
the minds of those who can read their language, not in the name of attending to
 the present, but with the purpose of exploring underneath, beyond, and past it.
 And
 
what else is pleasure, but a heightened sense of one 's existence, in the now?  
Drugs and alcohol, for centuries, have aided human beings in their quest to
 expand experience — and specific narcotics have influenced more than one lit
­erary movement in history. Sexual pleasures awaken bodily sensations, held in
 check by a cerebral civilization whose purposes are complicated by physicality.
 Such distractions cannot be incorporated by demands for attention — don’t
 drink and drive, and don’t read and drive — but neither can the pleasures they
 represent be expunged from human impulses. Literary study cannot abandon
 the pleasures of inattention without abdicating its essence 
as
 a tradition — not  
as a canon but as a mode of thought. For once we read past historical fiction,
 science fiction, comedy, tragedy, romanticism, and the rest, the single, universal
 object of literary study is the present in all its limitlessness and expansion. Any
­thing less trivializes our lives as literary scholars and trivializes the purpose of
 literary study. Above all else, we read literature to extend the present, to fill the
 now 
as
 fully as possible, paying no attention to the tendency of human institu ­
tions to trivialize the now by insisting that memory or management define it
 essentially. In the literary now, between the curling flower spaces, time will
 always tell what
 
it  is we get when we make room for the greedy wants and reck ­
less desires of literary employments. This is what feels right, feels good.
First comes Benjamin Compson, in other words, full of sound and fury, and
 
then comes puzzled attention, as when Caddy comes running with her book
­satchel and listens to what Benjy has to say. The strength of such literary
 encounters has always resided, ultimately, in the mode of thought resurrected
 on the page.
“Did you come to meet Caddy.” she said, rubbing my hands. “What 
is 
it. What are you trying to tell Caddy.” Caddy smelled like trees and like
 when she says we were asleep.
What are you moaning about, Luster said. You can watch them again when
 
we get back to the branch. Here. Here's you a jimson weed. He gave me the
 flower. We went through the fence, into the lot. (6)
What do we want to say, what do we moan about, when we become so dis
­
tracted we read past the page? Literary recognition is not a matter of mirrored
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reflection but an abrupt encounter with something we thought we had lost,
 
some way of thinking possessed by someone else, in another place, at some
 other time. In the text something survives, coarse and poisonous, like the jim-
 son weed, or playfully welcomed, like the jouncing booksatchel, dogging us
 through the fence and into the realm of public thinking. When we accustom
 our minds to the patterns on the earthenware pots, we find ourselves reading
 past the function of the jars, escaping into the realm of what tugs at the lines,
 and, while the bird singing, finding what provides when we become heedless,




Among the examples: Hahn and Kinney; Ross and Polk; Matthews;  
Polk; Bloom; Kinney; Bleikasten; Meriwether; and Cowan.
2.
 
This has become a problem in the workplace. See, for example, Breuer.  
It is also an issue with the growing move to allow employees to work at home.
 See Roha.
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